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FROM THE BEQUEST OF

JAMES WALKER, D.D., LL.D.

(Class of 1814)

FORMER PRESIDENT OF HARVARD COLLEGE

"Preference being given to works in the Intellectual and Moral Sciences"

THE WILL

AND ITS

WORLD.

PSYCHICAL AND ETHICAL.

BY

DENTON J. SNIDER.

ST. LOUIS, MO.:
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Evil . . . . . .
Virtue . . . . . .

INTRODUCTION.

Another book on the Will; the subject cannot settle itself and get quiet, as it ought, after having produced so much controversy. Moreover, the whole work turns upon Free Will as its center and pivot — that Free Will which in recent years has so often been supposed to be an old worn-out coat belonging to the past, and unworthy of even being looked at by any man with modern ideas.

Still the matter will not sink itself out of sight at the bidding of science or of any other authority, and there is no final resting-place in this as in so many other things. Each generation, and in some degree each man born into the world, has to fight anew the battle of Free Will, which is verily the soul of every kind of freedom, moral,

...g a long time theology was
scene of this conflict, and the Churc
upon the lines of Necessitarianism and I
anism; but the past generation has see
kind of Necessitarianism arising, that of
science, which has leaped into the aren
mighty flourish of trumpets, loudly proc
the defeat and total disappearance of Fr
from the face of the earth, and triumj
pointing to its last evanishment down t
devouring throat of unalterable, irresistibl
Such a proclamation is made with great
ance and even haughtiness by the philo
of science, Mr. Herbert Spencer (and it
peated in chorus by a large number of h
ciples); it is he who declares, in his well-
treatise on Psychology, that Free Will i
of "an illusion," and therewith dismisse
temptuously the whole subject, disdaini
discuss it at any length in his rather
book

5th ed., p. 66). This famous moral teacher, accordingly, gives us much instruction in a morality which has no need of freedom, and seeks to unfold a responsibility which has no connection with the liberty of choice. So he is going to make "no decision" upon this subject, but will get along somehow without entering upon the exceedingly vexatious discussion of Free Will. It is not an easy, still a very necessary task, one may well think. This utterance of Prof. Sidgwick, which seems to have in it the note of despair, has been oftener cited than any other opinion in his book probably, so characteristic is it as an echo of the worried thought of the present age. "The conflict of arguments" between the two opposing sides is indeed wearisome, and frequently profitless; but what if there be a different way of winning the fortress of Free Will? It may here be added that another equally distinguished writer on Ethics, Dr. James Martineau (*Types of Ethical Theory*, 3rd ed., Vol. II., p. 42), emphatically protests against such a "neutral" position in ethical science on the subject of Free Will, as that which has just been considered.

It is an amusing fact that the very words in which Free Will has at divers times expressed itself, have found bitter enemies. A well-known Professor of Psychology in Harvard University has thought that the problem would be much

the subject. So he proceeds
out his plan in a specimen essay whicl
given to the world. But the promise
does not seem to come, the old diffic
mains, as it does not lie in the word bu
thing. Then why banish that favorite
of our nation, yea of the whole wor
nobody else, the schoolboy will not suff
die, since it is always the burden of his
declamation. For our part, we do not
our liking for the word, and we also ch
belief in its great usefulness, when em
aright, in Psychology.

In a far more savage manner the wor
determination has been condemned by a
fessor in Columbia University. Hear h
of damnation, which becomes almost fr
"Self-determination is a term to juggle
and for that reason every scientific psycho
ought to detest it." (Giddings, *The Prin*
of Sociology, p. 381.) We had heard that sc
did not detest anything or anybody, but
rumbled the

which recalls that of Macbeth when he finds out that he has been deceived by the lying oracles of the witches, and through them brought face to face with grim death:

> And be these juggling fiends no more believed
> That keep the word of promise to our ear
> But break it to our hope.

The query will rise, Who has been deceiving the Professor, juggling with that detestable compound *self-determination?* Let the culprit be pointed out that he receive the penalty due to his misdeeds. So we start out in search of the rascal with no little zeal, but we soon find that just this word or its equivalent has been employed by the greatest thinkers, sages, and moralists from antiquity down to the present time. Plato and Aristotle are, then, the offenders in the old ages; Kant and Hegel employ the term in our century, not juggling with it, but having evidently an honest purpose in the pursuit of truth; in our own generation and in our own tongue the word is found scattered up and down the pages of Thomas Hill Green, one of the sincerest souls and probably the greatest ethical writer that the Anglo-Saxon race has produced. These are some of the jugglers, we suppose; not till Mr. Herbert Spencer arrived with his evangel proclaiming that Free Will is a cheat and an illusion did we get the

called scientific dogmatism upo
subject of Free Will, scaling heights
theological dogmatism hardly attained i
palmiest days.

Assured now that we are in good compan
shall still find use for the word self-deter
tion, making it the central fact of the pr
book, showing it to be the great end w
human activity is seeking to realize. Indee
very conception and starting-point of the
rests upon what we shall call the self-determi

And now let it be confessed there is a g
reason for the repugnance which some wri
have shown to all discussion of the freedom
the Will. That it has often been fruitless, la
ing the reader into an intolerable dualism wh
leaves only discord in his soul, is appar
enough. But the old method of discussing
subject need not be deemed the final one, or
only way of closing with the problem. T
method may be named argumentation by cr
cross; it piles up a great breastwork of so-ca
arguments on

side continues to hold its own fort in about the same condition as when the battle started. Thus the whole thing has the appearance of a prolonged sham-battle, in which nobody gets hurt. No wonder that earnest people, with work to do in the world, become disgusted and resolve to enlist on neither side of such a resultless conflict, sweeping the entire matter out of their mental horizon.

Still the subject is sure to come back, it cannot be wholly excluded from our soul, being just the subject of man's freedom. The question will arise: if you can get nothing in that way, why not cast about for another way? And here we brush upon the secret hope from which has sprung the present book. Let it be imparted in a whisper to the reader that the author has endeavored to strike out into a new path in this exposition of the Will. Not a mass of new arguments but a new method is the claim, possibly delusive, but honestly believed; so much of faith in his own work will be charitably tolerated in an author by his readers, for every author simply has to be something of an Egotist, else he would not write a book. He must think that he has done a deed which no one else has done, otherwise what is the use of his giving himself so much trouble to do a piece of work over again? Some points of this procedure may be here set forth.

the so-called faculty (the phase of distinction or specialization), and, on the other hand, the total activity of the Ego in that special act.

Such a procedure, as far as we are aware, is opposed to the usual method of psychologists, who have the habit of making their distinctions anywhere and as they please, and of arranging these distinctions in any order which may happen to be convenient. We have a strong conviction that this is a fundamental defect in the psychological science of to-day. It is handed over to boundless caprice which means chaos, and there is rarely the attempt to reveal the mind as ordered from within throughout its manifold activities. But it has not only an order, it has also a principle of ordering, both of which go together, are indeed one process, which, however, must separate itself and posit its distinctions as essential.

Thus we witness in mind everywhere the Psychosis with its threefold movement. Such is the ordering principle which unifies all mental phenomena and makes a science of mind possible. (The threefold movement of the Ego or of mind we have more fully set forth in another work. See *Psychology and the Psychosis, Introduction passim.*)

II. This recurring triplicity often rouses objection. It is declared to be something artificial or something foisted upon the mental process from the outside. Still the claim here made is that

Again it is objected that this perpetual
tion of the threefold process confines the
forces it by an iron necessity into a pre-
mined system, and is thus prejudicial to
freedom which should at least reign with
domain of thought. But such a freedom is
disorder, it subjects the science to capric
takes it away from the control of law, to
cover and to utter which is the psycholo
business. Now we believe most fervent
freedom, outer and inner; but freedom,
must be ordered, must have its principle, w
is just the ground of its necessity. That is,
dom is necessary; note the two opposing t
in this sentence, which, however, are sm
into one thought by the process just descri
Liberty and law must be united in the psy
ogical as well as in the political sphere. M
becomes scientifically free only in following
aw of mind, just as the citizen is free onl
obeying the law of the land. We must see
niversal principle working in

for itself. In other words, it is self-legislative, like the free nation; its government is self-government, which constitutes the liberty of science as well as of the State. Otherwise freedom may lead to anarchy in both. Nor again should the law be external, applied from the outside and forcing conformity to itself; thus we begin to feel this tyranny of system which is always the forerunner of rebellion and overthrow.

So we affirm that in a true method alone can the science of mind find its true freedom. The Ego is unquestionably limit-transcending by its very nature, but just this characteristic is what must be taken up and incorporated into its process. It posits all distinction, limitation, specialization; then it reaches beyond these and returns to itself as the source; in this way it is the self-limited, self-differentiated, self-determined. Hence its fundamental act manifests the law of its freedom and not its freedom from law; hence, too, it shows not simply an outward order in Psychology but a self-ordering, not simply an outward restraint in morals, but self-restraint, not simply an outward government in institutions, but self-government. Therein the externality of law is always moving out of itself and becoming internal, and the tyranny of system is perpetually correcting itself, through an inner and not an outer revolution, the former of which

[illegible] accordingly, app
throughout the present book
the method by which the freedom
[illegible] is maintained in its pure move
the same time can be brought into
[illegible] if you please; for
[illegible] anything without some kin
[illegible] and order must be u
that which is ordered is the free,
[illegible] which is also the orderer.
[illegible] the Will is freedom, hence ou
[illegible] strongly recalcitran
[illegible] of any kind; still the ne
[illegible] for the sake of freedom
[illegible] the danger of fly
[illegible] theoretically and pract
[illegible] society.

When the [illegible] things in his dist
[illegible] without indicating their ge
[illegible] we might
[illegible] his freed

is tyrannical, he is a psychological despot in the city of his science. Psychology, however, will endure neither the anarchist nor the tyrant in the long run; its true administration must not be chaotic nor despotic, subject neither to capricious freedom nor to iron necessity. Still it must have both freedom and necessity in their positive union, which is the Psychosis.

IV. It will be our object, therefore, to eschew the old expository method, as far as we may be able, the method which imports its distinctions into the science from the outside, and thus makes it wholly separative, unfree in its movement, determined externally by the capricious Ego of the expositor. This separative stage, which gives psychological distinctions, is indeed necessary to the science, but it must not be dragged in externally, it must be unfolded through the inner movement of the subject-matter; its distinctions, even when valid in content, ought not to be capricious in the ordering.

For instance, the distinction of Intellect into Sense-perception, Representation, and Thought, taken externally, is separative, yet they must be seen to be one process, which is that of the Ego itself. Out of every division unity is to be restored. Still the divisive act must be, the separation into activities or into the so-called faculties cannot be thrown out of psychology; but we must not stop with that, we must unify the mind,

this process of itself as the basic p
method. Your Ego is not to leave
distinguishing itself into Sense-perc
sentation, and Thought; on the c
always to come back to itself and t
process; thus it is the process of S
the process of Self.

V. In like manner the scientific i
of physical science) must be esche
to Psychology, specially alien to the
of the Will; in fact, it notoriously
Will out of its horizon, having no
category, whereby it can account for
the same. For this reason scientists
are, and cannot help being, determ
be sure they may in individual cases
the limits of their vocation, which,
not easy. Really the Ego has to s
science, science cannot account for th

The scientificially trained man, whe
the domain of Psychology is pretty
come the victim of his

victimized by his system, especially when he enters a spiritual realm, like Ethics and Religion? The essential point is frequently left out, remaining probably unseen, because it does fit into the fore-ordained formulas of his system.

We make haste to apply the same criticism to a pre-established metaphysical method, which can proceed just as externally as a physical method. Both commit the same mistake though coming from opposite poles of thought. Every student will feel this difficulty sooner or later in the case of Hegel, though on many points sympathetic with the great thinker. His massive terminology is not infrequently thrust upon some domain of nature or spirit, regardless of inner development. The result is a tyranny of system which affects the free reader, somewhat as German militarism affects the free citizen.

Still we shall have to re-affirm that the Ego must have a system, if it is to have a science; but this system is to be its own, self-derived, not taken from physical or metaphysical systems external to it and hence alien. The system of Psychology must be a free one, generated out of the Ego by itself and imposed upon itself through itself. Thus the free system can become the system of freedom, and can unfold and formulate the Will, whose essence is just this freedom or self-determination.

So the danger of system is great, but the

...sformed, or supplanted by something
but let us not rush to the opposite extr
think of getting rid of all system — a
mind which finds so much expression
days.

In this book, therefore, we shall have
tem, and not fail to make a strict use of
the very object of such a system is to sec
order, and to formulate the absolute freed
the Ego. Perfect order united with ab
freedom is the ideal striven for, though dou
often unattained; still the effort is somet
even if unsuccessful. Whenever the trip
herein employed becomes burdensome, fo
cramping, it may be the fault of the author
ometimes it is that of the reader; the ex
ion may get stilted and mechanical, not ma
o forms of thinking fluid to thinking; o
fort may not be given to understand
ake it real, by the spirit of the reader, w
nction it is to fuse all this formulation
pure activity of ki...

Ego, till the latter brings them back into the process of itself by an original fiat of its own. This is the reader's part, which no book can give him, however much it may stimulate him; his self-activity must come from himself, this being just what makes him an Ego.

System, then, is not to be abolished, in spite of much frantic declamation against it, but it must be elevated into a system of freedom. Especially is this requirement imperative in a book on the Will, whose essence is the self-determined.

VI. Very intense in certain quarters is the protest against the old faculty-psychology. But the protesters themselves will always be found, sooner or later, using its divisions. The truth is, we must have division, the faculties so-called; equally certain is it that we must see the mind as one and a process. Hence the strong demand is for a method which will give both sides and give them together — the separative and the unitary; a method which, in specializing the mind, reveals its oneness. We are not going to get rid of the old faculty-psychology, which is a genuine evolution of the ages; still we must supplement it by a procedure which will counteract its divisive, analytic, scattered character. The Psychosis, rightly seen into and applied, is intended to furnish all the division one wants and all the unity one wants; indeed it employs

–, belongs primordially to t
stage of the Ego, as we shall soo
show; still in this separation there
process of mind, which is also pr
method. The Will, though it be
must come back to itself, and th
determined, too; both belong to its
and the procedure which leaves out
other, either the Determined or the
mined, or leaves them in an unrecon
sition, must be pronounced inadequate

In the present book we shall have to
edge the old faculty-psychology in i
sphere; indeed we cannot well help
since from it is derived quite the sur
psychological nomenclature. One of it
the word *Will* itself, as distinct from
we cannot well abolish the languag
science, which is indeed the growth o
is inwoven into the very texture of
Still we ma

process which gives full validity to both sides. This process, as already stated, is the method of the present work, explicitly formulated and employed in every portion.

VII. We cannot, therefore, bring ourselves to give up theoretical Free Will; just as little can we think of surrendering practical Free Will, as realized in moral conduct and in the institutions of civilization, specially in the State. The denial of inner liberty involves the denial of outer liberty; if there be no theoretical ground for individual freedom, there is no such ground for political freedom. The latter, indeed, springs from the former, as its eternal life-giving source. A discussion of Free Will is not purely a speculative play of idle minds; in these days man cannot think irrationally and act rationally; thought and action, Will and Intellect, must go hand in hand, and find their complete harmony and reconciliation in the deed. A free country rests upon a Free Will; a conviction of the excellence of free institutions comes not out of a belief in an enslaved volition. Determinism means absolutism in some form; assuredly it cannot be realized into the works of liberty, which signifies the self-determined. So in this inner realm of Will one can fling his banner to the breeze, inscribing on it the famous, all-compelling word, and "shouting the battle-cry of freedom."

The reader naturally tries to reac
soon as possible, to the fundamental
Will. Let him bring before his mi
plest action, he will be aware of a g
out of himself, a separation within an
of himself into an object of some sor
the primal manifestation of Will; t
Will divides itself through its own inh
inative power of selfhood, and carrie
into an action, which is different f

over into the object, but just in such a separation and objectifying of itself, it remains truly itself. In such an act the Ego is original, indeed self-originative and is Will.

When I reach forth my hand to pluck a flower, there is a going forth of me out of myself, and a realizing of myself in an action; yet I remain one with myself in that action; if I divide within, and project myself into plucking the flower, I am the inner division and the outer deed. It is true that what I do is different from myself, yea, I make myself different from myself, still this difference is mine, is my Ego, or a stage of its process.

Here, then, we are trying to penetrate to the fundamental fact of the Will. We may now see it to be the stage of separation in the process of the Ego, the second grand phase of its movement, which has, in the complete science of Psychology, two other stages — one going before, which is Feeling, and one coming after, which is Intellect. The Ego as Will is, therefore, primordially separative, and this characteristic it will manifest through all its development, which is to be set forth in the following treatise. Herein lies its contrast with the sphere of the Intellect, which is essentially the return or the third stage of the Ego, though, of course, there is no intellection without volition. We are never to forget that every stage has in it implicitly all stages,

Will is accordingly, involved
consciousness, in the very natur
subject-object. For we cannot
without making ourselves an obje
without Will, whereby the Ego
objective actual. We must, ther
before the Ego can know itself or
must make this self-separation, wh
mental act of volition. Before
must be Will, the Ego must enter o
must enter or difference itself bef
turn, which is the act of knowledg
presupposes the object, which it int
as known; but the Will has to go in
past the object, or the world, ere t
can have any content.

This fact has an important education
and is the ground for the maxim app
child learn by doing (Clemens).
with the object, point the same through
we it can understand ...

the primordial separation of the Ego whereby the latter passes from potentiality to reality.

The Will is, therefore, the Ego as self-projecting — the Ego making itself different from itself, or making itself just the different, which, however, is still itself. Object, other, outer, external, different, are all terms going back to the Will as this primary process of the Ego. The Will is the world-maker, creator of all things, the origin of all origination.

And now we must mention a word which, in the present book, will be the main category to be applied to the Will. This is the word *determine* with its derivatives. As previously described, the Ego as Will makes itself object, other, different; it places a boundary line within itself upon itself; it limits itself, fixes, defines itself; this is what we shall name *determine*. Terminus was the old Roman God of boundaries; that people of the Will (the Roman) used him metaphorically in the act of *determination*. The preposition *de* seems to imply that the old God was an active Will-power, and directed from his site the Will of mortals; he is the might which governs volition. A family of words is born of the parent — *determining*, *determined*, *undetermined*, *self-determined*, and a number of others. Especially we shall employ that cardinal expression: *the Will determines itself* in many relations, for just that is the inherent character of the Ego

may be well to mention here a
possible ambiguity, which, in the
guage, accompanies these terms.
for instance, *I am determined to do*
ordinary speech, I am resolved to d
is not the signification above given,
something moves me to the act, an
determined to project myself outwa
tion puts the stress rather upon sel
tion than upon determination, and
Ego more in its active condition than i
The word *determinism*, however,
this passive condition of the Will, th
being determined by a motive or son
external to itself. Both meanings ar
English usage. Moreover the root
words *self-determined* and *self-det*
which suggest by their very form the
well as the innermost process of the V
indeed furnish the pivotal thought o
and its world

ject, but its very destiny is to become object. But when is it completely object? When it has realized itself in an existence which is also Will, and furthermore is a Will which wills just this realization of Will. That is, the end of the Ego as Will is to put itself in its total process into the world. This form of the Will, which is the ultimate, we shall see later to be that which goes under the name of Institutional Will. The three stages which constitute the Will and its world make the three grand divisions of the present work, and are as follows:—

I. The Psychological Will, and its world.—Psychics.

II. The Moral Will and its world.—Ethics.

III. The Institutional Will and its world.—Institutions.

The ground of this distinction is not to be seen fully till the end of the book, which proves, or ought to prove, the beginning. The last chapter properly mediates and vindicates the first chapter; still we have to begin with the first. A short description of each of the above divisions we may send out in advance.

I. The Psychological Will treats of the purely psychical side of the Will, and its world is the inner one; it is the Will as subjective. The Ego beholds its internal process as Will, and develops the same into all of its activities, each of which

the Will, or the
ing itself as Will through its own
which act is itself Will in its pr
From this stage the Will unfolds
stage, in which it determines its
Self-determined, or the Free Will
its end and content the Free Will.
call the pure idea of Freedom as psy

II. The Moral Will takes up this
chical idea of Freedom and seeks to
human conduct. The Ego as Moral
ideal End, to the pursuit of which
and transforms all its activities. The
vidual endeavors to make real in th
of his actions the Free Will whose gr
is just the realization of Free Will.
be moralized through and through b
End, which is, in general, that freedo
always securing and realizing freedom

Not Pleasure, not Happiness, not e
olence is the foundation of moral ob
the true content of the Will in mor
Free Will

in his free inner world realizing himself in his outer acts. Still in the present realm of morality the Free Will is subjective and individual; next it must become objective and universal.

III. The Institutional Will is the Free Will as existent in the world, not only realized in individual conduct (which is the fact of the Moral Will), but actualized in an object which is itself a Free Will, and that too a Free Will which wills Free Will. Such an object, existent as a Free Will, we call an Institution, and the whole cycle of Institutions we name the Institutional World, as State, Family, Church, etc. Each of these we shall find to be in essence a Free Will not only actualized but also actualizing Free Will.

Naturally the meaning of these terms must be developed in the course of the following work. Here, however, we may note one or two distinctions. The Free Will *realizes* itself in individual conduct, and calls forth the moral sphere; the Free Will *actualizes* itself in an objective existence and calls forth the institutional sphere. We might also say that the Ego as Free Will *objectifies* itself in an action, but *objectivates* itself in an Institution.

Such, then, is the general outline, or the primal Psychosis of the task before us. Here we may append some observations.

1. The above three stages show, first, the Will as potential or subjective, which, unfolded

of itself, and wills Will, wills itself specially in the institutional world, which is thus the realm of true freedom.

3. It is Fichte, as far as we are aware, who has most distinctly seen and expressed this connection between the second or separative stage of the Ego and the Will. (See his *Science of Ethics*, translated by A. E. Kroeger, published by Kegan Paul, Trench, Trübner & Co., London.) The act of consciousness, in which the Ego makes itself object to itself, is with Fichte an act of Will: "I become conscious of myself only on condition of becoming conscious of myself as willing" (p. 25). Another sentence may be transcribed: "Only in so far as I find myself willing, do I find *myself*, and in so far as I find myself I necessarily find myself willing" (p. 27). But Fichte had no developed Psychosis, though he certainly knows of and expresses the threefold movement of the Ego. He could never get over Kant's Thing-in-itself (*Ding an sich*), from which he was hurled back into his own subjectivity, the infinite flux of the spirit, out of which he seemed quite unable to bring any permanent form.

Fichte has little constructive genius; he meanders around in his Ego, through its darkest, most subtle passages, and finds many a hidden gem, yet all seems to close up after him, as if his road lay through water. Herein he is the direct

the philosophic world.

4. The Will has a very import
most important place in the philo
penhauer. The inner energy w
itself in all appearance is Will, acc
mechanical, chemical, vital force
nomena of volition. Schopenha
this Will with the Kantian Thing-i
for Kant and Fichte lay beyond
knowledge, was unknown and unkn
Schopenhauer claims to have discove
this Thing-in-itself is, and it is Will.
itself is Will and Will only. * *
innermost principle, the kernel of
particular and likewise of the whol
in each blind-working force of Na
as in the deliberate action of man."
hauer's *Die Welt als Wille und V*
131, ed. Frauenstädt.) In contra
is Representation (Image, Concept
lung), which is object as such or th
of Will in the

in the purely subjective limits of the latter, but he does not trace and apparently does not see with distinctness the source of the Will in the process of the Ego, which Fichte does on the whole.

5. The most influential work on the Will which America has produced is that by Jonathan Edwards, which he called *A careful and strict Inquiry* into the Freedom of the Will. According to Edwards, Will is merely the power of choosing, "that by which the mind chooses anything." Such is, then, our only freedom, but even this is jeoparded in the proposition "that the Will is always determined by the strongest motive." Thus Edwards has in him the dualism of the Will to start with, and, as far as we can see, he is totally unable to get rid of it in spite of his labor. But of this later on.

PART FIRST.

THE PSYCHOLOGICAL WILL.

This Part embraces the first of the thı
eral divisions of the present work, and t
the psychical element of the Will taken b
That is, we are now going to look at t
simply as a mental activity, not in its n
institutional aspects; we shall regard its i
process rather than its external works,
these may be drawn upon by way of illus
The complete movement of the Will as psy
with its inner or subjective

of itself into externality, thereby making itself something real, a thing or object of some kind. This act of the Ego separating itself within itself we have called its determination, which still further divides itself into a multitude of forms or special activities, yet all of these have the one fundamental form or activity. Now the Ego in the Psychological Will is going to examine and to order according to its own inner principle (which is the Psychosis) the forms in which it is determined either through some outer stimulation or through its own native energy. This we may call the immediate stage of the Will, being regarded as it is in itself, as distinct from its externalized reality in works and actions. Undoubtedly the Will must act, to be Will; but the Psychology of the Will is the Ego as Intellect beholding the Will in action and identifying the same with itself, namely with the Ego. So we have a science of Volition in which the Ego contemplates the Will as a phase of the subjective Self, and arranges the same according to its own process.

The Psychological Will, being itself Ego, and being contemplated and ordered by the Ego, will reveal the inner movement of the latter, so often referred to as the Psychosis. This first stage of the Will, subjective, in a sense potential, must be seen constructing itself internally according to its own law, which will show its leading propor-

[illegible] of the Will

Conception. The Ego truly conc
when it creates the Will, as the
essence. The Ego as Will has in
create the Will by its own inner a
scribe the process thereof. Since t
moving of the Ego from within to
projection, or indeed self-produc
movement is to be seized and unf
Psychosis.

II. The will as determined, or the
Will. The movement or the deter
not wholly from within to without
Ego to externality, but likewise fr
to within, from the external stimu
response of the Will in determinat
external stimulus may be physical
may be a sensation, emotion, idea;
outside of the special movement of the
is set a-going by it. This is the real
ration between the movement of the
stimulus, content or purpose.

III. The [illegible]

Will, of actuality, which reaches its culmination in the institutional world (Family, Society, State) which is Will willing Will, and which therein returns to the Will within, completing the round and finishing the total work of the Will.

The immediate stage of the Will shows it as determined from within itself; the separative stage shows it as determined by something outside, something different from itself, by a world not its own; the third or redintegrative stage shows it as determined by is own world, which it has called forth, and which wills the primal Will.

The Psychological Will, accordingly, deals with the Psychology of the Will. We may also catch a glimpse of the fact that Freedom and Necessity of the Will are simply forms or phases in the total process of the Will.

The Psychological Will, accordingly, has three stages or divisions, which have been above set forth, but which we may emphasize by briefly repeating their captions.

I. The Conception of the Will.

II. The Determined Will.

III. The Free Will.

The reader is not to forget that these three stages, apparently so divided up and separated, are really one process, which the Ego is also to grasp. This development may also be named

e from spontaneity to freedom. We may
ter the primordial act of Will, which is the
germinal process of the Self-determined
the Ego, as Spontaneous Will. This is
nitial conceptive, creative, originative act,
t which no Will is possible, round which
and out of which unfold all the complex
f volition. Spontaneity is the first factor,
basic Conception of the Will, its first gen-
n in and through an act of consciousness.
s what we must next consider, putting the
into its due place in the psychological
s.

SECTION FIRST— CONCEPTION OF THE WILL.

The aim is at present to conceive of the Will, to generate it in one thought. Let the reader grasp the following statement and verify it in the laboratory of his own mind: the Ego, conceiving itself as Will, has to be Will in that very act, it wills itself into being through Conception. The thought is subtle, yet fundamental, and must be held fast: the true Conception of the Will is its creation through the original fiat of consciousness.

Conception is, in general, that act of the Ego which calls forth the object conceived, creating the same anew spiritually; it is not a mere abstraction, or a product of external generalization, but a genetic thinking of the thing in hand. It is Conception in its present sense, which seizes the inherent creative process of the object, making itself one with the same, identifying that process with its own.

In fact, all thought worthy of the name, in

come into being through the power
You cannot think of Will, without w
very act; you must will to think
think Will; you must create the proc
can have it and behold it.

An inner verification is the only p
for this Conception of the Will. Let t
then, repeat to himself and verify w
Ego, conceiving Will, is Will in that
Conception. The Ego, in conceiving
example, is Will; only the Conceptic
stress upon the house or object conc
now the house (or external object) m
out, and the Ego must whirl back, a
and seize its own act as its object or
You must conceive yourself conceivin
act is the primal separative act of
(Will) grasped by the mind (Intellect)

Will is primarily the separation within
when the latter projects itself into an
Conception of the Will is that same Se
ing itself in the pure abstract form of

Turning the matter over once more,
see that fundamentally

the germ of the Will and its world, the unital creative fact out of which will evolve all the forms of the Will hereafter developed.

When Ferris conceived of his huge wheel, he first had the generative principle in his mind, then his Will clothed his conception with reality, transforming it from the ideal into the actual; the wheel turned around in his brain ere it began to revolve in the world. But now you are seeking to conceive, not of some product of the Will, but of the Will itself, whose reality is just its Conception in the present case, and whose Conception is its reality.

The Ego as Will, accordingly, utters itself, projects itself as object; the special word applied here is *determine*. That is, the Conception of the Will is the Ego determining itself, going through its process, its self-active power. Here, then, we shall have the Psychosis, the inherent activity of the Ego, as Will, beholding and going through its inner movement, before taking up into the same the external world.

I. The Ego as Will is the Undetermined.

II. The Ego as Will is the Determined and the Determining.

III. The Ego as Will is the Self-determined.

Such are the three stages of the conceptive Will, which are, however, but one movement, showing the fundamental process of the Ego. Yet the whole sphere of the Will essentially be-

within itself in the basic act of
characteristic remains throughou
sphere. Still the act of Will is jus
total process of the Ego; the wh
present in the smallest mental a
conception of the Will is just the pro

I. The Will as undetermined is i
diate, unrealized stage. The infant l
which has not yet determined itself
tent, but which soon begins its
infantile Will is undeveloped, a pote
say, merely the possibility of all dete
which is to be unfolded. But the me
has also many possibilities, which are
izing themselves, passing from the
into the actual. Around all that we
vast fringe of what we may be;
world of the Undetermined envelop
termined on every side, quite to in
unrealized Will always remains far
the realized.

Here we may note

however, is only a negative freedom. But the Ego as Will, even in negation, is something determined, is still determining itself in that very act, and is thus the Determined.

Indeed the inherent movement of the Undetermined, when brought into the process of thought, shows itself becoming the Determined. That is, it is determined as the Undetermined, wherein it gets its special determination, and so becomes the Determined. The Will cannot remain undetermined, else it were indeed no Will; its very essence is determination, it must be the special act, the Determined.

II. The Ego as Will is, accordingly, the Determined; it must separate itself within and go forth, it must utter or outer itself, in order to be active, which is to be itself. This primitive diremption is that of the Ego making itself object; the act of consciousness involves Will, is indeed the first Will; the separation into subject and object on the part of the Ego is the root of all volition.

Moreover this separation of the Ego as Will is the condition of external possession and mastery; I must get out of myself and go forth into the world ere I can have anything. Nay, ere I can have myself, I must take possession of myself in similar fashion; I must make a division within, and thereby determine myself. All action is the passing from the undetermined, undivided Ego

no determined one, and must go through this
s of inner separation.

at the division has two sides: the Determined
have as its counterpart the Determining;
are within or subjective, as yet in Concep-
Herein the second or separative stage of
Ego as Will shows most distinctly its dualism.
may note at this point the correspondence to
Ego as Consciousness, which divides itself
subject and object (see *Psychology and the*
Thesis, p. 19 *et passim*); so here the Ego as
divides itself into the Determining and the
mined, which division also lies in the act of
ciousness.

e Ego as Will, therefore, far back in the
unconscious act, in its very root, bifurcates

this process of self-determination. The simplest deed has such a movement coiled up in it as its very germ and generative principle; the Conception of the Will has herein finished its round, or cycle. For this Conception is the Will's originative movement, its very procreation; Conception must show the Ego generating the object which it conceives, and is what the philosophers have called speculative.

We may seek to grasp the present thought by some other designations. The Will in Self-determination has now attained individuality, which involves the going forth of Self and the coming back thereof, self-assertion and self-concentration. The Determined is now completely itself, since it is also the Determining; it is no longer something outside, something alien or *other*, but the movement of the Will itself.

Moreover, the three stages just designated may be taken as so many forms or definitions of freedom. The Undetermined, which is without any limits or determinations, is a freedom which is empty, without content, a mere possibility. The Determined is double: it may be freedom (as caprice) or may be servitude; a man may deem himself enslaved unless he can do just this and nothing else, or have just this and nothing else; that is, unless his caprice is satisfied, he is in a prison. But the true and complete Will is not the Determined, but the Self-determined; in all

...thing else.

The Conception of true Freedom is the total process of the Will, not the terminate Will which is without limit not the capricious or the enslaved Will; it is that Will which determines mined, or negates the Negative, yet remain negative in such an act, but positive just therein. The Will has i a negative power, and is by certain ph grasped purely as negative, destructi view is the basis of pessimism. The C of the Will must rise out of this nega that is, must negate the same; thus its n is seen to be a positivity, and the Deter the universe is found to rest upon t determined.

Such is the movement of the Will as tion; it is a Psychosis with its threefold and must be so grasped. Freedom is, t a Psychosis also, at least concrete Fr such; hence comes the difficulty

though it has arrived at self-determination, this is as yet internal, not realized, not actual in the world. It is the acorn but not yet the oak. The inner process has been revealed, which, however, finds itself limited and determined anew by an external world; this is the great outer realm of the Undetermined (by the Ego), which must be mastered by the Will. The Ego as Will, having already mastered itself, transforming its own determinateness into the Self-determined, must next proceed to transform the whole realm of externality into the Self-determined, thus clothing itself with a world as its garment.

Herewith we pass into a new sphere of the Will, the sphere of the Determined Will, or Determinism. But in that sphere we are to keep in mind the Conception of the Will which has revealed that the being of the Will must have an undetermined (potential) element, that the being of the Will must have a determined element, that the being of the Will must have a self-determined element, and moreover must have all three elements in one process, otherwise there is no Will.

Here we shall give a warning in regard to the use of the word *Undetermined*, which has two different aspects or relations. There is an undetermined Ego, as just set forth; then there is an undetermined world outside of the Ego. This external world we call undeter-

... the Ego, which is also th
before such determination. Th
a phase of Determination, or of
Will, as we shall see later unc
Impulse, in which the undetermin
lates the undetermined Ego to c
or to act.

This nomenclature may be a litt
to the student at the beginning, as
ture is, be it chemical, mathemat
sophical; still it is the only way to e
with any definiteness. So let tl
patient in this, as he has to be ir
matters of learning.

Observations. Some general r
may add to the preceding developm
discursive way.

1. The treatment of Conception
longs to the Psychology of the
which reason we have sought to u
some fullness in another place (se
and the Psychosis, p. 179

stages, which, however, as stages of the volitional process, have their own names — the Undetermined, the Determined, the Self-determined. Still the two sets of terms have and must have a certain degree of interchangeableness; so we shall hear of the Universal Will (as abstract or undetermined), the Particular Will (as special or determined), and the Individual Will (which, being a return to the first stage with a content, is the concretely Universal Will, or the Self-determined). Conception goes back and seizes the primal origination which underlies the whole movement of the Will.

2. The Ego as conscious Intellect, or as subject-object, has its direct correspondence with the Ego as Will. The Ego as determining is the subject, the Ego as determined is the object; the Ego is union of the two, is subject-object as the complete process of consciousness; in like manner the Ego is the union of the Determining and the Determined as the complete process of the Will, which is the Self-determined, as just unfolded. Again we may note that the primary separative act of the conscious Ego involves Will as much as it does Intellect.

3. As this last point pertains to the unity of Intellect and Will, which has an important place in the history of Thought, we may expand it a little. This unity goes back to the simple act of consciousness, the first separation of the Ego

self, and the looking at itself. Which
oth a doing and a seeing, both volitional
ellectual or practical and theoretical, in
that is, Will and Intellect in their primal
. All separation, distinction, differentia-
ven negation, are fundamentally of and
h the Will; the Ego making itself object,
g itself, is volition. Not without some
has Will been regarded as the destroyer,
vil of the psychical universe, but that is
whole of its character.

we behold both Will and Intellect evolv-
mselves from the first act of conscious-
nd constituting with Feeling the primary
sis of the Ego, and therein starting to
the science of Psychology.

ment is seen to be an inherent and necessary element of the Will, though it be the source of all finitude, along with evil, pain, and negation generally. The Buddhistic Will proposes to solve the problem by simply wiping out this second stage of the Will, and thus undermining the complete volitional act in its very germ. As Will necessarily springs from the act of consciousness, whereby the Ego determines and finitizes itself, the Buddhistic religion, in order to get rid of the finite and attain the infinite, which is God, has at last to get rid of Will itself, and also of consciousness. This final act of the Will is its own negation, and lands the individual into the will-less and the unconscious, which is the Nirvana.

The Buddhist has, accordingly, his form of renunciation, asceticism, moralism; he roots out desire, he defies suffering; he mortifies the flesh; he wills to get rid of the Will to live, not by suicide, for that does not slay the soul, or even the Will, but by slowly undoing, through a life of religious discipline, the separative stage of consciousness, which is also Will. He tries to solve his problem, not by passing through the third stage (the Self-determined) but by a lapse back into the Undetermined and Unconscious.

5. We must see, therefore, that, in the present sphere of conceptive Will, we are not only conscious of the act of Will, but that we cannot be

itself, must know itself as Will ju
knowing. Here, in the first step,
to will are together in the one proc

Indeed the expression, *act of cons*
in itself the above mentioned tw
well as the process out of the same.
an act (Will, separation); secondly
act the Ego is conscious, which inv
turn to self and the recognition, wi
one is not conscious. Thus I canno
self without willing to know myself.

The idea of causality must be look
at this point. The Ego as Will is th
ality, which is thence transferred to
body and to mind. Will is the primo
energy, causé, law; it is also selec
natural selection, and is the fundame
ple running through quite all the ca
Natural Science.

6. In strong contrast with this in
Conception is the outer environment
is placed, and which

a thousand channels pours in upon me, like wheat into a hopper, and I am to grind it over, and throw it out of me into actions. The passing view may make me laugh or weep; the clanking of chains may cause my organism to respond with a shiver; thus I am acted upon by an outer world, which drives me to act; I am determined to be self-determined. For unless my organism were self-moved it could not be moved to move itself. A stone, for instance, can be moved, but cannot be moved to move itself. Through the outer body and its stimulus, the Will becomes outer or uttered, a reality in the world. The Will as Conception, however, is the Will not yet real, not yet determined to the outer act; it is still the germ. But the Determined Will, at which we have now arrived, has its outer Determinant, its inner Determined, and the resultant action.

We are now to conceive of th
placed in an external world whic
from all directions. Whence com
world? A very important questi
be answered here; at present we
take for granted this external worl
as Will put into it, into its hea
Such are the two fundamental pr
of Determined Will.

But we may say that the great
external world is, in its present rel
pel the Ego as Will to freedom.
purely ideal Conception of the Wi
sidered is to be made outer, real, t
determined by nature to be sel
nature forces

words of this caption — the words *determined* and *Will*. They are in thought opposed to each other and thus express the complete dualism and contradiction of the present sphere; this contradiction has, however, to be united in the one process. The two permanent factors are the *determined* and the *self-determined*, both of which must be present in any exposition of the topic before us, which is often called Freedom of the Will and quite as often Determinism, according to the bias of the expositor. We shall try to give due validity to both elements, which may be combined in the expression: I am *determined* to be *self-determined*, which is the fundamental statement of the Determined Will.

In the previous section the leading fact is that the Ego as Will has determined itself, or is the simple Self-determined, which lies in the primordial act of consciousness. But the Ego now finds itself in an external world and hence finds itself determined from the outside, by nature. In Conception, as just treated, it knew itself as internally free; but in the present sphere it begins to find itself unfree, limited on many sides. Such is indeed the scission which faces it throughout this second stage, truly the separative one, being that of the Determined Will, whose whole effort and movement will be to get rid of its own inner contradiction.

The Will, accordingly, must proceed to make

internally, ideally free, in the p
Conception; now its process is t
so. It has conquered its own
nateness as subjective Will; now
determination, conquer this new
nateness, must make the same its
become a reality; what is *other*
taken up and transformed. Th
Will, accordingly, has as its end t
of its own determinateness, the fr
the Determined, when, of course,
longer Determined Will, but Free
is the end toward which we have
with certain intricate labyrinths
through on our path.

We have here introduced the i
ment of *end*, which in one form
stay with us. The universal end o
to transform the world which is c
different from it, into its own dete
impresses upon all externality, bein
nal to the same it

determined, and so determine the external object over against itself by its own end, and thereby make the same a part of its domain. Such is the realization of the Will, the end being carried out and made objective; thus the grand end of the Will, even as determined, is to realize itself, to vindicate its freedom.

It will be obvious why the present sphere has been the great battle-field between the two sets of opponents on the subject of Will, who commonly are known under the names of Determinists (or Necessitarians) and Libertarians. Both sides have ground for their arguments, each can claim a part of the process of the Determined Will, but neither seems to get hold of the total process, which is the true solvent of the difficulty.

The Determined Will is, in the first place, Will; that is, it has the power of origination, of self-activity, else indeed we could not call it Will. Yet it is also determined, is moved from without, herein we behold the contradiction which lies in all Determinism. There must be the primordial act of self-separation of the Ego, else there is no Will; still this primordial act of the Ego, which is its self-determination, is made to function from an external source.

These two elements we find in the simplest act of Will. I reach forth my hand and pluck a flower; the presence of the object stimulates me

We can, therefore, say, that
Determined Will, *the Ego as W*
to determine itself. But the nex
Through what is it thus det
through some phase or form of
ment, of itself as process. Here
fundamental movement of Dete
will unfold the different ways wl
as Will is determined to determine
ways are manifold, almost infinit
but they all show and must show,
ess of the Ego which we hav
Psychosis.

Now the Ego as Will has alrea
the preceding section its fundamenta
the Undetermined, the Determined,
determined. These, then will c
three leading stages of Determinism
of the Determined Will), making t
of the subject in hand and also formi
They may be formulated as follows:

1. *Impulse*: the W

while the third is the variable one and characterizes the special sphere of Impulse.

II. *Desire;* the Ego as Will is determined to be self-determined through the Determined.

Let the student note again the three factors, two of which are permanent and belong to the total sphere of Determined Will, while the variable factor is what transforms this sphere into Desire.

III. *Choice;* the Ego as Will is determined to be self-determined through the Self-determined.

Here again the formula is seen to contain the two permanent factors of Determined Will, while the third factor is variable, and, united with the other two, constitutes Choice.

Note the movement in all three divisions, as well as through all three, since thus the structural character of the Will, its architectural principle, is brought out into strong relief, as it is the builder and the built.

Such are, then, the three stages in the process of the Determined Will — Impulse, Desire, Choice. Observe that in this sphere two factors are constant, both of which are embraced in the statement already employed: The Ego as Will is determined to determine itself. Here are the Determined and the Self-determined interlocked as it were in one act of thought, being the aforesaid constant factors. But the third factor is the variable one, and is what brings forth the

[illegible] by a De
[illegible]ged in our mind, or by a Ch
objects of Desire. Many illus
statements will be given later,
development of their meaning;
ever, let us note again and keep
two constant factors and the va
Determined Will.

The reader's attention is once
the preceding formulas, which a
not flush in language somewhat ex
ing. In each expression will be f
ness of the Will with its three pri
active or the determining, the pass
termined, the self-active or the sel
Such is their oneness; but the differ
them should also be noted; each s
own way of being determined. In t
Determinism, the Ego as Will is acted
be self-active; herein lies the unity of
But the Ego as Will is acted upon (d
in various ways; herein lies the diff
division and [illegible]

the determining principle, in that which determines the Ego to be self-determined, which process, we may again remind the reader, is threefold, the very movement of the Ego as Will, a fact already developed under the Conception of the Will in Section First.

Perhaps a word may be here in place, giving a reason for the rather stiff formalism of the preceding exposition. The Will has a strong mechanical side, it is indeed the mechanical phase of the mind as such, being, as it were, the machine thereof, the working principle, which must go according to an order. Yet, on the other hand, the Will is also the machine-maker supremely, first of all originating itself, or, as we say, self-determining. So it is the machine which ultimately makes all machines, and even has to make itself as machine-maker. The rigid mechanical working of a treatise on the Will is derived really from the theme, and must at least be sympathetically accepted by the reader who wishes to penetrate to the soul of the matter.

Undoubtedly there is much impatience expressed in these days at such "metaphysical jugglery." But impatience is not the attitude of the fair-minded man toward anything, nor is it a very good foundation for criticism.

Note. This seems to be the best place to insert a note on a subject which naturally rises in the

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is the
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it is determined. But I know that my individual Will did not make this material object as determined; what did? It must have been another Ego as Will, the Divine, Universal Will as absolute Self-determination, veritably the Will of the Universe. This, as Ego, as self-consciousness or self-objectification, must determine itself as other to itself, as the Determined. The Divine Ego, the Will of the Universe, also differentiates itself, it has difference within itself and so is different from itself, just in the process of its own Self. The Divine Person is the center and the circumference of all things, both separately and in unity. The Universal Will as the absolutely Self-determined, must posit the world as the Determined. This is the world into which the finite human Will is born, and through which it must unfold and get itself. The characteristic of such a world is, therefore, the Determined completely and absolutely, it is the Determined of God himself.

Moreover since it has been determined, created, produced, it has just this capacity in it as fundamental, it is capable of being determined, created, produced. That which is determined by the Divine Will must be determinable, is indeed just the determinable in the Universe; that which he creates must be absolutely creatable. So it follows that the external world is permeable to the Will through the divinely creative act, it must

You have really to will God's
ing this piece of rock into a grin
in it your Will. The rock is
created object, is a Determine
say, or by nature's Creative Will
change its form and purpose,
anew, your Will creates it over,
responds to your Will by its ver
is the being determined by Will.
ifies himself in the world, so
yourself in this fragment of Hi
it over through your Will into a
doing so you perform afresh H
you have to will his Will in maki
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such work: still unless you follow
Will, the material would be abs
trable to your Will.

Undoubtedly the material rem
make that, whatever be its transf
grindstone is still a stone, though

We may note here in passing that not only can you make a grindstone for your own purpose out of the God-given material, but you can make an image of the Divine Giver of the same in his creative act. When man makes out of the stone the divine maker of the stone, he has risen to the realm of Art, whose supreme function is to reveal through the senses the divinely Creative Ego unto mankind. This Universal Will making the world is also made over by the human Will, which thus becomes Artist, Poet, Thinker, according to the material and the manner in which it works and embodies its conception of the Divine.

It was a famous saying of Malebranche that we must see all things in God; in a like significance it must be declared that we must do all things in God. As all our cognizing is a re-cognizing, so all our doing is a re-doing. The material object before us drives us anew to will God's Will; a divinely determined world determines us to be self-determined. The Supreme Will is also the Determinant and the Determined, which latter is the world, through whose mastery we rise into a unity with the Divine Determinant, with the act of the Supreme Will world-creating. But we have to overcome or rather re-create the Determined, even if it be the divinely Determined, in order to attain our spiritual heritage, our freedom.

self-determined, limit-transcendin
the struggle of life and liberty be
have to transform the Determine
be the divinely Determined, by d
anew, so that I be not externally en
but be liberated from it through
Wherein we see that the grand des
is not only to be free, but to make h
to create his freedom every day fron
mined.

But such a work is a process,
labyrinthine, yet transparent, orderec
izable. Specially it is the process o
have called the Determined Will, th
which we shall now pick up again.

I. Impulse.

I am passing through the forest, of
see a dead limb of a tree dropping
me. I make a spring, or at least I dc
diately, without

movement without my own knowledge or consent. In the one case I am reached through the sense of sight, in the other through the sense of hearing; in both cases I am said to have an Impulse, which, in the instances just given, is a sensational Impulse, as will be hereafter seen.

In dodging the bullet, I am moved by an object coming from the outer world; I have nothing to do with sending the bullet which moves me to act. This outer world, by me undetermined, is, therefore, the determinant of my act; I am impelled to move (to determine myself) by something over which I have no control. Or, to state the formula of Impulse, *the Ego as Will is determined to be self-determined by the Undetermined.*

But Impulse has in itself a process, it is not something absolutely fixed and crystallized. At first the Ego as Impulse has its determinant in the outer world, but its whole movement is to get hold of this external determinant and to control the same. Impulse is seeking to master itself. Though it be the very nature and definition of Impulse to have its determinant outside of itself, still it is impelled to control itself therein; Impulse impulsely seeks to master Impulse. This fact we shall illustrate more fully later on.

Let the student, then, grasp and bring before his mind the real character of Impulse: it is a battle between the organism (or the organic

nant: then there will be the strug
two sides, the organism seeking
outer determinant within itself;
will sally forth out of the organi
ternal world and attempt to ge
determinant in the latter's own fi

Thus the cycle of Impulse is co
organism or the organic Ego is at
by the determinant, but it sweeps b
controls the determinant, when t
Impulse is brought to a conclusion

By the organic Ego we mean, i
Self-determined as vital, as anim
It is the lowest form of Will, the
strate thereof, absolutely necessary
ning, but something out of which t
rise more and more toward freedo
has self-movement, having the pow
tion within; to this extent it is se
and has Will, in common with all a

We recollect that in the primal
the Ego as Will

In general, we may then say that in Impulse the undetermined world determines the undetermined Ego to determine itself. The whizzing bullet, coming from the outside, hence not determined by me, determines me to dodge, to an act which springs from my organic ability to determine myself. A tree cannot impulsively dodge or make a movement from within outwards by a change of place. Thus the outer or undetermined world (in general here called the Undetermined) moves the Conception of the Ego as Will (see p. 41) to its process, that is, determines the undetermined Ego to be self-determined, which statement contains the three factors of the Conception of the Will (Undetermined, Determined, and the Self-determined). Note carefully in the present sphere of Impulse that the *undetermined* world is not to be confounded with the *undetermined* Ego, but that the two are brought together as opposites and produce through the organism the phenomenon of Impulse.

The organic mechanism, which Impulse brings into play, is made up mainly of three parts: the sensory and motor nerves, and their union in the cerebro-spinal center. The stimulation from the outer world is received by the sensory nerve of a sense organ, is carried to the cerebro-spinal center, and then is transferred to the motor nerve, which moves some muscle of the organism. In the case of dodging the bullet there was

terminism, two factors are constan
is variable, and has the movement
sis. Still this third, the Undete
itself difference, and will influen
various ways; or, to revert to the
formula, the Ego as Will is dete
self-determined by the Undetermi
modes. These modes of the Und
fluencing the Ego we shall try to or
in which we may again behold the
the generative principle.

There will be, accordingly, three
process of Impulse, which are, bri
as follows:—

I. The primary stage is simple
pulse, in which the organism is
itself, and which executes itself in
response to the stimulating world
termined by me). This stimul
determines the different ways i
organic Impulse may be excited.

But this stimulus can [illegible]

which seeks to prevent, negate, inhibit the stimulus coming from the stimulating world (the Undetermined by me). It is still an Impulse, which, however, seeks to inhibit an Impulse; thus Impulse divides within itself and turns against Impulse, hence this is the separative stage. When Impulse can not only negate Impulse, but control it as well, we have reached a new stage; from the negative Mastery of Impulse, we have come to the positive, which is next.

III. The third stage of Impulse is the Mastery of Impulse, therefore a kind of self-mastery, in which the Impulse is to control Impulse. This is a return to positive or active Impulse, but not in its first immediate form; it has now within itself the power of self-inhibition. The stimulating world has in the present stage roused the process of Impulse to master Impulse; or, the externally determining world rouses the organism (or the organic Ego) to a kind of self-determination.

The Mastery of Impulse, therefore, means the Mastery over Impulse by Impulse; Impulse is both the mastered and the master, or the self-mastered. Note the process in it: (1) the immediate organic Impulse; (2) the inhibition of the immediate Impulse; (3) the Impulse which is both executive and inhibitive and hence self-controlling. This last stage is often deemed not

... beings must have o
put down Impulse.

Still we should observe th
threshold of a new transition a
transition out of Impulse int
the Ego as Impulse is the det
pulse, inhibiting it, or calling
manifestly getting out of the s
determined by the Ego, into th
the Ego, whereof the treatme
At present we shall develop t
pertaining to the subject in
Impulse.

The fundamental thought of
tained in the statement: The Eg
undetermined at the start, is *de*
self-determined through the *Unde*
reader is often inclined to ask
formulation, which is hard to
sounds like a jingling rigmarole?
of the phraseology and he will
words interlink in meaning and
ing through both the process, its
as its difference.

statements. The latter may be called a rhetorical or popular statement, intelligible to everybody, while the former is a technical statement, intended for a strict scientific treatment of the subject.

Now, if one is plainer than the other, why not take the plainer? Because the formulated statement, though more difficult at first, links together into unity the whole subject-matter through its terms, while the popular statement leaves out the nexus which is given by the nomenclature. The common root-word *determine* utters the oneness throughout the whole sphere of Will, while its prefixes and suffixes express the varied differentiation in the same sphere.

I. The first stage is Organic or Executive Impulse, in which the Ego as Will is stimulated or determined to a movement or action immediately through an affection of the organism, which may receive its stimulus from within or from without itself. The execution is immediate, not inhibited; or, the motor discharge takes place without any intervention of the conscious Ego. The undetermined world outside thus passes through the body, and determines it to Impulses of various kinds; doubtless every stimulating object stirs the Will to some form of re-action, which, coming from the senses, is often called senso-motor.

1. We may first take notice
ments of the corporeal organism
which seem to come and go a
chick in the shell is found to b
fœtus in the womb has its strug
in its play moves from such ar
which is a necessity of its growtl
must be continually transcending
is. The young of all animals show
almost tireless yet apparently purp
the organism being driven to a
itself. But such activity is not p
physical body must realize itself,
ally determines the Will to such s
The total organism has in itself a s
produces the impulse to pass fro
state to its reality; it proceeds o
matically, self-moved, to fulfill its
organism.

It is manifest from the above
the stimulating object and the stin
complete unity, not separated int
and internal stimulus. The orga

tion of self-consciousness. But this unity is only a germ, implicit, unconscious, immediate, which is next to be seen separating within itself, and thereby unfolding into a new stage.

2. Herewith we come to what may be called Sensational Impulse, which is Impulse determined through sensation. The separation is now marked; the stimulating object and the stimulated organism, which gives a sensation, are the two distinct elements, which determine to the impulsive act. An external world impinges upon the senses, which in turn impel the action.

Sensational Impulse has, accordingly, for its stimulus not the total organism, but some specialized part of it, some sense, which is stimulated by something external. Every sensation taken up by the body has probably a motor effect or response. Put an object into the hand of the infant, it will contract and clutch; the sensation at that part rouses the immediate response. The new-born babe starts to breathing at once, doubtless through the fresh stimulus of the air; the sunlight will draw its eye; it will suck and swallow, if something be held to its lips.

Such immediate responses of the organism to a stimulus are often called reflex actions, which are without the intervention of a conscious purpose. The eyelids shut unconsciously when a blow is seen descending; the movement is an im-

[illegible] a sensation st
external object. In this case tl
acts through Impulse, which i
motive power is not its own, but
side of itself.

As the human body is a vast
tions, so it is also an outlet of
movements, which fact indicat
variety of Impulses. Touch, th
sense, has its motor counterpart, a
sense has its special movement.
nerve may bring in a sensation a
nerve may carry out a motion, b
sion of one into the other is psyc
of Will, even though it be son
involuntary. Such an act of Will
which is a determination through
mined.

Very simple is the case of th
itself in water to wash away an i
cle of dust. But Impulses have
become complex in their ground

decently; still further, I have had a tendency to forget just this little duty, and have been compelled to make a special resolve of this kind: First of all brush your coat. Thus many experiences and thoughts may lie unconsciously between a Sensation and an Impulse.

It is plain, therefore, that a latent sensation or a chain of latent sensations may help determine the Impulse. The real sensation starts a chain of latent ones, which at last determine the act. Thus our Impulses become often very complicated, and our immediate outer sensation, stimulating inner latent sensations, brings about a remote reaction.

3. Emotive Impulse we name the next phase of Organic Impulse in general. Not only an outer sensation, but an inner one also may have a motor reaction. Such an inner sensation is that of hunger or thirst, each of which has its special location in the organism, and determines the Will to activity.

In Sensational Impulse we saw the sensation becoming internal in the form of latency, which latent sensation requires to be stimulated and started by an external sensation. But now the inner sensation requires no external stimulus; there is felt a lack, a breach, a defect; something is wanting in hunger and thirst and in appetite generally. This inner sensation moves the Will to supply the deficiency, thus begetting

with itself.

Thus we have passed in revie
of Organic Impulse, as determi
of its stimulus — the automatic
and the emotive. In the latter
found the stimulus to be a
moves the Will that it be suppli
deficiency be excessive, there se
tion of the organism called pain
a new stimulus followed by a n
like manner, in a sensation, if
excessive, there results pain, or
agreeable. The prick of a pin p
an impulsive reaction, but the st
in the form of pain.

Now this excess of stimulus,
the reaction of the organism doe
immediately by its impulsive move
thus remains, calls forth another k
which seeks to inhibit the stimu
That is, an inhibitory Impulse
moves to reverse or

II. This brings us to the Inhibitory Impulse, which is an inner impulsive reaction against the outer organic reaction. Thus the Impulse in its process separates within itself, and reverses itself; the first immediate response it undoes, if the stimulus continues. Very important and significant is this inhibitory power which seems even organic in part; the animal has it and can become stoical to pain; the mule in particular you may belabor cruelly and still you may not be able to make it respond except by a twitch; and the inhibitory power of a balky horse will thwart any persuasive means known to man.

The inhibition is still an Impulse, though in the human subject the higher activities of mind, thought, reason, duty, may play in. The Ego as Will is determined to act (that is, to be self-determined) by the Undetermined, which is now not simply the organic stimulus, but also the reversal of that stimulus. It is true that the first stimulus remains in the form of pain; there is an interference with the organic process, an interruption of function, which is painful or perchance only disagreeable. The Undetermined is, therefore, still present and active, yet limited, inhibited, at least up to a certain point.

In physical pain, therefore, there is a conflict between the total natural healthy process of the organism and the stimulus, which enters from the outside interferingly; the immediate bodily

, ... say, in pain, being in a
ration with itself. It tries to get i
ference, and therein reveals the
pulse, which again can be looked a
according to the nature of its stim

The sensational stimulus in its ex
pain, and therewith evokes the In
pulse. A wound, being an interru
organic process, causes a painful sen
may at first call forth a shout or a pa
which, being continued, the Will see
in proportion to its strength and d
The organism naturally is in agre
itself, in a state of equilibrium; the
what produces the disagreement,
equilibrium. Resistance to such dist
organism makes through itself, seeki
the same, for this Inhibitory Impul
the negation of a negative in the ph

Mark again that this inhibition i
a conscious act of Will, though it
tially so; it is still an Impulse

ever, see that the Will is beginning to determine the Undetermined, though from the outside as yet.

The emotive stimulus produces pain not only in its excess but in its deficiency, and in both ways calls forth the Inhibitory Impulse. The sensational stimulus (just considered) works pain by being excessive, in contrast with the emotive stimulus which works pain in two directions. Hunger is such a stimulus, which may become the source of pain by the lack of gratification or by a surfeit, by deficiency or by excess.

There is an inhibition upon eating and drinking set by nature; the bird and the wild animal are, on the whole, not intemperate. All appetites have this double character, with the possibility of the double pain, which is thus divided by the twofoldness of the stimulus, which twofoldness again calls forth the double prohibitory Impulse. The organic Inhibition thus reaches upward and downward, meets and negates excess and deficiency, bringing the organism back to its harmonious round, to its uninterrupted total process.

In the movement of organic Inhibition we can also observe the working of the Psychosis, which shows in this sphere the immediate, the separative, and the returning stages.

1. The most direct, or the immediate form of organic Inhibition, takes place within the body;

tive, the Impulse is inhibited in
an Impulse, also organic at the
stoical resistance to pain may be c

2. The separative form of Inh
when the stimulating object outsi
inhibited — not appropriated and p
removed, inhibited. It is mainl
Impulse which calls forth the pr
Inhibition. The chief point here to
that the organism, or some member
lated by some external object, swe
brushes away, or turns aside and av
of the stimulation.

3. The third form is the Inhib
Inhibition, the negation of the neg
choose to think the matter under su
the return of the organism to its s
turbed process after the interruptio
call this also Impulse, since the or
of itself to return to its own har
after interference and inner separ
is, then, the movement of org

outcome of the Inhibitory Impulse: the restoration of the organism from the negative power of the stimulus. Thus we bring before us the battle of the body; the stimulus assails it in one way or other, it turns upon the attacking foe and repels the assault. This is done by Impulse, not through conscious purpose; the organism in its own might and action, will defend itself when assailed. Still, we have here a manifestation of Will, though in its lowest, most trammeled form, being determined to act through a stimulus so largely external.

Undoubtedly this restoration may not take place at once, or even very soon, but only after long and many struggles, and after many means have been employed in aid of the inhibition. A protracted case of illness is an instance; the organism is attacked, it resists, but it has to be supported in its resistance by many auxiliaries in the shape of medical attendance, nursing and remedies. Yet all these may avail not, the assault may arise, must arise in the end, which is death.

At present, however, we are dealing with the organism as restored; it has passed through the negative might of the stimulus and has reached wholeness again, which is health. The process of recovery is pleasant, being an overcoming of pain, of organic interference and separation. Pleasure is, in its more concrete form, just this

But we have now recovered the
from its inner scission and con
before us whole and triumphant
begins to manifest a new kin
embracing this wholeness of the bc
ing from a new kind of stimulu
third stage in the movement of I
we have designated as the master
which mastery, however, is still ar
involving the inhibition of Impulse

All these stages of inhibition a
in many facts pertaining to the ch
the infant will suck almost any
between its lips; there is an immed
to the stimulus. But it soon begi
this response, it will suck only a c
the mother's breast, and will inhi
stimulus; yet it will also inhibit t
and suck again, when it is hungry
which we see the first immediate
the stimulus, then the inhibition
sponse, then the inhibition of

Impulse is thus getting the mastery of itself. Indeed the child can form no organic habit without going through these three stages — the direct yielding to Impulse, the inhibition of Impulse, and the inhibition of this inhibition. To use another well-known fact: the infant, having taken food, responds to the stimulus in its intestinal canal and evacuates; then it soon begins to inhibit such stimulation and refrains from evacuation for a time; finally, being placed in a proper position, it inhibits this inhibition and evacuates. Thus the movement of Impulse is toward the mastery of Impulse through the inhibitory power, which power in the present sphere is still an Impulse.

III. The third general stage is what we have called the mastery of Impulse, the positive mastery thereof, still through Impulse. Already we have seen that Inhibition is a negative power over Impulse, but now there is a reaching out for a positive power over itself, yet through itself. We have just observed the might of Inhibition exercised against the immediate organic Impulse and negating the same, then followed the Inhibition inhibited, with the restoration of the organism out of its scission and pain.

But it cannot rest quietly in itself as long as there is a stimulating outer world continually rousing it, determining it, impinging upon it through the senses. It is stimulated anew to

showed in inhibition, when it s
the stimulus negatively; but no
scend this inhibitory limit, anc
possession of the world which
appropriating externality.

Accordingly this is what may
general the appropriative Impulse,
get possession of the object, indeec
external world, as the latter is, i
grand stimulus of the organism.
that we are still in the realm of Imp
the Ego as Will is determined to ac
thing not of its own determination,
Undetermined. Still it is seeking t
just that something, and is rapidl
toward such a result.

When the child runs after the but
to appropriate it, to make it his ow
color, movement and freedom, he
the Impulse above designated. He
by the sight of the object primaril
and all the world must

he is going to own, and indeed to be, the whole cycle — the object stimulating, the stimulus, and the response to the stimulus.

Herein lies the general distinction between this third stage and the first stage, that of simple organic Impulse. When the infant clutches the stick which touches its tiny fingers, the movement is merely automatic; there is no volitional Impulse to possess the stimulating object, but simply the organic response to the stimulus. But when the infant will possess the stick, making it his own, we come to a new Impulse.

The Appropriative Impulse will also have its movement, its Psychosis, which will manifest itself in three stages.

1. There is, in the first place, the Impulse to Appropriation by immediate seizure. The world stands out against the Ego as Will; the latter must overcome the difference, transcend the bound and take possession. For the Ego by its very nature cannot rest in separation, but its being is just the process out of separation and limitation. The external object through the senses stimulates it to be itself, that is, to reach forth and seize the object stimulating — to overcome the gulf of separation between itself and the world. The little child grasps for quite every thing, and the grown man "wants the earth." There is, accordingly, an immediate

propriative Impulse springing from the very ence of the Ego as Will.

The Ego as Will is impelled further to take up struggle with the external world, and to ure all the pain of such a struggle. As ady indicated, the stimulus caused by the ect can become an interference with the anic process, producing that inner physical sion called pain. But this too must be tered, and hence the necessity of reaching r to the stimulating object which causes pain, getting control of that. Pain gives an ulse to appropriate, to control, as well as to sh aside or get rid of the pain-causing thing ome way.

child, if he cannot get the moon, will at least make a moon for himself; if he cannot have the thing, he will be the thing; he cannot have that horse, so he will be the horse himself. Thus he is forced to a new and indeed higher appropriation, a spiritual one; if he cannot transfer the object to himself, he will transform himself into the object, obtaining thereby an inward possession.

3. This brings us to the next stage, that of Imitation. In the training of the child, it is an important turning-point when he seeks external appropriation and fails. He is not unreasonable in his attempt to grasp all; still he must fail, and the educative question comes up: What can he do with Failure?

There follows naturally the Impulse tc appropriation through imitating the object. It has often been noticed that the child at a certain age has a tendency to imitate everything in his environment, especially the movements and sounds of animals; thereby he is really taking possession of them in their action and character. The horse's motions were wholly alien to this child's mind, till he could imitate them, till he could do what the horse does; then he internally owned the animal. He also plays rider or master; a toy horse he will have and drive; he must make, too, a picture of the horse; thus he shows in many ways his imitative bent.

an also must imitate as well as the child. eeks to imitate the highest, to be what it is, e over himself into its image. Poetry is ed by Aristotle to be Imitation, and all art n it the imitative principle. Of course Imi- n has its limits; to copy the particular is a great matter; but to imitate the true and niversal, and to be the same in thought and is the greatest of greatness.

itation still is Impulse, having a stimulus the outside which determines the Ego as to action. Yet this stimulus coming from bject has now a peculiar character; the Ego opriates it internally, copies it through Imi- n, and so possesses the copy which it makes.

Herewith we have passed into a new stage of the Determined Will. The Ego has stripped the stimulus of its immediate or presentative side which comes from nature and has made it representative or an image. Or, from the stimulus of sense-perception which gives Impulse, we have passed to the stimulus of memory or imagination, which gives Desire. To revert to the formula of the process, the Ego as Will is determined to be self-determined by the Determined, that is, by that which is determined by the Ego.

Summary of Impulse. Although we have sought to order the various phenomena of Impulse in the preceding account, unfolding the same according to the inner process of the Ego, of which they are manifestations, we hope it will be of advantage to the student to see a condensed statement like the following.

I. *Organic (or Executive) Impulse;* the bodily organism responds immediately to the stimulus produced by the stimulating object, without reaction or inhibition. Or, in general, an externally determining world determines organic activity directly through its stimulation.

The kinds of such activity or of organic Impulse are three: first, the *automatic*, wherein the stimulating object and the stimulated body are one, unseparated; second, *the sensational*, in which the stimulating object and the stimulated body are separate, the senses being stimulated by

stimulus, which (as in the case o
lack or deficiency and hence painf

II. *Inhibitory Impulse;* the s
feres with the process of the or
then inhibits impulsively such stim
this case becomes some form o
the externally determining world
inhibited from determining the org
organism itself — the battle of the

The kinds of such inhibition are
the stimulus as such, within the org
hibited, showing the reaction of the
a whole against interference or pain
stimulating object from outside is inhi
the inhibition is inhibited, when t
restores its natural process, or re
equilibrium.

Thus the organism asserts itself a
nal determination in the form of
negativing its own inner stimulatic
negativing this negation or inhibition.
ment is toward the control of

taken possession of by the organism, through Impulse still, wherein Impulse seeks to get control of what stimulates it, and thus reach self-control or self-determination. This, however, is not attained in the present sphere, though we see that Impulse is at bottom the Impulse toward self-end, which is indeed a getting rid of Impulse.

The movement in this mastery of Impulse is threefold: first, *the appropriative Impulse*, which impels to an immediate or real seizure of the external world; second, *Failure of such real seizure*, the world not letting itself be seized in that way; third, *the imitative Impulse*, which impels to the ideal seizure of the external object.

At this point, when through imitation of the sensuous thing, the stimulus passes from the external world to the internal and becomes an idea, image, or ideal end, which in its turn stimulates to action, the realm of Impulse is transcended and we have passed into that of Desire. That is, we have quit the field of stimulation undetermined by the Ego, and have entered the field of stimulation determined by the Ego.

In the mastery of Impulse there is the Impulse to reach over and take possession of the stimulating object outside the organism, or to get control of the external determinant which starts the Impulse. Thus we see that Impulse

s ultimately to take up into itself its own ing-point — in which, when it fully succeeds, no longer Impulse. In this fact we observe Impulse moves toward the grand end of the , a complete self-determination or freedom.

Observations on Impulse. Casting a look back the preceding development of Will as Im- , we may distinguish the movement of the es as follows:

In the simple psychical Will there is the constant factor, the Self-determined, which e very Conception of Will, without which annot think Will.

In Determined Will there are two constant rs, the Determined and the Self-determined,

the mastery of Impulse, which is the complete cycle of Impulse involving the other stages.

V. Still further, each of these three stages being the Ego roused or stimulated to action by the Determinant, will itself be a Psychosis with a threefold movement. That is, the Ego as executive Impulse is stimulated by the Determinant to go through its immediate psychical process — automatic, sensational, emotive; the Ego as inhibitory Impulse is stimulated to go through the separative (or negative) process of inhibition in its threefold manner; finally the Ego as mastery of Impulse, being stimulated thereto by the Determinant, will have its threefold process.

VI. From the preceding we see that, in the passage of the most general form of Will to its most particular form, that is, from the Will as the separative stage of the Ego to the Sensational Will for instance, there are six steps — the Will as such, the Psychological Will, the Determined Will, Impulse, Executive Impulse, the Sensational phase of Executive Impulse. In each of these divisions, however, there has always been seen the fundamental process of the Ego, the Psychosis, uniting them all.

Moralization of Impulse. Though we are treating of Impulse in this part of our work as a psychical phenomenon, we may look at it for a moment in a different sphere, that of Morals, which, however, depends directly upon the psy-

within itself the Determinant, to inhibit such outer influence by its own inner self-determined power. Third, having gained control of itself, the organism sweeps back to the Determinant, and seeks to get possession of the same, that is, seeks to determine the Determinant, making this its own, internal. When, however, the Determinant has become internal and is determined by the Ego, we have passed out of Impulse into Desire.

II. Desire.

We shall at the beginning state the formula for Desire: *The Ego as Will is determined to be self-determined through the Determined.* Let the student compare this with the preceding formula for Impulse, and note wherein they are alike and wherein different. Thus he may see the object of the formula as the connecting and organizing principle in setting forth the total structure of the Will, and as that which, though bare and skeleton-like at the start, is to sweep forward and develop into the full movement of this stage of volition.

The relation of Impulse to Desire may here be touched upon. Desire has in it Impulse, yet Impulse inhibited, and mastered, not executing itself in the act, at least not immediately. I see an apple and am hungry, my Impulse is to seize

devour it on the spot; but I reflect that it
s to another or may not be good for me;
hibit the execution of my Impulse, having
ed it and made its process internal, ideal.
may be said to *desire* the apple, having
e Impulse for it, but the Impulse con-
. If I grasped for it immediately on see-
that would be Impulse (sensational); but
it such Impulse, so that the visible object
ger starts the actual movement of the
m, but rather a movement of mind which
e (here called the Determined), and which
only Impulse but also the inhibition and
astery thereof, in fine its total process
lized.

"I desire to go home;" the going home is before me more or less distinctly as an image, which I am to transform into a deed. This image has been already taken up and ideated by me at some former time; now it is separated from my inner Self and held up before me by my own act; still further, I, in an effort of Will, seek to realize it, converting it into a deed. I cannot desire anything before knowing or feeling somewhat of it.

In the above instance of Desire we may note the three elements of time — past, present, and future. When I desire to go home there is in it a past experience, which I propose to repeat in the future; the image of that past experience belongs to the present, I am now determined by it to the future act. The Ego with its process is the central fact; it takes from the past and projects into the future, its activity being in the present. The Ego, therefore, is the total continuous movement through past, present, and future, reaching backward and forward and connecting both extremes in the Now.

To be sure, I may desire something which I have never experienced directly. I may desire to go to Europe, never having been there. Still, in such a case I have the image, doubtless somewhat vague before me, and that image is a result of former experiences, a result of what I have read, seen and done.

These experiences are chiefly former sensations

eelings, which have been stored away in ind through sense-perception and organic lation. In the impulsive stage, which has receded, the stimulus was present, imme- more or less directly sensuous, and de- ned the Ego as Will to action; but now in e, the Impulse remains as something ex- nced in the past, as a feeling or an image, , however, can be still called up and set to as an inner stimulation. This again deter- the Ego as Will to repeat the deed, possi- new relations and combinations.

s the image or feeling or thought, as an nt of Desire, is not presentative, but re- tative, not presented immediately from

world, being the work of the Ego itself as Intellect (see *Psychology and the Psychosis*, p. 222).

Thus we reach the formula which covers the whole field of Desire: *The Ego as Will is determined to be self-determined through the Determined.* The significance of each of the three factors must be brought into mind and then the total process realized in a sweep of thought, otherwise the whole thing is hollow. For some it may always seem hollow. Note the three factors: the image as agent or motive power moves the Ego as Will to realize the image, which thus becomes the deed. Or I may say, the ideal determines me to make it real; or, the past experience moves the Ego in the present to repeat it in a future action.

Do all images rouse Desire, as all sensations rouse Impulse? Does the very fact that I possess an image derived from some former experience have a tendency to excite the Will to repeat the experience in a new deed? It is probable, though there must be conflict and inhibition among so many experiences. Still the Image (or ideal) is always soliciting the Ego to make it real, that is to make it complete in the process of the Ego. For the image is but a part of this total process, and so rouses in the Ego the longing for self-completion, which is the foundation of Desire. Why do we desire? Because of incompleteness; we feel a lack, a deficiency in the mind; just as

hunger, we feel a deficiency in the body, ch has not what it needs to make the organic e complete; hence, too, physical pain, as have already seen. So Desire can become ful where we have not something which we for, and which we imagine more or less inctly.

or must we forget in this general connection all to mind the negative side of Desire; we in some cases desire not to realize the past erience quite as strongly as we may desire to ze it in other cases. The image of home excite the Desire to stay away, wherein nory and experience are again the determin- element. Here, then, we may notice an bitory power in Desire, corresponding to

has become an internal Determinant; the apple of Impulse is transformed into the apple of Desire, in which the Impulse is outwardly inhibited yet ideally exists in the form of appetency or longing. Desire, accordingly, involves the Ego with its process; in order to desire anything, the Self must, as it were, be coiled up in the same; if I desire the apple, that object as desired has within itself the total process of the Ego as before stated.

The Ego working over the external Determinant into an internal one must show its individual character in the Desire, which is the Ego's elaboration of Impulse. One man desires to spend his leisure in reading Shakespeare; another man to play cards; each Ego reflects itself in the Desire. Both may have the same general Impulse as the starting-point, but how different their Desires!

We shall now take a look at the three stages of Desire in advance of a more detailed treatment.

I. The primary stage we call Executive Desire, inasmuch as the Will as Desire carries itself out into the act immediately, in response to the Determinant, which is the Determined (by me), that is, some inner determination of my own. This inner determining world of mine has three general ways of stimulating Desire, corresponding to the Psychosis of the Ego in Intellect.

But the Determinant finds itself able to deter-

not, that is, to negate Desire, hence the new

The second stage is that of Inhibitory
e, which seeks to prevent, inhibit, negate
nmediate Desire coming from the Determi-
This is still a Desire, which, however,
to inhibit a Desire; thus Desire, so to
, divides within itself and turns against
, hence this is the second or separative stage
sire. Here, too, is a process the result of
is that Desire can not only inhibit Desire,
an remove the inhibition, and thereby has
bility to control Desire. Next this ability
pass into reality, which is a return to the
tive stage yet with the power of inhibition.

notice that we are on the threshold of a new transition, namely, the transition to Choice.

This outline is now to be unfolded into its details, which we shall find to be governed by the movement of the Psychosis.

I. The Desire which executes itself, that is, carries itself out at once into the deed, we may designate as executive. The Ego as Will is immediately determined to the action and is not stopped; the determining activity has its outcome in the deed, without any successful inhibition. This determining activity now becomes the source of different forms of Desire, which we shall find to be threefold — a feeling or sensation, an image, and a thought. As already noticed the Ego as Intellect determines these three forms of knowing as its own, which three forms are now agents or determinants moving the Will to action; what I know, I can realize, must realize, unless inhibited.

1. Desire in its most immediate and unconscious form, as feeling or inner sensation, is usually called instinctive. By force of Instinct the human being or lower animal performs actions which bring about certain ends of which it has no foresight (no distinct image). The bird builds its nest by Instinct, not imagining its young probably, and assuredly not thinking of the preservation of its species. Yet both these ends lie in its acts, yea, are the essence of it,

hout which such kind of activity would be aningless. Man, beholding the work of the d, is the one who does the imaging and the nking of such ends, as far as we know. Still bird has them too, in the form of feeling or efeeling (presentiment), which drives it to ion.

Here we must mark the distinction between pulse and Instinct. Impulse is an immediate ponse of the Will to a stimulus, outer or er, without any intervention of an ideal end; ereas Instinct has such an ideal end, though in a conscious form, but in the form of feel-. Thus Instinct belongs to the field of Desire. ll Instinct has always in it an element of Im-se: the bird builds its nest by an Impulse, if

not all Impulses are Instincts. Still most Impulses have some meaning or ideal end, and thus rise to Instinct. Perhaps we shall discover, on investigation, that all genuine Impulses are Instincts of some kind. I do not see why the little boy makes so much noise, he certainly has an unceasing Impulse thereto; on looking into the matter I find this Impulse has an ideal end which the boy is seeking to realize with all his might. Child study has, as a part of its function, to catch this ideal end in every outward Impulse and to make it a means of education. It was especially Froebel who saw in the play of children not simply Impulse but likewise Instinct, which could be developed into embodying the highest ideal ends of man, and thereby bringing them into the lives of the little ones.

The field of Instinct is very large, but this is not the place to bring together and to order its multitudinous forms; the subject belongs to Feeling rather than to Will. Still we shall note a few of its leading manifestations, especially in so far as they determine Volition.

There is, first of all, what may be called organic Instinct, the immediate response of the organism through the ideal end. The infant closes its lips for sucking when it feels some object touching them; this is a "motor reaction" undoubtedly, yet something more, else we could not truly call it an Instinct. The appetites,

nger, thirst, the sexual passion, are properly
ganic Instincts, in which the ideal end is im-
citly contained. The conservation of the indi-
dual and of the species is unconsciously at work
many bodily reactions, which thus become
stincts, having their ideal end. Not a few of
se Instincts are transitory, belonging only to
ldhood and needful at the time. Other In-
cts come with time, indeed may be generated
d established in the organism.

There are what may be called emotional In-
cts, such as presentiment, longing, forebod-
, the prophetic Instinct. A feeling of the
ure produces its response in action; such a
ling is not directly organic, though often

futurity, of the order which is to be. The great man must be great first in presentiment, which he is impelled to fulfill in his deeds.

Aspiration is a very noteworthy form of Instinct, the Instinct to transcend the limit, the infinite Instinct. Especially do we aspire to know, to reach over the bounds of ignorance, and therein assert the supreme selfhood of us. We feel the present limit, we desire to remove it, indeed we cannot rest quietly in it without a kind of self-annihilation. The ideal end is now not merely some particular end, but the universal one, and the Instinct is not alone to live but to know. The world-poem of *Faust* has its fundamental conflict just here: the strongest Aspiration, the infinite Instinct, or the Instinct for the Infinite, on the one side, and the inhibition of that aspiration through skepticism on the other side. Faust aspires, above all things, to know, that is, to know the truth, but just that is the knowledge which knowledge denies, in his case. Thus the theme is not some phase of aspiration struggling with some obstacle, or with some other phase, but the conflict of aspiration itself with its own negative.

Instinct, on account of its character (having the unconscious future end in the present act), has long been the favorite field for teleological speculation. The bird builds its nest, unconsciously providing for its young and the contin-

of its kind; who implanted in it this fore-
or rather forefeeling? The bird does not
of it, but the creator must have known of
d intended just that in the primal creative
Providence, alone conscious of the ideal
gives to us all, man and the lower animals,
Instincts which we unconsciously carry out.
ution, on the contrary, deduces them from
orking of natural laws, and Instinct becomes
tor reaction of the organism. Premonitions
have been supposed to have in them some-
of the divine, on account of their sugges-
of the future event; and prophecy, the
ctive utterance of the future without the
of reasoning, is a well-known phase of

image of the little brood can hardly be absent in such a case, though the ideal end as feeling and not as image be still the propelling power.

With the appearance of this image, however, we pass over to a new stage of the present movement of Desire.

2. That form of Desire which is mediated by an Image may be called Ideational Desire. The instance which was above cited, *I desire to go home*, and used as an illustration of Desire in general, belongs to the sphere of Ideational Desire. The image of going home is a previous experience which I now recall and which I propose to repeat. The mediating object is the Image, representing here something which has been and is to be, with the Ego as Will making the connection between the past and the future and forming the complete process.

Through some former sensation or impulse there has been a response of the Will; the act of representing this sensation with its response becomes an image with a motive power; such an image with its motive power stirring the Will to a new deed is Desire as ideational, sometimes called ideo-motor, because the idea or image has this motive power. All sensuous presentations have more or less of a motor reaction; all representations are an ideal copy not only of the stimulating object, but also of the corresponding organic reaction. The image is, therefore, not

lete without its motive power over the Will; e has in it the demand for such complete- To inhibit this completing energy of the e is disagreeable, possibly painful.

e image is a determination of the Ego, now determines the Will to activity. More ctly than any form of Instinct is the image a an elaboration of the mind, something nined by the Ego. At this point it is well back and make the connection with the al formula of Desire: *the Ego as Will is nined to be self-determined through the mined*, that is, through what is determined Ego, here the image. Thus the image in is both past and future, both means and

present undertaking. Everything which we have experienced and which can be recalled may be the source of some Desire. The appetite for food is an impulse primarily, then we see it to be an instinct tending to self-preservation; finally it may become a Desire by the image of some favorite dish enticing us to eat. Some such image perpetually haunts the glutton. In like manner the sexual appetite is first an impulse and an instinct; then through the image it is transformed into lust. The inhibition of the image is the root of moral reformation in most kinds of sensual indulgence; especially is this true of carnality.

But not only the images of Memory can stimulate Desire; we can put together images of our own which have the same power. That is, the Imagination proper is able to generate the imaged stimulus, and becomes particularly active in some kinds of disease. Insanity has a good deal to do with the image forcing the patient to action. Ability to inhibit the image at its creative fountain-head is often the test of sanity.

As the vague instinct clarifies into the image, so the image rises to thought or conception. When I created the image which determined my Will to action, I showed a creative power; this power now produces the energy determining the Will. Here, however, we come to a new stage.

3. That form of Desire which is mediated by

ception (or thought) may be called, in
resent connection, Conceptive Desire. A
ht strikes me, as the expression runs, and
ceed to carry it out in a machine, in a book,
deed. The conception of the machine, the
the deed, is what determines me to action;
sure, it is my conception, hence something
mined by me. That is, the conception is
mined by me, yet this my conception is now
determines me to its execution.

conception is not the mere image of the
not the image of its contents, but the
on of them. All true conception is the
ve act of the Ego, which ideally generates
oject, say the machine, and makes it run

poet, scientist, or inventor, has this creative conception, which compels him to give birth to the new thing in the world. He is driven to production by overmastering Desire, which is a necessity of his nature. The present form of Desire (conceptive) touches his deepest self, the point of origination; it is his determining element, which, however, is created by himself.

Herewith, however, this sphere comes to an end, having attained its highest point, and therein run upon its limit. The Ego, having created its determinant, must be able to inhibit that determinant through the same creative power; if it can originate the conception to do, it can originate the conception not to do; both belong to the power of origination, being its two sides, so to speak, the positive and the negative. That is, if the Ego has the complete power of creating what determines it to action, such power includes the veto of the determinant. In general, the executive stage of Desire implies and passes into the inhibitory.

II. In the stage just considered, the executive, we saw all the determinants of Desire — Feeling or Sensation, Image and Thought — carrying themselves out into the deed immediately. But now the Ego as Will is inhibited, is determined not to be self-determined (to act) by the Determined (some determination of the Ego). On an inspection of this formula, we may find in it that there is still determination, though negative,

purpose and quite as accessible? As she has passed some of them and taken the one, she must have felt some inhibitory impulse in specializing the one place by rejecting the rest. Still further, she continues to go to the same spot afterwards to lay her eggs, till the first inhibition hardens into habit.

The inhibition of the image in ideational Desire has been already alluded to. Memory and imagination may be too active in pouring forth their riches; certain things we must forget, not only inhibiting the consequent deed but also the provocative image. If our will is not to avenge an act of wrong, we must blot out the recurring image of it, for that image has a tendency to translate itself into action. Imagination may be well curbed at times, as having the opposite result, namely that of destroying action. If the image does not go over into the deed, there is a gradual sapping of the Will, a resignation to day-dreaming, which never accomplishes what it has imagined. Whole races have apparently surrendered themselves to imagination largely; the Hindoos, of all terrestrial peoples, seem to have the most images and the fewest deeds. Desire with its image unfulfilled is but an empty wish, and wishes are proverbially vain, though entrancing. Hamlet in one phase of his character is such a dreamer, giving himself up to the image without the deed.

[illegible] inhibition of thought or conception is [illegible] manifestation of the Will as desire. We [illegible] conceive but not carry out our conception, [illegible] plan but not realize our plan. Here [illegible] the great separation which we see in some [illegible] the separation between thought and [illegible]. In the executive sphere the conception [illegible] over into the deed immediately; but the [illegible] Will can inhibit that going over. Un[illegible]ly thinking without doing has a tendency [illegible] the Will from action, producing a kind [illegible]alysis of volitional power. The great poet [illegible], Shakespeare, has portrayed such a [illegible] in his Hamlet, who well knows that "the [illegible] hue of resolution" can be "sicklied o'er

the deed immediately, such is their primordial tendency, they are determinants of the Ego driving it to performance. But just this is what the Ego as Will first inhibits. Take the image of going home, I may inhibit the act but keep the image, making desire a wish. In like manner, I may cherish my conception of some invention but never realize it in the machine.

2. The second inhibition turns against the determinant itself — Feeling, Image, Thought may be inhibited. In the first stage of inhibition they remained, their execution alone was inhibited. But now not only the action but the determinants to action are stopped by the negative might of the Ego, are apparently wiped out, and there is left — what? A seeming blank, which is, however, the negativity of the Ego, and which thus becomes a determinant again. So we see a new determination of the Ego arising in place of those inhibited, yet the latter may still recur, being likewise determinations of the Ego. Such is the outcome of this second Inhibition, it has inhibited all content of Desire, all determination thereof, but just therein has become a determinant itself, and so must inhibit itself.

3. This is the inhibition of the inhibition, or the inhibition of Desire is now itself inhibited. The result is a return of Desire, but in a new form; the execution is no longer immediate, but depends henceforth on the inhibition; each De-

has its own negative over it, it can be car-
out only by consent of its own veto power.
more or less conscious of the ability to
it, which lies back of every Desire which I
w. If I cannot inhibit my Desire, I have
self-control; if I must at once execute every
I wish, I am indeed in a pitiable condition.
still further, I must be able to inhibit the
ition, or to stop stopping Desire.
now see the meaning of the inhibition; the
is not to be controlled by its Desire, it has
mined not to be determined by this one or
one, just as they spring up, but to subject
the might of inhibition. Such is the nega-
control of Desire, which, however, must

hibit Desire must, by its own inner necessity, be inhibited, since it too is Desire; thus inhibition inherently leads to the inhibition of inhibition, just as negation leads logically to the negation of negation. If we can inhibit all Desire, we must be able to inhibit the Desire to inhibit Desire, or to negate the negative. This is, as above stated, the negative mastery of Desire, its suppression and even the suppression of the suppression. Next we are to see what is its positive mastery.

III. This is the third leading stage of Desire, which we designate as the mastery of Desire. With the inhibition of the inhibition came the restoration of Desire in general, yet with something added; though we removed the veto, we had the consciousness of possessing still the veto power, the power of saying nay to every Desire. But now we must realize our power of saying yes to the Desire, *if we so desire;* we are to execute again Desire, and thus Desire also seeks at last to determine itself. Just as Impulse reaches out toward the mastery of Impulse, so Desire reaches out for the mastery of Desire, which means the mastery over Desire through Desire. That is, the immediate Desire, which carried itself into execution directly, no longer controls, but is controlled, this time by a new Desire, however; this new Desire has been mediated by the inhibition.

In the present stage there is, accordingly, a

n to the first or executive stage, yet through nhibition; there is the fiat, but likewise the inhibited. Here, too, we may observe the fold process: first is the immediate mastery, hich one Desire is carried out, while other eting Desires are inhibited; second, the ition gets the mastery and carries itself out e act — Aversion; finally, this mastery is ered, the negative might of Aversion is put , which gives a new mastery — the mastery ersion.

The totality of Desire inclines to one course nduct in preference to all others, to do just and not differently. I must master every e through inhibition, then I must follow

other Desires. I am indeed a totality of Desires of which one rules or is executed, the rest are suppressed.

Thus we see that Desire, after inhibition, goes back to the original determinant of Desire, be it instinctive, ideational, or conceptive, and seeks to control that, choosing which it will execute, or desiring anew the special Desire which it will realize. Such is the immediate mastery of Desire through Desire.

From what has preceded we see that this mastery comes through the inhibition of competing Desires so that the strongest is taken, and the others inhibited. Moreover this inhibition is more or less latent, unconscious, implicit. But now the inhibition is to become strongly explicit, and to show itself the determinant of the desire which is carried into execution.

2. This is the field of Aversion, the Desire not to follow, but to turn away to the opposite, or the Desire not to execute the given determinant but the reverse, which is not merely the negative inhibition of the Desire, but the positive contradiction of it realized in an act. The example was: I desire to go home; the image of going home puts down all other competing images. But this image of going home may stir me, through some memory or experience, to move just the other way; not only do I inhibit it as a competing image, not only does it determine me

o go home, but even to start off in the
site direction.

ersion, therefore, leads to a positive act of
; there is again execution, not simple inhi-
n; the inhibited Desire becomes itself the
minant, the new Desire which realizes itself
act. Aversion still has the image as deter-
nt, but this image determines to its oppo-
The image of my going home turns me
from home. Thus the Ego as Will is not
elled to, but repelled from, the deed through
e, does not execute the corresponding act,
he antagonistic one, not proceeding imme-
ly, but mediately through the negative
doubtedly Aversion may be more or less

Aversion may thus be mediated through its opposite. Our Aversion to falsehood may be brought about through our love of truth. We have an inclination for temperance, we turn away from drunkenness. The love of moderation must make us averse to excess. Dislike of wrong follows from our liking of justice.

In such cases there may be no special call to master our Aversion. We are inclined to the good, and are averse to the bad naturally, immediately, let us say. The inclination to the good means inclination from the bad, or Aversion. So we let the two tendencies remain; we hate the hateful, and love the lovely, being at bottom one character. But suppose that we are averse to the good, inclined to evil, turned against the law, hating order, the state, authority, all ethical restraint? A new problem rises; we are to conquer Aversion, and therein change our attitude, — wherewith a new stage.

3. This is the mastery of Aversion, which demands a fresh control over the inhibitory power, when the latter turns against the positive element in man, society, institutions. Aversion to the good calls for the mastery of Aversion, such is the psychological as well as moral demand.

Still further, this mastery of Aversion must be made universal and complete, not simply for the sake of moral but also for the sake of psychological completeness. When I am dominated by

to the opposite. I must not hate anything so intensely that I become hateful.

Aversion has thus attained to Inclination, having negated itself and become positive. The inhibition is not merely a stoppage or cancellation, but has mediated a new Desire, which has been brought forth through the inhibition of a Desire. Aversion has been carried out directly, then inhibited through itself, through its own negative character, and finds itself at last transformed into a new positive Inclination, or perfect Desire, which is the culmination as well as the end of the present sphere.

We may now cast a glance backwards over the movement of this third stage, called Mastery of Desire. The first phase is the immediate mastery of Desire, which takes place when, of several competing Desires, the strongest makes itself real through the executive act, and implicitly or indirectly inhibits the rest. The second phase is Aversion, which is seen when the inhibition of a Desire is so explicit and emphatic that it turns to the opposite Desire, which is likewise carried into execution. The third phase is Aversion inhibited, the Ego averts itself from Aversion, whereby we attain to the conquest of Aversion. In the present sweep, therefore, we witness not only the mastery of Desire, but the mastery of the negativity of Desire, the latter being quite as

tion, Image, Thought, but by the total process of Desire, which, as we shall see, is a process of the Self-determined.

Summary of Desire. The preceding discussion of Desire may seem prolonged and complex to the student. We shall add a summary which will give him a survey of the details in a compressed yet organic shape, and possibly incite him to fill out to greater completeness such a tabular statement. For the essential fact is that the entire subject be organized in his mind; moreover it must always be remembered that organization does not mean crystallization, but the living process of the Ego itself.

I. *Executive Desire*, the Desire which is carried out immediately, without inhibition; the Ego as Will yields at once to the stimulation, which is here an ideal determinant of some kind; that is, the Ego as Will is immediately determined to be self-determined.

The kinds of this stimulation of Executive Desire through an ideal determinant are three: first, *the instinctive*, in which the ideal end (or determinant) is present, though unconscious; the stimulating image is not separated from feeling and so is not held up before the mind, but is one with the stimulated act; second, *the ideational*, in which an image gives the ideal determinant or end to be realized; third, *the conceptive*, in which a thought or conception

this negative. This result now becomes manifest.

III. *Mastery of Desire;* the positive control of Desire, not merely the negative control of it through inhibition, is to be attained next. The Ego as Desire is to get possession of all Desire, constituting a totality of Desire, which will specialize the particular Desire. Here is a return to the executive stage, yet with inhibition.

Three kinds of such Mastery may be designated: first, the strongest among competing Desires, the one favored or selected by the totality, is realized while the rest are unconsciously or implicitly inhibited — *immediate Mastery;* second, the inhibition, in the previous stage implicit, now becomes strongly explicit, and the inhibited Desire is so pronounced that it determines the Ego to the opposite; inhibited inclination passes into *Aversion*, which is a positive Desire though resulting from and containing a negation, whereby it is Desire mastering a Desire. Third is the *mastery of Aversion*, for Aversion must also be inhibited and controlled on its negative side; we are not to hate intemperance so strongly that we become intemperate in our temperance. Thus while we have Aversion, we must also possess an Aversion to Aversion.

Such we behold to be the movement of Desire seeking to control Desire, that is, to be self-

desired above all others. Over all finite Desires there is the one Desire, which properly includes them all, and which is the ideal end transforming them all into means for its realization.

Still we have to ask, What is this supremely desirable object? What is the content of this Good? Manifestly Desire cannot answer, the Ego as Desire has to rise to a higher stage ere the response can be given; it has to clarify itself out of its present determined condition. The infinitely Desirable or the Good cannot get its full content or meaning till we come to the conception of Free Will.

Desire is still a stage of Determinism, though it have an inner Determinant, and therein rises above Impulse. But our subjective Desires require to be moralized also, they are to be transfigured into the means for realizing the ideal end which is the final determining principle of the moral Self. That is, Desires are not to be immediately realized, but are to be first transformed by the ethical ideal of the soul. Even my Desire for the apple yonder is to undergo such a transformation, and thus become moralized before I may carry it out. Of course the complete unfolding of this thought belongs, not to the psychological but to moral Will.

Sweep of Desire. Let us summon this before the mind ere we pass to the next stage of Determined Will. The Ego as Will yields to the

al Determinant and executes its behest im-
tely, till the latter begins to interfere with
tal inner movement of the Ego — whereby
the struggle of Desire with Desire, in
the immediate Determinant is inhibited.
y, the Ego as Desire having gained control
lf, sweeps back and determines its internal
minant.

when the Ego as internal Determinant
mines the internal Determinant of itself,
akes this total process of itself a new De-
ant, we have evolved the Motive, and have
out of the sphere of Desire into that of
. For the Determinant of Desire, having
ined itself is now the Self-determined,

It is well to give a warning at the start in regard to the word *Choice*, which has been somewhat narrowed from its ordinary meaning. It is not here used as mere selection according to Desire or the strongest Desire, as when we select this road leading to the theater and not that one leading to the church. Moral Choice is commonly predicated of two courses, one good, one bad; the Ego as Will can take one and inhibit the other. Such an immediate Choice is not meant in the present sphere, but a mediated one, mediated through the *Motive*.

Again, this word *Motive*, in the present discussion, is not employed in its widest significance. Primarily it means that which moves, specially moves the Ego within to an action. In such a sense any Desire or even an Impulse might be called a Motive. What is the exact nature of the Motive, we shall try to unfold later; here in advance we may say, however, that it is not simple Desire, but the total process of Desire, namely, Desire with the inhibition and the mastery, as just set forth. Hence the reader must be at the start on his guard against the ordinary loose meanings of Choice and Motive; their full purport, however, can be understood only after the following discussion, which is nothing more than a psychical evolution of their place in the complete process of the Will.

Perhaps it is also well to express in these intro-

ry remarks the formula of Choice. *The*
s Will is determined to be self-determined
Self-determined. Again we must premise
his formula, empty as it sounds, has to be
with a content by the coming development of
ubject. But the reader will notice that
gh its wording it is connected with what has
before, with Desire and Impulse, for in-
; this inner connection is what should be
s held fast in the mind — such being, in
the main object of the formula.

ice is, therefore, still a stage of Deter-
Will, even if two of its factors are char-
zed as self-determined. The element of
minism, though much reduced, is not to be

can put into it the element which involves Choice. *I desire to go home;* this is simply a Desire (with its stimulating image), which I may execute or inhibit. But when I say, *I desire to go home in order to write*, I have grounded my Desire in the additional clause; or, I have motived it by putting behind my immediate Desire (which is to go home) another Desire (which is to write) more remote, and telling the reason why, the end-in-view, the Motive. Note then the two Desires and their relation to each other in the above sentence.

We may express the same meaning by bringing out the latent term, as follows: *My Motive in going home is to write*, that is, a Desire to write propels me, not to write, but to go home; nay, further, it is the Desire to write which, under the given circumstances, propels me to inhibit writing and do something else. This act both desired and inhibited, is the propelling power, the Motive; thus dawns upon our investigation of the Will the realm of Motives, which, as already said, is the mediating principle of Choice. When I go home, I do not follow my immediate Desire to go home, but back of that is the fact of Choice; I choose to go instead of staying, through a Motive which determines me to act (to be self-determined). Here we may observe again the interplay of Liberty and Necessity (so called) in Choice; before we choose we have the

ciousness of being able to take one or the
r alternative; but when we have chosen, we
also the consciousness of being determined
at one way by the Motive. Evidently both
rty and Necessity constitute the process of
ce; one is not to be separated and held up
st the other in argumentation, since thus we
lways landed in an unreconciled dualism.
sire, then, by itself has properly no Motive;
mage, instinct, or thought, each of which
form the content of Desire, is carried out
e deed. Desire is not Choice; if I simply
e to go home, I have no true Choice, though
be the external alternative of remaining
I am. Still further, the inhibition of

is quite a difference between the two. The image of writing is before me, still I do not write, but I go home first, which is also an image, and this I immediately execute.

But the writing I do not immediately execute, on the contrary I project it into a future act, hence it is ideal, something to be attained, still an image with its deed imaged. The Motive is, therefore, ideal — not something which is, but which is to be realized. Still that future ideal element is what determines me to present activity, with the design of making it real in the deed. That is, the Motive is a Self-determined as ideal — not merely an image (which would be only a form of the Determined), but the image with its corresponding act, as a total process ideally held up before me. The Motive must have in it not Intellect alone but also Will.

It is most important to note carefully the process of the Motive, which has the following stages: (1) there is the primal Desire with its subjective content of feeling, image, thought; (2) there is the inhibition of this Desire in its executive act, though its subjective content remains; (3) there is the inhibition of the inhibition, and therewith the going-over or the ability to go over, to a new Desire with its content, which is executed, and whose execution is the means of realizing the first Desire. Herein we observe the Psychosis as the inner pulse of life,

ital throb in the Motive and its Choice; it
t simple immediate Desire but the total
ment of Desire, as unfolded in the preced-
ection. Note again the three stages of this
ment: first is the simple immediate Desire;
d is the separative stage, here the Desire
ted; third is the return to Desire, not the
one it is true, but to a new one, which is
ted for the purpose of bringing about the
ment of the first Desire. As already often
ted, this total process of Desire is the
e which determines Choice, drives to the
choosing, and this is, in the present sphere,
ere selection springing from Desire, but
hing deeper and completer.

mination of the Ego, since it requires the act based upon the changed Desire. Simple Desire acts directly through the Determined, but Motive (along with Choice) acts through the Self-determined.

Taking a general glance at Choice, we see that it has two ways of doing placed before itself; each appeals to the Ego, solicits to be taken and followed; the Ego as Will must through itself, through its own originative, self-active power, choose one or the other. Still each way has reasons in its favor, and the Ego must choose the reason determining it; or, if it must take the strongest reason, and cannot help itself, this is because it has determined which is the strongest reason and chosen that, to the exclusion of less strong reasons. Somewhere the original fiat of the Ego as Will, the self-determining act comes in, yet it also determines. Here, then, we introduce again the general formula of Choice: *The Ego as Will is determined to be self-determined by the Self-determined.*

Thus the Motive is Desire, yet also the inhibition of the execution of that Desire, and the change to the execution of a new Desire. Just this change involves the Self-determined Ego as a totality; the Motive is the Ego's own act, which still determines the Ego to act. Note again the three factors, one of which asserts Determinism, but the other two assert Self-determination.

e we may note another fact, which is to be
zed and put into its proper place later on:
l this central process of the Motive hovers
an infinity of Motives, less and less dis-
ill they quite vanish into the unconscious.
ting be my Motive for going home, I can
What is my Motive for writing? Say, to
noney; thus I go back to the Motive of
otive and pass through the same process,
n this last case my writing becomes no
a Motive, but a Desire, which is also a
. Now the statement is: I desire to write
er to make money. Still further can I go
nd find a Motive for my earning money,
Motive may be that I wish to go abroad.

Still in all this multiplicity there is seen the one fundamental process: the image or concept as the content of Desire, the inhibition, the rise of the new image with its corresponding act. The subtle Psychosis of the Ego throws off thousandfold forms of Motives, yet it remains the same process in them all.

If the foregoing discussion be correct, Choice bears in itself the thought that the Self-determined determines the Self-determined. Hence the Self-determined in Choice has to be determined — wherein we see the determinism in Choice, and so we say Choice is determined by the Motive, or the strongest Motive. Still that which determines (the determinant) is the Self-determined; so this motive which is the determinant, is really the Self-determined. Determinism must not be left out of Choice, being one of the three factors, and being interjected, so to speak, between two acts of self-determination. It is, accordingly a bad mistake to deny determinism in Choice, but it is a worse mistake to deny self-determination in Choice. Both are in Choice which must be seen as a process, involving both the Determined and the Self-Determined.

In the preceding introductory remarks we have repeated a number of times the one thought which lies at the basis of Choice and Motive. The formula has been given twice with examples and explanations; we hope that its meaning and

[illegible] to make a new

[illegible] consideration
[illegible] various activi-
[illegible] Psychosis,
[illegible] and revealing a
[illegible] of Impulse
[illegible] brief outline of
[illegible] followed by a

[illegible] considered, in
[illegible] immediately,
[illegible] Choice.
[illegible] indicates, is
[illegible] through Choice

formed by the Ego into a new determinant, which determines my going home, determines me to a different act. It is thus a Motive — the Ego itself determining itself not simply not to do this (to write) but to do the other (to go home). The image alone, therefore, does not determine the Ego, else it (the Ego) would write, but it determines itself.

Still we must not forget that this self-determined element is also determined, the Motive determines the Ego to be self-determined. That is, the Self-determined does not stand alone, but is in the process of Choice, it is determined to be self-determined through the Self-determined.

We must carefully mark this distinction: we may be led through a Desire to choose, and we may be led through a Motive to choose. As already said often, the Motive is born of the Desire, but is not the simple Desire; it is the total process of Desire, which signifies the mastery of Desire, this being the third stage thereof.

In the present sphere of Determinism an inner world of Motives has arisen and determines the Ego as Will; very different is this from the outer world of nature determining the Ego, such as we saw in Impulse. Yet the two worlds are counterparts and belong to the complete unfolding or the Psychosis of Determined Will.

The subtlest thing in the human heart is the Motive; it can be the hardest matter to discover,

and Conceptive — in correspondence with the division of executive Desire. Nor should we neglect to notice that these three classes correspond with the three main divisions of the psychology of the Intellect, which herein has a bond of connection with the Will. In each of these cases the Ego as Will acts immediately, goes straight to the deed without any inhibition, whatever be the content of the Motive.

1. Instinctively we choose a course of action, implicitly rejecting other ways, selecting the one way, and then sweep forward to the act. An unconscious instinctive Motive we may employ, which has secretly coiled up in it the total process of Desire. I wish to go down town, in due order I step to a certain line of street-cars, unconsciously eschewing all other ways of reaching my destination. Such action pre-supposes that I have previously gained experience in the matter of going down town, and know the various means of transit. Here is, then, the Desire, the inhibition of other lines, and the taking of the one line — Choice, all done in a single unconscious thrust of the Ego. The bird, picking up a straw for its nest, has to reject the rotten leaf lying beside the straw.

I enter an art gallery, I choose a certain picture for my contemplation, omitting the rest. I went to the place perhaps for another purpose, but my unconscious nature has made a new

e for me. The picture roused my interest, y; it touched some natural bent, or possi- me acquired tendency; I became interested and at once was moved to do as I did. My scious Ego was the chooser, felt itself to e with the object and responded imme- y. Interest is, therefore, an unconscious e for doing many things; in reading a book absorbed by it, I am held by its spell which ot break except by a strong effort of Will. he unconscious Motive shows in an instinc- orm the process of Desire which moves to mediate act.

bably every instinct has this process of the

arate the unconscious impression from itself and hold the same up before itself as distinct — wherewith we have passed into a new stage — the ideational content of the Motive executing itself immediately in Choice.

2. This is the second stage of executive Choice, namely the separative, and corresponds to the stage of Representation in the Psychology of Intellect (see *Psychology and the Psychosis*, p. 222). One form of Desire springs from the Image (namely, the ideational) which through the total process of Desire becomes a Motive (also called ideational). This kind of Motive executing itself directly in Choice, is what we are now considering.

Let us then look at the Image which may become the content of a Motive. It is probably best to take the example already given and connect it with the present sphere. I wish to go home in order to write. Primarily, however, I desire to write; this image (or idea) I hold up before myself, then inhibit it, then inhibit this inhibition of the image by passing to a new image which is the source of a new Desire (namely to go home), and this is what I proceed now to execute. But the first image with its process of Desire has become the Motive, which impels me to fulfill the Desire to go home, of course in order that I may realize the Desire to write. This last Desire is the content of the

conception, and the new stage to which it gives rise we may designate as the conceptive Motive of executive Choice. This comes next in order.

3. The third stage, then, of the present sphere, is the conceptive, the nature of which it is well to seize at once. Conception or thought of the object is something altogether different from the image thereof; conception is the genetic act of mind, which generates the object afresh, thinks it anew as its creator thought it. The conception of a book is its creative idea, which the reader must create over for himself, if he would truly possess the same, or would know what the book really means. Thought or conception belongs, as is well known, to the third stage of the Intellect, the second being representation and the first being immediate presentation or sense perception.

It is manifest that conception is often the content of the Motive which insists upon direct execution. The artist has the conception of a new picture, it is not merely the image, but the creation of that image, which drives him to the deed, to the painting of it. In the example already given, it may be the conception which impels me to write, not the mere representation of some past experience, though that too may co-operate. Having it, I proceed immediately, without inhibition, to its realization. No reason do I give for so doing; there is no interruption

e way, no deliberation perchance. So the ption of Justice moves the Judge to decide ; the conception of the future in some form s the seer to his prophecy; he has or may the conception intuitively, not through the tion of reflection.

ch are the three stages of the Motive as tive — instinctive, ideational, conceptive. have noticed the same three stages under e, which is also immediate or executive. Ego in conception has created the Motive, at moves it to action; my Motive in writing realize my conception, that is, creation; my ve power drives me to the deed, is my moving y. But my creative power, or conception

tion. Thus Choice divides within itself, choosing to inhibit Choice. Such is, in general, its second or separative stage.

The Motive lies back of the inhibition of Choice. My Motive in not taking the journey which I had chosen, is (let us say), to save money; previously I was influenced to the choosing of the journey; now I am influenced to the inhibiting of that Choice. Thus Choice negates Choice, and thereby asserts negative control over itself.

On the contrary, executive Choice, as above unfolded, is uninhibited, and so is followed immediately by the deed. But now the movement is reversed, the fiat of the Will is to refuse execution, the fiat turns against the fiat and begets the conflict which springs out of the Will. We see that the Motive works negatively as well as positively, it leads to execution and also to inhibition.

Choice as inhibitory will have a movement containing three stages which are similar to those already noticed under Impulse and Desire. The negative act of Choice will at the start inhibit the Execution, then the Motive, and finally the inhibition will inhibit itself. These are the three stages which are now to be unfolded and which form a Psychosis. First is the immediate inhibition, which stops the executive act; second is the separative inhibition which separates the Motive or determinant of the act, and

that; third is the inhibition of the inhi-
n which there is a return to the Motive
, or at least to the ability to form the
.

he first inhibition, accordingly, is directed
the execution of Choice. The result is a
is of the fiat, which is often called Ir-
ion. You resolve to perform, then you
our resolution and fall back into your
ish to perform, or into your Motive which
s purely internal. Irresolute characters
tively inhibit the fiat, this push of the
act; they often become very ingenious
ng excuses for their aversion to the deed.
n, however, is of two kinds: first, it is

Choice, namely that which determines itself, namely the Motive. Not only do I inhibit my going home, but I inhibit my Motive in going home, which springs from the desire to write. That is, I banish the wish to write, which produced my Motive for going home.

Yet this inhibition of the Motive must have a Motive. If I put away the desire to write, it is because I desire to hear some music, which desire, we shall suppose, can be gratified only by my staying where I am. Thus my Motive for staying, which inhibits my motive for going home, is a new and stronger Motive. (This question of the strongest Motive will come up under the head of Mastery of Desire.)

Herein we witness the conflict of Motives. Fresh desires are perpetually rising which form themselves into fresh Motives, and these inhibit antecedent Motives by seeking to realize themselves in the deed. A grand field of struggle it is in which several Motives may co-operate for one end against another Motive or other Motives likewise co-operating for a different end.

3. The inhibitory act of Choice involves the inhibition of the inhibition of the Motive. We have just seen in the preceding paragraph that for the inhibition of the Motive there appeared a Motive, which therein negated its own. But the logic of this negation is the negation of the negation, since the Motive has shown itself as negative

iting the Motive; thus the Motive, being
ive, must destroy its own destruction in
ng the Motive. That is, the Motive, in
g the Motive, inhibits logically its own
n.

e can be seen to have the power of in-
Choice, and then of removing this inhi-
I, having chosen to go home, can inhibit
oice and not go home; then I can inhibit
ibition and go home. The freedom of
nvolves not only the power of inhibition,
the inhibition of the inhibition.

eliberation, which precedes usually the
e is a rapid mental movement between
inhibition, and the inhibition of the in-

In this last stage, in which the inhibition of the Motive was itself inhibited, we have the return to Motive (or the ability to motivate), which is again ready to assert its native energy. This new power of the Motive is not the old one, but has a negative control over itself through its inhibitory principle. But the Motive necessarily pushes towards the execution of itself in the act whereby the process of Choice is completed. Accordingly we must now proceed to the next stage in the movement of Choice, which has in it the executive element restored, and we pass from the negative mastery to the positive mastery of Choice.

III. We have now reached the stage designated in general as the mastery of Choice, since the latter passes out of its negative or inhibitory stage and becomes again positive and executive, though in a new way. The power of inhibition is still present, and gives to Choice its complete movement; unless it could inhibit both the fiat and the Motive, it would not be complete. So Choice has now in itself execution and execution inhibited, as well as Motive and Motive inhibited.

The Motive has been hitherto the determinant of Choice, but in the present sphere Choice chooses its Motive and so asserts its mastery over the Motive. I wish to go home in order to write; but also I wish to go elsewhere in order to see a

; thus two Motives solicit me to two dif-
acts; which shall I take? The Choice is
and I choose not only which act I shall
e, but also which Motive I shall follow.
therein goes back and determines the
, thus asserting its mastery over that
was hitherto its determinant. Such
y of Choice is the mastery over Choice
oice.

ice chooses its Motive — it has to reject the
order to take the other; here is the power
ibiting the Motive as already discussed.
Motives are present to me; shall I go or
I choose to stay, but I can do so only by
ing the Motive to go, and transferring the

But this mastery of Choice has its process whose phases we shall unfold in a brief outline.

1. The most direct form of choosing the Motive is seen when the strongest Motive is taken and carried into execution. We can say that the Ego as Will is impelled to action by the strongest Motive, to the exclusion of other Motives. Several courses of conduct lie open to me, each with its own Motive competing for my Choice; I select immediately the strongest, and inhibit the rest, which indeed are more or less latent or in the background; the strongest Motive determines me to act (to be self-determined).

Still I have to choose the strongest Motive; it is strongest only by comparison with other Motives which must be present too, and soliciting my Choice. Such a selection we call immediate since it is quite instinctive, hardly conscious; we seem determined by impulse in following the strongest Motive, yet it has to be chosen.

This immediate mastery of Choice may be, in general, termed Resolution. A man of Resolution possesses a permanent trait of nature, that of choosing his Motive at once and carrying it out with vigor. Persuade me not, I am resolved! This signifies the complete inhibition of all other Motives except the chosen one and its deed. Resolution is not simply decision or

ection of the Motive; we may decide
doing, but Resolution involves the exe-
it is the Will incorporating the chosen
in the deed. To resolve is to assert the
Will emphatically against all distractions,
ibitions, even against deliberation and
on.

e through the strongest Motive has a
mmediate character, which makes it quite
ection which was noticed under desire.
en, that I select my Motive from a number
ives; but why do I thus select? So a
for my selection is called for; that is,
ediate selection demands to be mediated;
selected my Motive, I must have had a

where or to stay where I am. Still further, this second Choice (of the Motive to write) must in its turn have a Motive (say, to make money, to acquire fame, to propagate an idea, etc.), which has to be chosen from among these various competing Motives. Such is, then, the second Motive, which in its turn, must be chosen, must be determined by Choice, which is the third. This third Choice will demand its Motive, which is the third, which again looks to Choice and so on *ad infinitum*. Thus we see developed a continuous *regressive* series from Choice to Motive.

Let us look at this movement again. I now choose the Motive out of several competing ones; but such Choice too demands a Motive, which in its turn must be chosen. But this new choosing must also be motived, and this new Motive requires still another Choice farther back. Thus every Choice demands a Motive, and such Motive, being chosen, projects another Motive for such Choice behind itself.

But this is not all. The Ego as Choice not only projects a series of Motives back of itself — the regressive series — but also becomes itself Motive and thereby projects a *progressive* series from Choice to Motive in front of itself. To take the old example; I choose to go home — such is my Choice proceeding from the antecedent Motive. But I take my hat in order to go home; the going home is transformed into the Motive

ng my hat. Still further: I rise from my
order to take my hat; here the second
of the series has become the second Motive.
in: I place my feet in order to rise from
r, wherein the previous Choice has been
med into a still different Motive. All
Motives are very close to their correspond-
s so that they hardly seem separate;
ry Motive will show, on examination, not
Desire, but the complete process of De-
ich is the essential nature of the Motive.
ance, if my Motive in placing my feet in
n position is to rise from my chair, I
st desire to rise, secondly I must inhibit
sire till I have adjusted my feet, and I

progressive series, my End is the going home and my Means is the rising from my seat. Less accurately Cause and Effect are sometimes used in the same way.

But in these endless series there is at work the same movement: the Motive, having determined the Choice, the Choice turns round and determines anew the Motive. Though this is not the same Motive as the first, yet there is underneath always the one recurrent process which is that of the Ego itself. It is to be seen returning to itself and so making the active unitary principle in this infinite diversity of play between Choice and Motive. Such is the third and completed stage in the mastery of Desire, which we shall now consider a little more fully.

3. The Ego as Choice has shown that it chooses what determines it, thus it determines its determiner. Moreover this determiner (or determinant) is the Motive, which is, as before said, a form of the Self-determined. So the Ego as Choice is here determined to be Self-determined, through the Self-determined. Choice, though motived, chooses the Motive; Choice therein is seen returning to itself and choosing what determines it, and is in so far self-determined.

Still the Motive as the external determinant is present though it be chosen by the Ego. Thus the old dualism appears; the Motive after all determines the Choice which chooses it, or the

the Ego chooses it; in one sense it
in another sense has to choose it
thereto). That is, in form the
Choice is free, but in content is
the latter is not Choice itself but so
from the outside. The Ego, there
cious in Choice, chooses what conten
it pleases, according to whim, fancy
according to its own subjective det

But the Ego as Will must have a
which is just itself. That is, the
must not merely choose its Conte
from a given quantity of Motives
from the outside, but must choose
very act of choosing, as its Conten
Thus we attain truly the Free Will w
as its inner moving energy the F
itself. Now Choice really chooses
ing the same as its Motive, whereas
did so only formally.

Herewith, however, we have manif
out of the stage of

The mastery of Choice has thus completed itself, by completing what may be called the cycle of Choice; the Motive determines the Choice, but this determining Motive is itself determined by Choice; or the End becomes the Means, and then the Means turns about and becomes the End. But even this final mastery of Choice (which is the mastery over Choice through Choice) has in it still the Motive or an external determinant; this externality is what is next eliminated or eliminates itself, in order that we arrive at Free Will.

It is manifest that Choice hitherto has been free to choose the Motive, yet behind such choosing of the Motive it has projected a new determinant or Motive, and so it is determined. Thus Choice shows the endless contention between Freedom and Determinism, passing from one side to the other in an infinite series of repetitions. Even when these repetitions are seized in their single fundamental process (as in this last stage of the mastery of Choice) the dualism between the free and the determined element remains.

But the destiny of Choice is to realize its own unconscious principle and to take the same as its end. Choice has been free to choose its Motive as its content; but now Choice is to take just this freedom of choosing as its content. I have come to the place where I have to choose my freedom of Choice, and therein explicitly assert my Free

hich has hitherto been implicit. Choice is
moved by many Motives but by one, the
l one, which is freedom. The Motive if
no longer determines me to be self-deter-
but it determines me to determine myself
elf-determined. The full purport of this
is to be unfolded later.

e we pass on, however, the student may
ore work over in this new connection the
stration: I desire to go home in order to
Primarily the Motive (to write) deter-
ne to go home instead of staying, deter-
ne to choose, a self-determined act. But
e found that this Choice exerts itself not
regard to my going home or staying (the

Such is, in general, the transition from Determined Will in its last stage of Choice, to Free Will, wherein the Ego is free Choice choosing its own freedom as content, and motive.

Summary. We shall give a condensed survey of the foregoing section on Choice, showing in brief outline its organization and meaning.

I. *Executive Choice.* The execution is immediate in the act; the Motive carries itself out into realization without inhibition. Or the Motive (which is a Self-determined in the form of the total movement of Desire) determines the Ego as Will to be self-determined (to the act).

The kinds of executive Choice are three according to the varied psychical content of the Motive determining the Choice. First is the *Instinctive*, in which the content of the Motive is an Instinct with its total process of Desire executing itself in the act. Second is the *Ideational* in which the content of the Motive is an Image with its total process of Desire executing itself in an act. Third is the *Conceptive*, in which the content of the Motive is a Thought with the total process of Desire executing itself in an act.

II. *Inhibitory Choice;* there is an inhibitory element in the very nature of Choice; it must be able to choose to stop choosing. Inhibition must also have its Motive, as well as execution; if we could not help choosing immediately, we would be completely determined from the outside and

. Choice has at last to control its own
ve, choosing to inhibit. Here too are three
First is *the inhibition of the execution*,
fiat, though the Motive still remains.
l is *the inhibition of the Motive*, in which
d Motive comes up, for, in order to inhibit
ve, I must have a Motive for the inhibition.
ises the conflict of Motives. Third is *the*
ion of the inhibition, that is, the inhibition
oved, and there is the return to the Motive
ast to the ability to motivate. This is the
e control of Choice.

Mastery of Choice, or the positive con-
Choice; that is, the mastery over Choice
h Choice. The essential fact is that

to select and execute a Desire; for instance, the Desire to go home (in the given example) is determined by the Motive, which determination is the act of Choice selecting and possibly executing the Desire. Now, as the Ego in Choice moves forward and chooses the Desire, so it will sweep backward and choose the Motive.

Notes on Motive and Choice. It is evident that Motive and Choice belong together, in the sense of these words just given; they are symmetrical counterparts of one cycle, or better, they are the necessary stages of one process of the Ego. No Motive without Choice and no Choice without Motive; different, yet one in their movement.

1. The Motive, as we have just considered it, is essentially the psychical Motive; the moral Motive, however, in times past has been the grand object of disputation. This kind of Motive we shall have to relegate to the sphere of the Moral Will which comes later in the development of Will. Still we may note here, that, as the psychical Motive has in it the process of self-determination, there comes with it the idea of responsibility. Since the Motive is not an Impulse, nor even a simple Desire, but has in it the total process of the Ego, the Ego holds itself responsible for its Motive. Hence the importance of the Motive in moral conduct, and also in every attempt to construct a Theory of Morals.

The Motive has passed by analogy into the
e of Literature and Art, which seek to ex-
in some form of outward manifestation the
moving principle. Shakespeare *motives* the
of all his great tragic characters; he does
t them perish by accident, but through
deep violation of the ethical order of the
, which comes home to them at last in the
y for their deeds. Some of his personages
first glance seem to be exceptions to this
for instance Cordelia and Othello; but the
fate of these two characters also will be
to be carefully motived on a searching
nation of the dramas in which they occur.
e has declared, in a passage contrasting his

the theme, of which the words of the poem are another and different expression; the two, language and music, reach down to the one substantial element, to which each gives its own way of interpretation. There are many Leading Motives in an opera by Wagner, as there are many Motives in a human soul acting out its life-drama.

3. One of the most difficult things for psychological insight is to discover the Motives of children. These Motives are as yet almost wholly instinctive, undeveloped, unconscious; yet they exist, and are unfolding. Why does a little boy, in a fit of wrath, run and smash his dearest toy? What strange acts are traceable to jealousy in children; and then we have to ask what motives such jealousy? The kindergardner is in possession of this field and must work it wisely and carefully; let her, in her child-study, use the inductive syllogism and tabulate her experiences; but all this will do little good without rational insight, the power of looking immediately into the soul of the child, which is best forwarded by looking into her own soul and catching the subtle play of its Motives.

4. You may just as well study the fact that you, as students, are here, and nowhere else to-day, and consider the Motives which have brought you into this class of mine. First of all, you are here to learn kindergardening; that is the most direct Motive which brings you

er. But why study kindergardening? this question the second set of Motives hemselves and begin to vary; say, it is for g the time, for culture, or for getting a on. But why do you wish to have a voca- In order to make a living, to gratify on, or to acquire money. Select the last- Motive; if your object is simply the , then such a Motive will show in your here, and in your school. You will not hat poem, because it is not useful directly ur profession, which is studied simply for ney in it. You will seek to acquire the for getting along well enough to draw alary. More or less distinctly will the

not in correlation with the totality of the kindergarden. At the present time color is made the ground of extravagance, the children are led to discriminate the various shades and tints to the last degree of refinement. In like manner the kindergardner with a theatrical Motive can change all her flock into little actors, who will assume a part on the spot and play it, and who will not only naturally imitate, as children must do, but imitate imitation.

Thus we may bring home to ourselves the significance of the Motive, especially the ultimate Motive, for our vocation as well as for our conduct of life. We must correct the Motive if we truly wish to build up a right worthy character; seeing our inadequacy, or failing, or sin, we must proceed at once to transform ourselves, for that is just the truth of spirit — to be able to correct itself and to be always rising out of a lower into a higher, more universal Motive.

5. Your head, or, if you please, your soul is full of Motives, active, wrestling, conflicting often, often co-operating. Some are kept secret, you know them, but you would not tell them for any consideration. You may act from them, yet you assign a different Motive for your action; still the keen eye of the one who knows the human heart can see them, and judges you according to your concealed Motive. For this is what you really are, this is what makes your

..., even when they
and propel you to act. The
dart into your horizon of activ
outlying territory of the sou
Thought lie as yet unborn, an
again in a sudden luminous, y
Still they are your own, yo
deepest Self often, and detern
ter. Indeed they form to a ce
very body, your gestures and l
the secret sculptors in your sou
features; they make your face
your face expresses. For the M
out, though all unknown to your
Motive, unless it manifests itsel
the most hidden story of your
itself in your speech, nay, writ
countenance.

Thousands upon thousands d
rise and surge and wriggle thro
They remind one of the enormou
the great market of Paris
intertwined

his sinuous snaky body; with one wrench out he slips, drops down with a splash, and plunges out of sight. What mortal man could identify and land that eel for me now? Here comes the keeper with a kind of scoop-net and does his work of dipping up a sample for a customer. One big fellow rears his black body in curves from the water by a tremendous effort, and opens his mouth; does he want to speak to me, and what will he say? Listen: "I hold now the mirror of your soul, look at yourself" — then he falls back and is lost in that dark living mass, as the spirits of Dante's Inferno drop down again into their ditch after speaking. One thinks too of that electrical eel, the *Gymnotus*, which if you but touch it, gives you a shock. So too with Motives; often when you find them, and find out what they are, you receive an awful shock, which may be the premonition of a great change.

6. Sometimes we hear a fierce outcry against this introspection, this examination of Motives. Undoubtedly it has forms of excess, and may be pushed in certain cases into a mental malady. Too much brooding over ourselves is bad, we all know; still it may be said that self-examination in some way is the condition of all lofty character-building. The man must know his weakness in order to transcend it, and he can know it only by looking into himself. That Ego into which one gazes is indeed the source of all evil as well

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Also we must be able to take
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7. Let us study the transition f
Free-Will a little further. First,
general, the Determined (by the
ondly, Choice is the Determinant
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of Choice; thirdly, Choice is botl
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The Motive is here not the determining principle of Choice, but Choice itself is, which, however, is thus Free Will. Hence we may say that Free Will now wills Free-Will; this is the sphere in which man asserts his freedom, inasmuch as all struggle for liberty is just the Free-Will willing Free-Will. The Motive in this new sphere determines not to Choice, but to Freedom, and the Motive is Freedom, which is indeed the ultimate universal Motive or End.

8. Also there is at this point the still broader transition from Determined Will to Free Will; that is, the second grand division of the Psychological Will passes over into the third, as its aim and outcome. Note, then, that the whole movement of Determined Will through Impulse, Desire, Choice, is to attain Free Will, which has been underneath Determinism all the while, and has often cropped out in the course of the preceding exposition, giving to the same its inner moving principle, which, from its implicit condition, has now become explicit, and is be unfolded through its process.

The essential fact of Free Wil
the formula: The Ego as Will
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freedom; or, we

Will, to take itself as its own content, motive, etc. I may be transacting some business of my own, as is my right, when an outside person may interfere and seek to prevent me by violence. At once I drop the business, for a new and far deeper matter has crossed my path; I must, first of all, vindicate my freedom, which is the very condition of my doing any business, and indeed of living worthily. If I tamely submit, I am not a good citizen of a free country, I am not really a free man.

Thus I am led to act (to determine myself), and the one object of my free action is just the freedom of action (the self-determined). Hence we say that the Ego as Will in the present sphere determines itself to be self-determined, wills itself to be Free Will; the free act of man must primordially assert freedom of action, then the Ego is really Free Will.

"Give me liberty or give me death," cries the schoolboy in his favorite declamation. That liberty of his undoubtedly is somewhat vague and capable of being abused; still he means, and ought to mean, that before anything in life, before life itself, he is going to will Free Will. Such is the spirit of the youth who is to unfold into the free citizen of a free country. "Strike for liberty" we hear shouted in the passionate lyric; but here in the present treatise, we must calmly reflect that the free act (*strike*) must

for the first time apparently in rec
the human Ego reached the point
asserting Free Will as the principl
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tion history may well begin, since
something worthy to tell about him
has staked all — property, life, city.
Will, which has thus dawned on the
supreme end of man.

If we designate this last by the tern
find that it differs from the Motive in
Will. The end-in-view (Motive) is r
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But in Determined Will the Motive
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has as its End or Motive the asserti
free act — or the

mined, external to the act of Will. Hence we find that the Ego as Will determines itself to be self-determined through the Determined in the present case. My going home, therefore, can be transformed into an assertion of Free Will, which I have to make the content of my act and not the writing. Hence there is still a determinant of the Will willing itself to be Free Will. (See second stage below.)

This brings us to the division of the present subject. The Ego as Will determines itself to be self-determined; through what? The question asks still for a determinant of freedom, and there will be the process of this determinant, which process is the Psychosis. We shall have the three stages, which are seen in the movement of all Will — the Undetermined, the Determined and the Self-determined. The following, then, will be the movement of Free Will:

I. *The Undetermined Free Will* — the Ego as Will determines itself to be self-determined through the Undetermined, that is through the outer world in which the Ego is placed, but which has not been determined by it; hence this outer world is here named the Undetermined. This undetermined world (of nature, let us say) being external and opposed to me, reaches me through the senses and stimulates me to overcome it and to transform it into the instrument

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III. *The Self-Determined Free Wi*
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be self-determined) through Institutions. Or it wills the Institution (whose function is to will Free Will) as its content, end, motive. Thus the Ego wills as its end that which wills Free Will. The determinant or means is now the self-determined (what wills Will) and the act is self-determined, and the end is self-determined (the Free Will).

When I obey the law of the State, I, as self-determined or free agent, determine myself to be self-determined. The law wills Will, secures it; this law is what I will; I as Free Will, will Free Will. If I say the law determines me, this determination is not only my own, some desire, wish, caprice or choice of mine, but is just self-determination realized, since the law is Will willing my Will.

So I will my Free Will, or assert my freedom through an existing world which wills Free Will, that is, through the Self-determined (not through some determinateness of my own), that is, through the State with its laws.

Glancing back at the movement of Free Will as a whole, we observe that it has the two constant factors, and the third variable one — all of which are in a process with one another. This third variable factor is the determinant, determining the Ego as Will, and hence manifesting in its movement the three fundamental stages of the Will — Undetermined, Determined and Self-

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material world is, accordingly, for him the realm of the Undetermined, that is, not determined by him, but determining him. Such is the grand contradiction of his existence: a Free Will environed by the determinism of Nature. Now this contradiction the Free Will at once sets about removing, in order that it be actually free; it starts to transforming the material world about itself, making the same into an instrument of freedom.

I build a railroad in order to get the mastery over Space which is an element or phase of the Undetermined determining me; I shall no longer let it rule me absolutely, my deepest aspiration is to remove these limits of Nature and attain freedom. Such is my ideal end in all my works; everything in the way of manufactures springs from my effort to release myself from dependence on Nature; I seize and employ all her forces with the one ultimate purpose, that I become more and more completely self-determined.

Plainly the great battle of my Free Will is to transform that which is undetermined by myself into that which is determined by myself. The world I must make over in order to be free; our age is often called the mechanical age; yet its huge mechanisms, its colossal implements are finally means of freedom, and the Ego as Free Will through them is determined by its own, by itself.

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pure and simple will say and will try to make himself and others believe that such sacrifice of life had really the end of preserving life, and that freedom is only a means of living. But a means is used or used up for the sake of its end; life is for the sake of freedom and not the reverse.

Thus we may note the threefold gradation: we can gratify our appetite simply for the sake of the gratification, or for the sake of living, or for the sake of living freemen. This last is indeed the great end of all activity; the Will has as its ultimate content itself; or, as we have formulated it, the Ego as Will determines itself to be self-determined.

To such an act, however, the Will must be stimulated, it must have a determinant to rouse it to assert its freedom. This determinant in the present sphere we have designated as the Undetermined, which has three characteristics: first, it is not determined by the Ego or by Free Will; second, it is a determinant of the Free Will which wills the Free Will; third, it has to be made over by the Free Will in order to be a determinant, made over into a means of freedom. This ocean before me is something not determined by me, yet it limits me when I cannot cross it, it determines me, restrains me of my freedom. But this very fact is what stimulates me to remove the limit and to vindicate my Free

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together the whole process, the Undetermined determines me as Will to determine myself to be self-determined. As to this last sentence, the reader may well test himself whether it is for him a mere rigmarole and empty jingle of like-sounding words, or the expression of a process whose separate terms are fused into unity by the electric spark of thought.

In the present sphere, which we have called the Undetermined Free Will, these are the two constant factors which belong to all Free Will, while the third or variable factor is the determinant, here the Undetermined. That is, the variable factor varies throughout the sphere of Free Will in general, but it becomes permanent in the special stage of Free Will. For instance, the undetermined element will persist through the stage of Undetermined Free Will, as the determinant, but will change to the Determined in the following stage.

Let us, then, bring before us the total process of Undetermined Free Will. It is started by the external determinant (the Undetermined) which is hostile to Free Will, and it proceeds to convert this determinant into a means of freedom. It seeks not merely to get possession of the outer stimulating object (as we saw in the case of Appropriative Impulse) but to transform the same and to use it as an implement of realizing Free Will. So the Ego as Free Will

be transformed.

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III. *Mastery over the outer*
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This mastery has its three phases: the immediate mastery through the selection of the strongest determinant, then there may be a new inhibition and a new selection; finally the Ego as Free Will, conscious of its mastery, is to seize and transform the entire undetermined world, making it into a realm of freedom.

Such is the process through which man passes in realizing his Free Will by means of external Nature. He is, as it were, a cave dweller, being penned up in his physical limits on all sides; he is in the vast cave of Polyphemus, the giant, who perpetually threatens to eat him alive. What can he do? He must be a Ulysses, he has to conquer the giant by intelligence, setting him to work and causing him to remove the huge stone which blocks up the entrance to daylight and to freedom. Ulysses, the wise man, turns one huge force of Nature against another force of Nature, and so controls her, making her obedient to his Will. Thus he escapes from the dark cave of Polyphemus, and brings his companions also to liberty and to light. Such is, indeed, the function of the hero, he leads forth his people out of the slavery into which they are born, out of the cave of Nature which environs them on every side, into the realm of freedom. Ulysses is a Free Will willing Free Will, who, being obstructed by an outer undetermined world, converts this into a means of liberation.

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soul through sensation the Instinct to transform that world from an obstacle (which it is by nature) into an instrument of freedom. Probably every sensation rouses in the Ego an act of Will to subject in some way the stimulating object, and still further to make it over into a means for furthering Free Will. Particularly the great vocation of the child is to conquer its freedom from the undetermined outside world; it has really nothing else to do in its infancy. How it works at its task! Many of its naughtinesses spring from its resistance to attempts which hinder its pursuit of realizing its own Free Will. It has the pure Impulse (or Instinct) for freedom; not yet rational, yet on the way to rationality.

Men have also the same Instinct; the very presence of a sphere external to themselves and not determined by themselves, irritates the Will to self-execution. Habit, vocation, character, play into such an Instinct; the farmer will jump out of his wagon and cut down a Canada thistle along the road; the boatman cannot help taking the oars out of unskillful hands, and controlling the unruly craft; the genuine watchmaker will still make a watch now and then by a kind of irresistible Instinct, though he knows he cannot compete with the machinery for that purpose. Such cases show the Ego as Free Will asserting itself against an outer determining world. The

my freedom which is obstructed, I have to determine myself to be self-determined, and I proceed to realize this fact. To be sure, I fulfill my Desire, too, which is to reach home; but first I have to vindicate my freedom. Ulysses standing on the shores of Calypso's Isle longs to get back to sunny Ithaca and prudent Penelope, but he cannot execute the wish of his heart, the ocean stands in his way. Then he begins constructing his raft, every blow struck on its timbers is a blow for freedom. The image of home and wife in his mind drives him to reconstruct some part of surrounding nature in order to master the watery element before him, and to convert it into the service of his Free Will.

3. The undetermined world can rouse a *Thought* which is the creative principle of mind, and this Thought may impel me to a transformation of that undetermined world which has stimulated it. Thought is not the Image but rather the creator of the Image, and it is this creative element upon which stress is now laid. In the preceding example let us suppose that Ulysses had never seen a raft, but had to invent one outright; he might have an antecedent Image of it in his mind, but his Thought or Conception would be the producer of the Image. Such is indeed the supreme activity of human spirit — that which is called originality, invention. Of course Thought may realize itself immediately

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world stimulates it to assert its freedom against the outer limit, which it proceeds to remove or to transform or to transcend in some way. But the same Free Will can refuse to be determined thus by the Undetermined to remove or to transform or to transcend the limit, it can submit to the external restraint, it can even deny its own content and object, namely freedom. Such is the mighty contradiction which the Free Will contains within itself: it can determine itself not to be self-determined, it can give itself up to bondage by its own free act.

Still even such an act has lurking within it an implicit Free Will. The inhibition of freedom presupposes freedom; to inhibit his free spirit man must be free. So the inhibitory process will result in bringing forth a deeper freedom, namely, that which is acquired through its own negation, and the return out of that negation. Hence this process will reveal first, the inhibition of the outer fiat; secondly, the inhibition of the inner content; thirdly, the inhibition of the inhibition.

1. There can be, in the first place, an inhibition of the outer executive act. The Free Will may be stimulated by the undetermined world, but is able nevertheless to cut off the fiat. There still remains the stimulus to transcend the limit, yet the execution is repressed by the Free Will. A man interferes with my passage down the

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The undetermined world, rousing a sensation or an image or a thought, can call forth in the Ego the strong resolve to assert freedom, but the present inhibition goes back and undoes the resolve, negates the very power of the spirit to respond within itself to the stimulus, which thereby can no longer stimulate the Ego as Free Will to determine itself to be self-determined. Whole nations often give up their spirit of liberty and droop in slavery; what once determined them to noble deeds determines them no more; we say that their spirit is gone, not merely suppressed or waiting for action; it is no longer stimulated by the act of tyranny to determine itself as self-determined. In like manner individuals give up this eternal struggle of freedom, which is the true content of life.

3. The inhibition of the inhibition is the final inhibitory act of the Undetermined Free Will; having reached the preceding complete contradiction and self-negation, it must proceed to inhibit just this negative content also, as in the previous case it inhibited a positive content, namely, the limit-transcending spirit itself. Or, as we say in abstract speech, the negation negates itself. The inhibition must apply its own logic to itself, and so is in a perpetual conflict with itself, seeking to inhibit itself. The Free Will denying Free

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from the outside by chance, but by the Free Will itself, which has reached back and is determining its determinant, selecting and rejecting the same.

III. The Free Will has thus reached the mastery of the executive and inhibitory elements which belong to its complete action, and hence it can employ both. The undetermined world is still the stimulant of Free Will, but is put under its control; this control is not merely negative in the present stage, not merely inhibitory, but is positive; the Free Will still has its determinant in the Undetermined, yet it has gained the mastery over this determinant of itself. The inhibition of the inhibition was the process of negating the negative, yet remained negative or, at least, inactive therein; the present mastery, however, implies the Free Will which has overcome the negative process and commands the same by virtue of its sovereignty.

Thus the Free Will is seizing upon its stimulating world and is using the same for its purpose, which is to realize freedom or to determine itself to be self-determined, not through a world which is outside of Free Will, but which is through Free Will. It is a mastery over the Free Will by Free Will, since the latter goes back and determines its determinant, which is the Undetermined. This mastery will also have its process; the immediate, the separative and

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be the best for its purpose; having been chosen for a certain end, it may fail partially or wholly. The Free Will must, therefore, inhibit its own first choice, and open again the whole field, which is the undetermined world; man's freedom cannot be allowed to hang upon one mistaken selection of a means. Thus the Ego as Free Will asserts anew its mastery over its own act, over itself; it inhibits its former selection, returns to the realm of determinants, and then inhibits its inhibition again by making a fresh selection. In such manner it insists upon having not one but many choices, wherein we see that this is the second or divisive stage of the present sphere.

Let us carry out still further the example of choosing a vocation, previously cited, the ultimate object of which is to realize the freedom of the individual in civil society. I find that my calling does not bring out my development, does not stimulate me unto freedom as I expected; on the contrary, it hinders my Free Will willing Free Will. Hence I think of other vocations, I undo my choice (gradually it may be) and seek that occupation which brings out my highest Self. The great problem in Goethe's famous novel, *Wilhelm Meister*, is the choice of a vocation, which will aid and stimulate the human soul to the most perfect freedom by it attainable. The hero in that novel changes from one thing to another, in pursuit of culture, till he passes

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makes over its outer environment into an image of itself as well as a means of its own realization. Not a single determinant is chosen now (as was the case in the first stage) but the totality is to be taken and wrought over anew into the bearer of the ideal end of the Ego in the present sphere.

It may be said that the American people, more than any other perhaps, are engaged in developing the resources of nature — which means, at bottom, the transforming of a whole continent into the abode of freedom. The frontiersman cutting down the forest, the plowman turning up the virgin soil for his crops, the manufacturer converting the minerals of the earth into implements of utility, are all ultimately doing one thing: That undetermined world outside they are transmuting into a realm of liberty. They are making it tractable to Free Will, yea to Free Will willing Will; in fact, that is just what they are doing in the very act of work. To be sure, they may all be said to be making money, and they are, but when the test comes, they will give their money and their lives for the higher end. Any how it is better to make money than to take money.

The Anglo-Saxon race is the race which has most fully developed commerce and manufactures, which has adopted as its calling the transformation of Nature into a means for man's improvement. The dollar-loving race it is

imes dubbed by its detractors; but note
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by the Ego itself. Accordingly, the stress of power now passes from the objective to the subjective determinant. Thus we move out of the Undetermined into the Determined, as the stimulating energy which drives the Ego to will Free Will. This is the next sphere which is to be considered and which is distinctively the separative stage of the total process of Free Will. We have already noticed that there has been in Undetermined Free Will an internal element, though it be implicit, and not separated from the outward act. Still it is present and is now to become explicit; that is, the Impulse or Desire for freedom, which lay in the Ego, intermediate, as it were, between rude external Nature and its transformation, is to be made distinct and is to be seen as the determinant taken by itself. Thus the Ego divides itself from its coalescence with the outer determinant, and asserts itself as the inner principle which determines itself to freedom.

II. Determined Free Will.

There is an inner or subjective world of determinants which move the Ego in manifold ways; the ultimate end of them all is to determine the Free Will to will Free Will. Let us again begin at the beginning and take one of the lowest of these lower determinants, anger, which is an

determinant of my Ego, and rises usually at obstruction to or attack upon my freedom. is undoubtedly an external occasion of in most cases, still it may flash up from a ing image of some past wrong. It is, er, a psychical tendency, a disposition determines me to some action, unless ed; it is one of the most immediate forms pulse in which the Ego as Will is deter- not merely to be self-determined but to nine itself to be self-determined. Anger e, and usually is, irrational, nevertheless it bjective determinant to freedom.

en the outer fact or event quite loses itself internal state of mind or feeling which it

The flight of a bird may make me feel my limitation to such an extent, if I am very sensitive on the point, that I at once think of a flying-machine, create a plan of the same, and start to produce it, realizing therein not only the mechanism but also my freedom. Here the subjective factor is what moves me to act, and if obstacles be put in my way, it may move me to assert my freedom just by my act. At the same time I am transforming nature and therein creating an outer world of freedom.

In contrast with the previous sphere (the Undetermined Free Will) we name the present sphere the Determined Free Will. In this caption we must first recall and carefully join together the three factors which enter into the process. The two constant factors which make the sphere of Free Will are present: The Ego as Will determines itself to be self-determined; that is, the Will not only acts but has its own freedom as the content of its action. But the third or variable factor, that which gives the varieties of the Determined Free Will, is also to be stated in the formula. This factor is, in general, the Determined, that is, something determined by me, by my Ego, and not determined externally by the outer world. So we have the formula: The Ego as Will determines itself to be self-determined through the Determined. The Will wills itself

e Free Will through a stimulation coming
within.

hen I leave my position, not merely to do
thing else, but to assert my freedom, which
be jeoparded by the conduct of my employer,
leed is an instance of this present sphere.
t only act, but the end or content of my act
liberty of action; my Free Will wills itself
Free Will, stirred by my subjective deter-
tion in the matter. Yet we must always
lect that there is a determinant to such
n on my part. I have to feel or to think
my freedom is, and to have a very strong
ng about it; the act of the employer would
letermine me unless I had a consciousness

were prepared to take fire. The inner realm of the Ego, with its determinations, thus becomes the main co-efficient of the deed.

Herein we can see the distinction between this and the preceding sphere. The undetermined world stimulated the Free Will to transform it into the instrument of freedom, so that the kingdom of nature is made over into the works of liberty. But the determined world (determined by my Ego) stimulates my Free Will to realize my instinct, my desire or my conception of freedom. It is my own determination which determines me to assert my Free Will. Though the Undetermined moves me through my sensation, my image or my thought, I am moved to get rid of that undetermined element as an obstacle to my freedom and to transmute it into an instrument thereof.

The Free Will, therefore, in the present sphere, is determined directly from within by the activities of the Ego. We may call it the realm of subjective freedom. Another term we shall employ, Caprice, though it is in some respects misleading. Any determination of my own, a whim, a sudden notion or fancy can move me to assert my Free Will; I will my Will through willfulness. Yet the moral Will is also subjective and so has an element of Caprice in it; it is we who choose our moral ideal and carry it out.

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Will. Contradictory they ar
movement of this sphere is
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into freedom.

We may now bring before o
process of Determined Free W
ning is made by a subjective det
though internal, moves the Ego
to assert Free Will, and hence
hostile to freedom. This subject
must, therefore, be mastered by
is, the Ego must determine its ov
to willing Free Will, and not be
the same, thus it attains the mas
by its own Inner Law.

The stages of this process, whic
of mastering Caprice, are three
Psychosis: —

I. *The Executive;* the Ego a
Free Will responds to the inner d
Determined by me) in an imme
out inhibi...

Free Will, finding itself determined by a determinant outside of itself, though this determinant is subjective, reacts against the same, and proceeds to inhibit it.

This inhibition will manifest the three forms which it usually passes through in the sphere of the Will: the inhibition of the fiat, the inhibition of the content, and the inhibition of the inhibition. This entire process of inhibition gives what we have called the negative mastery over the determinant.

III. *The Mastery which is positive, or the Mastery of Caprice*, which is the control over the subjective determinant, and the subordination of it to the Inner Law. The Ego as Will willing Free Will, being able now both to execute and to inhibit the determinant, has gotten the mastery over the inner world of determinants, and can take which one it chooses; thus it determines its determinant.

This mastery moves through three phases: the immediate mastery which shows itself in the selection of the strongest determinant and in the inhibition of the others; then comes a new inhibition followed by a new selection from the total field of determinants; finally, the Ego as Free Will is placed over all subjective determinants as their Inner Law, whose content is the Free Will willing the Free Will.

Thus the process of Determined Free Will has

... by determining the E
freedom, and has ended in bei
determined by that same Ego,
the Inner Law over all finite d
the Inner Law begins to elabo
these determinants into means
the outer world was wrought o
of Undetermined Free Will, an
an instrument of man's liber
world of subjective determinants
over in the sphere of Determ
and must be made to further
his inner life. When this ideal
becomes the controlling principle
ual and transforms all his condu
its behest, we have entered the r
At present, however, we are sim
the psychical fact that in the mo
the Ego as Free Will willing
reached the point at which it c
jective determinants, and uses th
bring forth the end, which
the

adequately within its purely internal self. So the Law must be objective and universal, not subjective and individual; thus the Ego is to receive a new content, and a new authority is to rise, the authority of institutions. But all this lies much in advance of us.

At present, therefore, we must return and unfold the Determined Free Will, giving in detail its various stages which have been designated above in a general way.

I. The executive act of Determined Free Will follows immediately upon the determination of the Ego, whatever that may be. There is no conscious inhibition of the outgoing energy, no stoppage of the fiat. This determined element, which is the stimulus, is mine, is a determination of my mind, and may be an Impulse, Desire or Choice. These we have already seen as stages of the Determined Will (see last section), but they are also stages of the Determined Free Will, with which we are now dealing. That is, they are in the present case determinants not only of the Self-determined (the act) but also of the content of the act as self-determined; I am herein moved not merely to act freely, but to have freedom as the content of my action. Moreover this action is now immediate, the execution follows implicitly and directly the determinant, which, as before said, is at present subjective.

Impulse can be an inner or subjective deter-
nt of Free Will. We have already given
example of Impulse the whizzing bullet
h causes me to dodge; an outside sensation
s me to act, to determine myself. The
nism is stimulated immediately to a free
ment, yet the very purpose of this free
ment of the body is to keep the body free
ove; if it were struck by the bullet, it
d lose its freedom. Thus the inner Impulse
r can have as end or content the Free Will
g Free Will; that is, it can be a determi-
to freedom.

doubtedly such a determinant, being merely
natic, is very inadequate, and can act with-
ntelligence. It is started or roused from

proceed to thrust him out out of the way by violence. My Free Will is willing my Free Will in such a case doubtless, but it is the lowest form of asserting freedom.

Thus there is a sphere of corporeal liberty which is watched over, and, so to speak, willed by Impulse; there is a realm of organic freedom in the body, which impulsively, quite automatically, gives a distant glimpse of the supreme end of Free Will. The lower animals have in them such an immediate impelling power for liberty. The caged bird will usually try to fly away when opportunity offers; the muskrat, if one of his feet be caught in a trap, will gnaw off his own leg for the sake of gaining his liberty. Man, imprisoned, has a perpetual spontaneous movement in his soul which drives him to escape from his captivity, even if all the wants of life are better satisfied in it than in a state of freedom.

Such is the might of this Impulse throughout the whole animated world. Under the head of Determined Will, we saw the primary superficial form of Impulse; but now, under the head of Determined Free Will, we see the deep inner purpose of Impulse to tend toward the realization of freedom.

2. Desire can be an inner or subjective determinant of Free Will. We have already noted that the image of a former experience rises in the present and impels to the future act — all of

Impul[illegible] which in its turn
ut of Fre[illegible] freedom. To take
n example [illegible] desire to go home;
h causes [illegible] act, or am deter-
es me to [illegible] But if there be
nism is [illegible] this image of
ement, yo[illegible] may to act (to go
ement of [illegible] vindicating my
move; if [illegible]
ld lose its [illegible] is not rational,
or can ha[illegible] such is at last to
ng Free [illegible] accumulated from
to freedo[illegible] impulse) by some
ubconscio[illegible] ses to the sur-
matic, [illegible] vortex of the Ego.

way, it at once begins to indicate that its Free Will is asserting Free Will by crying, by assailing the restraint, perchance by a general attack upon everybody and everything in its environment. Of course, here is a loud call for training and direction. Women are generally reported to have Caprices, quite unfathomable, sudden ebullient spirts from the bottom of their oceanic Ego, whose rise and duration no mathematician has yet been able to calculate. Let it, however, be added in all haste that man, born of woman, has in this respect inherited the traits of his mother and often improved on them.

Thus the whole inner world of the soul has a tendency to transform itself into Desire, and still further, this Desire has a tendency to make itself the determinant of Free Will. The Desire for freedom is indeed inherent; the Ego as Free Will has not only the Impulse, but also the Desire to be free; it is always holding up to itself some image, some ideal of its freedom; it cannot wholly dwell in the reality thereof. The Determined Will in the form of Desire thus stimulates and passes into the Determined Free Will, becoming therein its determinant.

3. The Motive can be an inner or subjective determinant of Free Will. We have seen, under the head of Choice, that the Motive, properly speaking, involves the total process of Desire in its three stages, which Motive then passes over

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Free Will to will the Fre
go home in order to write
the immediate Motive for n
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writing may be to get the
my liberty, or to emancipate
such a case, the Ego as Free
Will, being urged thereto
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seizing upon the means, let u
Thus my true Motive in goin
to realize my freedom, or b
mined to determine myself
mined.

Here again great variety en
for freedom may be of

the Motive man becomes responsible, more so, at least, than he is in mere Impulse or Desire. For the Motive contains the total process of Ego, as before shown, and hence must have in it something of deliberation. You cannot have a Desire, then inhibit it and pass to a new Desire through such inhibition without having some consciousness of what you are doing.

The ultimate Motive, whatever be its moral nature, is freedom, as this is also the ultimate Impulse and the ultimate Desire. The whole sphere of what we have above called Determined Will is to determine the Ego as Will to determine itself to be self-determined, or to determine man unto freedom. It may be asked just here again: But if man is determined, how can he be free? The question takes for granted the fatal point that Determinism and Freedom are absolutely separate, whereas they must be seized as elements of one process. Free Will must be seen to be more and more deeply determined to be free, and to pass through a continued unfolding into its actual self (or self-actualization).

At this point undoubtedly the Ego must be able to inhibit the subjective determinant in the form of Impulse, Desire or Motive (Choice). Even the Motive, though a Self-determined, must be put under the might of inhibition, being a subjective determinant in the present sphere.

II. Accordingly, the Ego as Free Will finds

f determined, unfree, moved by a deter-
nt not its own, though the latter be sub-
re. Hence it begins to assert itself by
iting this determinant as something really
de of itself; it will stop the execution of
Impulse, Desire, Motive; then it will inhibit
f these within, as internal determinants of
f, and finally will inhibit the inhibition.
the Ego as Free Will having found it con-
ctory to its freedom to be ruled by such a
rminant, turns against it and negates it,
h, being subjective, has the form of Caprice,
hence must be put under control, whereof
eginning is inhibition.

e inhibition of Caprice, of this subjective
rmination, is necessary for the completion

gratified, he may deem that he has no freedom. Such a person becomes a victim to his own inner states or mental determinations, when he makes them determinants to an assertion of Free Will. Thus even the Free Will in asserting Free Will can be enslaved to Caprice, which must, therefore, be inhibited by Free Will.

Again the inhibitory principle will pass through the three stages of its process, as already indicated. Still we must remember that the content or subject-matter of the inhibitory process is different in the present sphere (Determined Free Will), from that of any preceding sphere.

1. The first inhibition is turned against the executive act, the immediate going forth into the deed. The entire inner world of subjectivity may be let loose upon the Free Will and seek to determine it, that is, to move the Ego to will Free Will; some turn of the fancy, some notion, any internal determination may become such a determinant, which the Ego, if it is to be free, must be able to refuse to carry out. It does so refuse, negates the fiat and cuts off the act.

The young lady may take a sudden notion to become an actress; opposition is made by her relatives, but she feels the strong stimulation to assert her Free Will against such opposition; she declares she is vindicating her freedom, and goes upon the stage. Or she may bring herself to inhibit the carrying out of her fancy, though

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is to be inhibited. It is [illegible]
simply the outer execution
the inner determination; the
itself, being the source of the
has often been said in the pr[illegible]
content must be inhibited; [illegible]
always the danger that the act
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minant, is annulled, the act [illegible]

In all moral training of my [illegible]
not only cease from the outer
wrongful deed, but also I m[illegible]
notion or thought which tempt[illegible]
must eschew the lustful image
ful deed; if my heart be pu[illegible]
cannot help being [illegible]

paragraph, involves the inhibition of this inhibition of the subjective determinant. The negative power of the inhibition has therein come back to itself and has gotten control; Caprice has obtained the negative mastery of Caprice, when it can inhibit itself. For this subjective annulment of Caprice, is still Caprice, which is just this inner determination of the Ego which determines the Free Will to self-assertion.

Such is the result of the inhibitory movement of Caprice; it inhibits itself, which is a negative control over itself. The subjective determinant has now the ability to determine the Ego to will Free Will or not to will the same; that is, the Ego as Free Will begins to determine its determinant, in a negative or inhibitory way. Next we shall see it rising to a positive control or mastery.

III. The mastery of Caprice, to which we have now come, signifies that the subjective determinant to the assertion of Free Will is under control, can be inhibited, though it be carried into execution. We again go back to the executive act, we restore the fiat, yet always with the ability to inhibit. The inner determined world of the Ego is still the stimulant of Free Will, which, however, has gained the mastery over this stimulant of itself, and responds no longer to a mere whim or fancy, but can put it down in favor of the determinant which may be worthy of itself. Herein subjective freedom attains its highest point.

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hy determinant of Free Will is subjective,
depends on the inner determination of the
It is still a Caprice, though it puts down
ice. The movement in the mastery of
ice will be toward getting rid of this contra-
on, toward finding a determinant which is
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at which we here call the mastery of
ice is the mastery of the subjective deter-
nt through the subjective determinant; the
as subject in the form of Impulse, Desire,
ve, having determined the process of Free
is now in its turn determined by that
ess. Such is the final attempt of the Ego

be, and may move the Free Will to assert itself. An infinite sea of subjective determinants thus lies in every soul, and their final object and destination is to stir Free Will to will Free Will. Man cannot rest, has never rested in unfreedom, being everlastingly scourged out of it by his subjective nature.

Of this multitude of determinants the strongest makes itself valid, and gets carried into execution; the others are inhibited. Evidently behind this competing, conflicting mass stands the Ego, and in the present case makes implicitly and quite unconsciously its own selection, accepting and rejecting. Herein we see that the Ego as determinant is asserting the mastery over all its own states and activities which are also seeking to be determinants.

2. But the Ego, having selected the strongest internal determinant, may find it, after such selection, to be not suitable for its purpose. The strongest determinant may not be the wisest; the immediate execution of a mood or feeling or notion, though these be at first very strong, may not be the best way to freedom. Hence comes the need of inhibiting this strongest determinant, and of opening the whole field anew. To be sure, when too often done, such action indicates unsteadiness and fickleness. But the Ego as Free Will must be able to recall its first immediate selection and to

...serts its mastery over its
correcting them; or, more
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one another — wherein we ma
divisive stage of the present sp
tial point of the struggle is:
determinant shall now be taken
of my freedom, for determining
myself to be self-determined?

3. The answer is, in general,
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of being the most worthy? O
given: that determinant which
But here we may well ask: W
rational in the present instance?
Ego as Free Will now determin
minant, is the master

dom, the highest end of man. The Ego which makes such a choice is the truly rational Ego.

Thus the Ego has chosen as its true subjective determinant in the sphere of Determined Free Will just its freedom, or the Free Will which wills Free Will. This is often called the Inner Law, or the Higher Law which commands all other subjective determinants to obey its behest, as supreme over all forms of Impulse, Desire, Motive. Moreover it grounds its authority upon the fact that its whole content is to be the determinant of freedom, its object is the Ego as Free Will asserting Free Will. We have already seen that we may have a Desire, for instance the Desire to go home, which when interfered with, becomes the determinant to asserting freedom; but in the present case, the Ego itself has become the determinant to Free Will willing Free Will. It is thus the Law unto itself or over itself; as before said, it is the Inner Law, in which the Lawgiver makes the Law over himself. Such is the completion of this third stage, or the mastery of the subjective determinant by the subjective determinant, which is the Ego as Free Will willing Free Will, elevated into Law over all its own finite determinations.

Still this highest determinant, this Inner Law, is only subjective, it is as yet merely my authority, I am the ruler and the ruled in the one Ego. My next step must be to make this Law object-

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Once more we may look a
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most rational; and the most rational motive is the one through which I most adequately realize my freedom, which moves me most completely to will Free Will. Such is the test by which I choose the most rational determinant. I as Inner Law, being a Free Will willing Free Will, command myself to take that determinant which is best for realizing myself, who am a Free Will willing Free Will. Every subjective determinant, every Impulse, Desire, Motive, has as end just this internally free Ego, which therein shows itself the supreme authority in this sphere, or the inner determinant determining all inner determinants. Thus it becomes the one Law, though still subjective; it rules the infinite multiplicity of Caprice, by a single stern authority, which is, however, even when rational, a Caprice.

Such is the inner limitation of the present sphere of Free Will (the Determined), which limitation must now be transcended. The loud call is for Law which will control Caprice and not be itself capricious. This final contradiction in Free Will the Ego is to free itself of by making its Law objective, whose authority shall extend not simply over one Ego internally, but over many or all Egos, and shall spring not simply from one dominating Ego but from many or all Egos. The Ego as Free Will cannot, therefore, be satisfied with even the Inner Law as its determinant, inasmuch as therein its freedom is not fully real-

It must in some way rise out of being
ined by its own subjective determinant,
at the highest is still capricious, and it must
ermined by the Self-determined, which is
ndent of the individual Ego. The Law
not be subject to me, I must be subject
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ght is to become my true determinant to
m; or the Ego as Will determines itself to
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orld is known as the institutional world, in
the objective institutions of man (State,
, Society, Church) determine him to free-

III. Self-determined Free Will.

First of all, these three words must be looked at with some care. They have a common meaning, yet are distinct; they indicate the three factors which go to make the final stage or process of psychological Will.

The Ego as Will now determines itself to be self-determined through the Self-determined — such is the formula, quite abstract and skeleton-like, which the reader must seek to make concrete and alive to himself through thought and examples. There is in the first place the primordial act of Will, the first form of self-activity or the Self-determined in the physical organism — the simple deed. In the second place, this act of Will is Free Will, it has as its content or purpose its own freedom of activity, or the Ego as Will determines itself to be self-determined. In the third place, this act of Free Will has a determinant or stimulus, which is the Self-determined, not the Undetermined or the Determined, each of which has just been unfolded. Such is the third factor of the present process, being the variable factor thereof, hence manifesting the stages or divisions.

An instance of the Self-determined Free Will may be observed when I obey the law of the State. Am I free in such an act? Undoubtedly I am determined, that is, I have a determinant

moves me, but this determinant is the Self-
ined in the form of the law of the State.
e State with its law is a self-determined
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lling my Will, making the same valid,
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the previous stage of Determined Free
ut in the present stage of Self-determined
Vill I am objectively free, inasmuch as I
a world whose very soul is the securing

Will; this Will actualized is what I am to will in order to obtain actual or objective freedom, since the Will which secures me and my Will is not my own subjective self, but an objective self, so to speak, whose fundamental purpose is to realize freedom, not alone internally, but externally, in the world.

So, when I obey the law of the State, I am following not simply my own individual Will, but I, this individual Will, have as content the Will which wills Will; or, I will the Will actualized, we may call it the universal Will, since its content is not simply my individual Will, but all Will, including mine. Such is the completion of freedom, when the world is free and exists for the sake of freedom. All institutions, properly speaking, have this end; hence the present sphere is the psychological foundation for what we shall hereafter call institutional Will, which is to be unfolded in the third part of this work.

A world of institutions, then, is the final supreme determinant as well as content of Free Will; its center is the Ego determining itself to be self-determined through the Self-determined; or it is the free activity of the Will asserting its free activity through actualized freedom as a positive working entity. I must will the State, but the State returns and wills my Will in its complete circuit; thus my Will

lf is objectified, is projected as a total
ito an actual existence. Not till it has
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object has it realized its own essence;
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mined Will (the State) determines me (is my determinant) to determine myself (moves me to an act) to be self-determined (to will my own Free Will or freedom). My Free Will pays a tax whose object is to maintain a Free Will which in turn maintains my Free Will. Or, the State commands me to do an act, which act has as its content or end my freedom of action guaranteed and safeguarded through the State. So I am still determined to determine myself to be self-determined in Free Will, but the determinant is now the self-determined Will actualized, existent in the world, and willing my Free Will and all Free Will.

The foregoing exposition may seem a mere play of words to puzzle the forbearing student. Still let him recollect that the problem of Free Will is one of the most intricate, riddlesome, subtle problems in Psychology. Indeed a number of eminent psychologists have simply given up the problem, have surrendered the very fortress of their science at discretion. We hold that mind is able to disentangle all the intricacies of mind; if it cannot, then there is no science of mind. Surely it is not wisdom to try to unfold a science of something of which we believe that no science is possible.

It may be here said that Hegel has once used the expression: "the Free Will which wills the Free Will." But in his development of Will he

not make use of it, nor in his unfolding of
ıtions, so that it can hardly be called a dis-
vely Hegelian formula. (Something more
e said on this topic later on.)

the present sphere there are three stages
ıtuting the process between the Ego as Free
and the Self-determined Free Will as Law
nstitutions.

There is, first, the primal stage of obedience,
nbroken unity of the two sides, the sub-
e and the objective, or the personal and the
ıtional. The Ego as Free Will is one with
elf-determined Free Will as actualized in
orld.

The breach between the two sides takes

master over the individual Ego as Free Will — the mastery over Free Will by Free Will.

In this sphere the Ego has found the highest determinant of freedom, namely freedom, freedom as actualized in the world, thus attaining that of which it has been in search since the beginning, or, having made explicit that which was implicit in the primordial act of Will. The completely free man now begins to come forth from his fetters, outer and inner; he is the Ego which determines itself to be self-determined through the Self-determined. Such is his definition, now realized, but which has to be thought over and created anew before being fully understood and appropriated.

To this end we shall develop in more detail the three heads just given, which in themselves form a Psychosis, and still further sub-divide into many Psychoses, which, however, show at bottom the one process of the Ego running through all the multiplicity of their manifestations.

I. The Ego as Will acts in immediate unity with the objective self-determined Will, which determines it, and which it obeys instinctively. Here again is the direct response to the determinant, which moves the Ego to determine itself as self-determined, to realize its freedom. The fiat, the executive act takes place, at once, without inhibition, in consequence of the determining power, which is here the actualized self-deter-

Will, which we have already identified
he institutional world.

he present stage the person is immediately
stinctively one with Family, State, Church—
eral, with his institutional world. He does
uestion their validity, but obeys unhesi-
ly their mandates. These institutional
work in me unconsciously and determine
freedom; I may not be aware of their
, but they are functioning within me and
character to my life; in fact, they are
g me to being a free man. My patriotism,
ligiosity, my domesticity are my inner re-
to State, Church, Family; through them
ed to actual Free Will, which demands also

In the present stage, accordingly, there will be a process which will show the Ego unfolding out of this instinctive condition into a deeper consciousness of its freedom.

1. We must first seize the Ego as completely obedient to the law and custom of its institutional world. It has as its absolute determinant the self-determined Will actualized; there is no breach between the two sides, the emotional harmony is unruffled. This is a kind of paradisaical state, which, however, is pretty certain to be disturbed by the intruding serpent. The soul responds immediately to its spiritual environment; the angels are such souls without any inner separation. The child, the man, the nation have each an epoch of such an intimate unity between themselves and their world; it is the epoch of their bloom, of their happiness, after which the breach sets in.

2. The Ego, still innocent, violates the law unknowingly; thus the separation starts. I become fully aware of the law when it smites me for violation; certainly there is now a difference between me and what commands me. I withdraw into myself and project out of me the authority which previously found in me an immediate echo. I now find that I was determined externally by that power.

3. Still, in the present stage, I do not break with the authority above me, I accept its man-

nd obey. But this obedience is different
hat first immediate obedience, I am con-
that I am determined from the outside by
v, I begin to feel that this contradicts my
m, that I am not a free being under the
Thus, while I obey, my obedience deepens
sm ; my subsumption, though not resisted,
to be external.

is, in general, the process through which
stinctive unity between the Ego and its
ional environment is broken. The Ego
e Will now declares that it is determined
de unfree by custom and law. It has not
ched the point at which it sees that social
ions are what secures its freedom; to

subsumed by authority. Such an authority I, in my present state, affirm to be not mine, not through me; so I not only question it, but challenge it and start to inhibit it in one way or other.

Thus we see the youth, in his development of Free Will, begin his challenge of the institutional world which he has hitherto accepted implicitly; he inhibits his instinctive obedience and asks why. He has gotten to the point of seeing that he is determined by an external, objective might, whereas his destiny is to be a free man, internally determined; the contradiction between his inner and outer worlds starts him on the war-path, and he is ready to settle with the authority put over him without his consent. On all sides he meets with prohibitions of his free activity; *thou shalt not* seems written on every stone; what a confined world! He will break over the limit to liberty; the very prohibition of an act, as is well known, has a tendency to provoke its violation for freedom's sake.

All this constitutes a necessary stage of his progress, he is really seeking a deeper unity between himself and his world through his doubt and challenge; he has broken with instinct, but has not yet attained insight. He does not really inhibit institutions as such, but his own instinctive unity with them and subjection to them; such is at least the starting-point of his inhibitory

, which, however, may deepen to the very
of negation.

ubtedly the form of external authority
erminism must be transformed for the
mind; freedom must somehow get rid of
etermined or compelled to be free, or this
sion must be found to be an inner one.
s an outlook in advance over the total
f the process which we have here called
f-determined Free Will, though there be
who never can get out of the inhibitory
so deeply do they become mired in the
e side of freedom. Very common is the
nt among even cultivated men that gov-
t is a necessary evil, utterly ignoring the

projection into an act. Such is disobedience of the external mandate whose right I may recognize, yet refuse submission. The Ego as Will refuses to be determined, though the determinant is in accord with its conviction.

The ability to disobey is a most important factor in human freedom. The mythus of all peoples has celebrated under manifold forms this primal inhibition of the law, even the Law of God. In Hebrew story the primordial act of the rising individual was his disobedience of divine authority; it was indeed the pivotal event of the human race, just that act of disobedience. The budding Free Will of Adam (and of Eve too) dared inhibit the command of the Lord; in that, if in nothing else, they were the ancestors of mankind. The prohibition, though divine, provokes the inhibition, which is human. The breach with authority the highest and most sacred thus begins our terrestrial career which is a grand process of separation from and return to Self-determined Free Will actualized in the institutional world.

2. The Ego in this sphere proceeds to a deeper inhibition, extending not only to the outer act but to the inner conviction; it inhibits in its negative sweep the Self-determined Free Will as actualized in the world. Thus it comes not only to disobey institutional authority, but to deny the validity thereof, and it proceeds to realize its

n by assailing and undoing the established

must not forget that the Ego in this in-
y, destructive stage claims to be asserting
edom, and is perfectly honest in such
It feels itself determined, yea enslaved
institutional order which environs it spirit-
n every side; the burden becomes intoler-
nd the Ego vindicating its Free Will, seeks
te in some way that objective power which
y what secures and makes valid Free Will.
s the profound, terrific contradiction of
here, which is at work specially in our
epoch.
difficulty lies primarily in the fact that the

and ordered. The sphere of negative freedom is this, since everything is done or rather undone in the name of freedom.

Education may show this tendency; in fact, culture seems often to beget not only a questioning, but also a denying, destructive spirit. In *Faust* we have a character, Mephistopheles, who is the embodiment of such a spirit: *Ich bin der Geist der stets verneint;* thus he defines himself in the poem, and gives the proof of the definition by his deeds. The devil is now a cultivated gentleman, and appears in the best society. Is not the University largely a training-school of negation? At present the education of the child has become the battle-ground of the Mephistophelean powers. The child is to be let alone, his impulses and caprices are the divine thing which is to guide the teacher: he is to be allowed his freedom, he is not to be directed on any pre-established line, as that might limit his Free Will. Thus the training of the child into an institutional life is completely inhibited, and all in the name of freedom.

It is manifest that this inhibition of the Self-determined Free Will, or of the institutional world, for the sake of Free Will, has assumed many forms in the past and played a deep part in history. In fact, the Ego as Will has in a certain stage a tendency to revert to the Undetermined, to negate everything determined in the way of

stom, institution, because it is determined
is not the Ego's own. This negative ac-
often becomes a gospel of freedom. And
st recollect that the blank, undetermined,
self-identical Ego is free, or rather is the
lity of freedom, since it is devoid of all
ntent. A reversion to such a state of pure
y or equality has often been the object of
lled ideal life.

Hindoo mind shows a tendency to reach
er release from finite existence by negating
erminations of its own consciousness and
back into its undetermined Self, the con-
tion of which is the grand escape from the
living into the only freedom. Renuncia-

actualize his Free Will. Such a doctrine, as has been remarked, springs from a corrupt or tyrannical epoch in which the Ego flees back into itself out of its sunken institutional environment, such as was the later Greek and also the later Roman world.

Shakespeare is fond of portraying one phase of this deep breach of the soul. The Ego suffers wrong, injustice, through the ruler and his administration of the law; the result is a flight of the wronged ones from the existent order, from Family and State, into a realm where institutions do not exist. So Orlando and Rosalind flee into the Forest of Arden, in which there is no civil order, that they may gain their freedom and get rid of the injustice of organized society. But the universal poet always brings his characters back to institutions after such a flight; there is the happy return to Family and State, since man cannot be individually free without being institutionally free. Out of this movement with its separation and return Shakespeare has constructed one of his most notable art-forms, basing it upon a profound insight into the nature of both Free Will and institutions. In fact Shakespeare is just the supreme institutional poet, and must so be interpreted in the final judgment of his genius.

Here, too, we must rank another great phenomenon in the history of literature: the con-

on of ideal commonwealths, of which the
ic Republic remains the best example.
dividual Ego, having fallen out with the
t social and political order, in which it
no actualized Free Will which seeks to
Free Will, begins to build its own institu-
establishment, and therein takes refuge
the discordant reality. Utopia, Oceana,
s, Icaria are imaginary societies which at
eveal the aspiration of the soul for a free
They all declare that man cannot be
free in chains, that he, possessing Free
nust make it actual in the institution, and
an objective existence.
these cases which have just been given

tinction to its own dead level of identity. Here, in this Ego, everybody is equal and free. Thus negative freedom showed its most terrific manifestation, showed what it means when carried out to its consequences.

A still deeper and intenser phase of this kind of freedom has developed itself in recent days. We have become familiar with the name and meaning of Anarchism; in it the Ego sets up as its conscious principle the unsettling of everything settled, the undetermining of the determined; specially is this negative power turned against the sphere of institutions. Freedom now defines itself as the destruction of the actualized Will in every form, the established must be disestablished and thereby we attain the enfranchisement of blank nothingness. The anarchist usually claims that he would establish a new order, but this lies outside of his direct purpose. He would at present make the undoing of the established order universal, but such an universal negation turns back and negates itself. That is, the anarchist seeks to establish the destruction of the established; so he must and does in the end undo his own principle.

3. This leads us to the third phase of the inhibitory process, namely the inhibition of the inhibition. The Ego as Free Will, even in the pursuit of its enfranchisement from all determination, finds that it must stop the annulment of

ed Free Will, or become itself null. We st seen, in the case of Anarchism, that the e Free Will cannot help actualizing itself, hing itself, and so becoming institutional, were, and a determinant of Free Will. it contradicts and in fact overthrows its inciple, for it started out to get rid of erminant, and now it makes itself a deter- Thus Anarchism becomes a law enforced supreme anarch, is a kind of government intending to destroy government, has to h it, has to inhibit its own inhibition. tion cannot well keep on forever revo- ing, it must revolutionize itself, and does so, it stops, it inhibits itself. The

mined Free Will, or the authority of law and institutions, as the genuine reality of its freedom. And not only this acceptance of the established world is here the fact, but also there is a new creation of law and institutions through the negative process just recounted. Such positive fruition thereof we are next to look at.

III. We have, accordingly, reached the final stage in the process of the Self-determined Free Will, having passed through its negative, destructive phase, and come out into the mastery of that phase, which, however, belongs to the complete movement of freedom. Hence we observe here a restoration, a return to the unity of the first stage, yet with all the experience of the second or inhibitory stage.

We shall thus witness a new mastery of Free Will, the truly positive one; that is, the mastery over Free Will through Free Will. This will give the complete and final reconciliation of the Ego as Free Will with the institutional world as Free Will. The former wills the latter and the latter in turn wills the former; both sides, previously in opposition, have thus become harmonious and enforce each other. The Ego as Free Will reaches the mastery of itself as negative and inhibitory, no longer assailing the institutional world for being its determinant, but recognizing the same as its vindicator. Still the Ego has the negative power of freedom within

but it controls the same, transforming it
means of progress. For all progress has
resistance and the overcoming of this
nce, or an inhibition and the inhibition of
ibition.

present stage brings about the change
tional conduct coupled with insight, out
inctive obedience and inhibitory doubt
strangement. This is, accordingly, the
to unity with the institutional world after
on; the individual sees it to be the com-
of his freedom, its only actualization.
s that his simplest act of Will necessarily
ls as its complement and fulfillment self-
ication, and therein calls for the existent

ing of institutions and at once respond with action. After an estrangement of this sort we hear the voice: Go thy way and sin no more. Through the undoing of our negative deed we pass to the restorative deed, which is once more in harmony with that institutional order from which we have separated ourselves. Thus man is restored to Church, State, Family, the Social Organism, to the whole realm of the Self-determined Free Will.

Such a return to the institutional deed after a deep negative experience is a beloved theme of Shakespeare. His deeper comedies have their happy outcome just in this inner restoration after a profound spiritual scission. Homer has the same thought; the Odyssey over and over again calls itself a return, which is not only the body's but the soul's coming home.

2. But in this stage which we have named the Mastery of Free Will, its negative power is not lost. It still must be able and may be compelled to inhibit its institutional relation. Authority may become so external that it becomes tyranny; institutions may grow to be so fixed, so crystallized, that they cramp the spirit of man, which is essentially limit-transcending, and must be transformed. Transformed, let it be noted, not destroyed. For the institutional world is also in the grand process of development: it has to reflect, indeed secure the Ego

ee Will, and in order to do so, there must
ew special forms of willing Will.
us the Ego as Free Will, seeking its highest
om which is its supreme end, has to adjust
jective reality in order that this may cor-
nd to its process. The present form of the
, for instance, may be inadequate, we may
hat it no longer carries out our Free Will
administration of affairs. In some way or
the new conception of Free Will must be
lized in the institution, which is, as already
rth, Free Will actualized. For the "Will
People" must always be flowing in upon
transforming the State and other institu-
so that these reflect, and (what is far

will universal Free Will, which, however, the individual may resist and seek to nullify. Then the State determines him, forces him to determine himself to be a Free Will even in opposition to himself. The criminal, even when punished unwillingly for his wrongful act, is nevertheless taken by the law as a Free Will and held thereto in spite of himself.

Still the Ego as Free Will must retain its prerogative of inhibition, which may rise at times to the point of revolution. The Right of Revolution comes in here; the Ego may be compelled to actualize itself in a new institutional world when the old one becomes utterly subversive of its end. Equally certain is it that there is a wrong of Revolution, and this wrong may be paramount. Shakespeare, who is the great poet of Anglo-Saxon institutions, has portrayed these two opposite cases in two of his greatest historical dramas. In *Richard the Second* he champions the Right of Revolution against the established royal succession; in *Henry the Fourth* he sets forth the Wrong of Revolution in its attempt to overthrow the new order. Herein, of course, the poet reflects the deepest spirit of his people as revealed in the events of history.

All progress, accordingly, demands the presence of this negative power in Free Will. The existent actuality in the form of Church, State,

Social Organism has to be improved, in
to be harmonious with the aspiration of
Ego, which is always moving beyond its
limit. So the Self-determined Free Will
be able to transform its determinant, which
e institutional world; only thus is it truly
letermined. In this Mastery of Free Will,
atter has finally to make or at least to make
the master which masters it; it must indeed
he institution, and the institution must will
he limit-transcending character of the Ego
also be existent, objective, actualized, a
ing entity in the world; thus it is able to
it, and likewise to posit the new order.

When the Ego sees its own complete process

of the Psychosis; its self-activity is aware of itself as self-activity. Will and Intellect are united in the free, self-conscious act.

We have seen that the institutional world gets its progressive character through the Ego possessing an inhibitory as well as a positing power, which are elements of its process. This process of itself the Ego as Will has now objectified, made actual in an existent object which is some kind of institution; still further, in such self-objectification, it has become conscious of itself and thinks itself — which activity we have called insight. Such insight is Thought in highest potence, Thought creative, which generates anew the object, which is here the total process of the Ego as self-determined Free Will. Thus the Will now requires Thought for its completion, is indeed one with the same; Thought also requires Will and becomes one with Will in the act of originating genetically the object, which is here the total process of the self-determined Free Will, as just stated. Thought, in thinking Will, generates it, and so becomes Will just in thinking it; such, indeed, is the very conception of the Will, its starting-point, as was set forth at the beginning. But now we have come to the end, having unfolded the entire process of the Will, which has not only actualized itself, but knows itself in its actualization.

Here, then, the psychological Will has attained

clusion, having started with the first inner
Conception of the Will and unfolded
is last stage, which has projected the Will
process into the world of objective exist-
ct, and has recognized the same as the
sis. The spontaneous Psychosis of the
as thus become conscious and knows itself
Psychosis.

Observations.

The preceding sphere of the Will we have called psychological (or psychical), though we are well aware that all Will is psychological (or psychical), inasmuch as it belongs to the domain of psychology. The term is, therefore, not the best possible, since it may cause ambiguity; still, with a little care the student can avoid all serious trouble from this source. In a general sense, moral Will and institutional Will are also psychological, but this word, as here applied, relates to the inner process of the Ego taken by itself.

Historical. The modern discussion of the Will hovers about the name of Kant. He may be called the philosopher of the Will *par excellence;* that is, his philosophy is positive on the side of Will, while on the side of Intellect it is negative. The fact may be illustrated in a brief discussion.

This philosopher (Kant) starts out with an investigation of the faculty of knowing in his *Critique of Pure Reason;* before we know, we must discover what are our means of knowing. Now it is manifest that such an investigation is itself an act of knowing; that is, we have to

efore we know. This Critique of Kant's accordingly, an inner contradiction in its rpose; the author seems not to be fully hat the thing investigated is just the investigating. A poet-philosopher once this work of Kant's a Critique of the Sun Moon; the Moon, looking at the Sun by the wn light, criticises and denies sunlight. Or borrowed light of the Understanding ques- the source of its own power of questioning, s previously given by Reason. The out- f this Critique is negative to knowledge; to the knowledge of truth — man cannot ruth. At this point it joins hands with at poem of Kant's time, Goethe's Faust.

According to Kant, the Will is what determines itself within itself, and this is the conception of Freedom. He grasps the primordial act of the Ego as this self-separation which we have identified as the second stage of the Psychosis. Moreover, this pure subjective self determination is the *automony* of the Will, the field in which it is absolutely free. On the other hand there is the *heteronomy* of the Will, in which the Will is determined from the outside, by desire, passion, finite ends, in contrast with its being determined from the inside, by itself.

Kant's idea of Freedom remains subjective, it is supremely a moral internal Freedom, and this constitutes its value on the one hand, yet reveals its limitation on the other. It puts stress upon the moral Ego which is to be a law unto itself, with its imperative; but it does not rise to a clear conception of objective or institutional Freedom. It has itself as its own subjective content, and thus is formal and empty, or may become so.

The Kantian philosophy, perhaps more truly than any other, has been the philosophy of the century, both in its positive and negative aspects. His denial of intellect is the expression of the skepticism of the age; he has voiced the doubts of his time in regard to the knowledge of truth as something objectively valid. Hegel repeatedly connects the negative side of Kant's

phy with the French Revolution, the lat-
ng its practical realization. The recent
cism, falling out with all true knowledge,
ltivating simply the ethical Ego, traces
ck to Kant. One cannot help thinking
latest development of the German state
ting in one imperial Ego, is a polit-
alization of the categorical impera-
Kant. In accord with the same we hear
rn philosophic cry in Germany which
'Backwards to Kant," evidently to his
Ego as the supreme authority. The
en as brute force has found its defenders
the most highly civilized peoples of the
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of volition as well as of knowledge. The primordial creative energy must be Will.

These philosophers, however, lead up to Hegel, who has developed and organized the forms of both Intellect and Will with a completeness which makes his work the culminating point of modern philosophy.

Hegel. The deepest source of Hegel's philosophizing is undoubtedly to be found in Kant, though he shows traces of having developed through Fichte and Schelling, especially the latter. But Hegel's main objective point may be called a critique of Kant's Critique of Pure Reason — a negating of Kant's negation. He turns Kant's denial of knowing upon Kant himself with undoubted effect and often with decided relish. Out of this movement springs Hegel's Logic in the main, whose soul is the famous Hegelian dialectic. It is, therefore, the great positive work of Hegel to have rescued knowledge (that is the knowing of Truth) from Kant's destructive attack, making in manifold ways Kant's negation negate itself — which is the essential movement of the dialectic.

So much for Hegel's treatment of Intellect. But when he comes to Will he is more in accord with Kant, who, as already stated, is positive in his Practical Reason, making it go back and save that Truth which Pure Reason could not reach. Still, in the matter of the Will, specially the In-

al Will, Hegel has, as we shall see, made
dvance upon Kant.

, notwithstanding, has nowhere given
like a complete account of the Psycho-
Will, and in one passage apologizes for
ng done so — he could not get the time.
oduces the subject in several places (see
osophy of Spirit under the head of *Will*,
in the Introduction to his *Philosophy of*
). The fullest and the best of these
accounts of Will is found in his *Philoso-*
Right (*Rechts*), though it is there thrown
ntroduction, and is not embodied in the
nt of the work itself — which fact we have
d as a blemish in that very remarkable

of the Will. Now the Will, as the essence of all freedom, resents such treatment, which appears to place its process under control of some external domination, instead of permitting it to unfold freely out of itself, and thus to be truly self-determined. Herein, strange to say, Hegel coincides in spirit with the method of Herbert Spencer, who also applies his categories (derived from Natural Science in his case) to the free movement of mind and thus tries to make the cart draw the horse. Personally we have no doubt that Hegel had in his thought the free internal movement of the Ego, still his treatment, in form at least, is external and thus alien to the essence of its content, here the Will. We may be permitted to say in this connection that the preceding exposition *tries* at least to develop the Will internally, out of its own inherent nature. When the Will is externally determined, it is called so by name, it is Determined Will and not Free Will.

Still, that same book of Hegel's, we are glad to acknowledge, contains the germ of the present work. The following passage indicates the relation; it is for us the most important passage in all of Hegel's writings (*Philosophie des Rechts, s. 60, Einleitung*). We shall cite the original and then give a translation; Der abstracte Begriff der Idee des Willens ist überhaupt *der freie Wille, der den freien Willen*

' The abstract conception of the idea of
l is, in general, *the free Will which wills*
Will." The emphasis on the words in
s also Hegel's.

reader of the preceding exposition need
told how often we have employed the
just cited, and what use we make of it.
strange fact is that Hegel employs it
this one passage; it does not enter at all
methodical treatment of the Will; it is
d observation thrown off apparently at
, an external explanation rather than an
t part of his exposition. Now, for our
re this statement contains the psycho-
germ of the entire development of Will.

and keeps making it, and gives to it life and activity. In fact, it may be said, in a general way, that the great philosophical movement of the future is to make the abstract (logical) method pass over into the concrete (psychological) method, which is to make the abstraction go back and take up into itself its maker, this, of course, being the self-conscious Ego.

Still, the most important of all Hegel's services to philosophy lies in the sphere of the Will, specially in what we have called Institutional Will. In fact, this is the greatest product of his, and, probably, of modern philosophy. This portion of his work is chiefly contained in the book already cited (*Philosophie des Rechts*, third part called by Hegel *Sittlichkeit*). Throwing Hegel's activity into three main divisions and taking a forecast of each, we should say that his specially logical and dialectical works will never again make the stir they once did; his historical books are exerting at present great influence, which reaches far beyond purely Hegelian circles; but his philosophy of Institutions is the most solid and enduring part of his labor and belongs to the future for its full appreciation and development. It is a noteworthy fact that Anglo-Saxon peoples are beginning to study, elaborate, and interpret Hegel's views on Institutions (at Oxford for instance, also in Scotland, and formerly at St. Louis).

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devoted a short cha
ogy (Vol. II., p. 4
With him the notion
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Power" called energy.

The special activity of th
by Mr. Spencer as follows:
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"In a voluntary act of the simplest kind we can find nothing beyond a mental representation of the act followed by a performance of it." Mr. Spencer can see in the Will hardly more than Desire, and that too, in its immediate, executive form, as he certainly does not bring out the inhibitory power of Desire or the still deeper mastery of Desire (see the preceding exposition under the head of Desire). How utterly narrow such a view of the Will is, may be seen from the fact that it does not even include the whole of Determined Will. The word *motive* is casually introduced once (p. 503), but it means apparently Desire, or any external determinant, which moves to action. Thus Mr. Spencer covers, in his own proper sphere, that of Determinism, but a very small area.

The freedom of the Will, therefore, does not exist, is an illusion; the only show of freedom being that one "is at liberty to do what he desires to do," if there be "no external hindrances." The idea of a Free Will which has freedom as its end or content lies wholly outside of Mr. Spencer's range of mind, which seems able to grasp only some form of Determinism. Equally out of his range is the conception of the Will as the second stage of the process of the Ego. Indeed for Mr. Spencer the Ego is not a self-active process at all, but a kind of passive holder of sensations, images, and thoughts, and helpless spectator of

[illegible] Mr. [illegible]
[illegible]
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[illegible] which, if [illegible]
[illegible], would overthrow [illegible]
[illegible] said. This persistent [illegible]
of the Unknowable Power" [illegible]
tion proceeds to define after his
showing that he at least knows
his Unknowable.

The utter inadequacy, we m[illegible]
of such a view of the Will is
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fact indicate his complete inabi[illegible]
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For introspection is still the fun[illegible]
site of the psychologist in spite o[illegible]
experiments, and methods of ph[illegible]
Indeed the trouble seems to lie in
so-called scientific [illegible]

spectacles and expects to read in that way, but soon finds out that he cannot and starts the cry of fraud or "illusion" on all those who do read, or have ever read.

Will and Intellect. These two divisions of the soul (psyche), or rather, these two fundamental stages of the psychosis of the Ego are always coming up in the mind of the student, and demanding to be re-thought and re-stated. Such a demand is to be heeded, since it springs from the inner desire and necessity for the unification of the diversified mental states.

As Will the Ego has to realize itself, to make itself into a world existent; it builds the spiritual house for the Ego to dwell in.

As Intellect the Ego has to idealize or make internal the world outside, and thus to know it, to identify it with the Ego. Every Ego born into the world is to know what the Will has done in the world.

Such is the contrast between Will and Intellect, yet each is always present in the other's process. Implicitly the Will is realizing itself in the act of knowing, the Ego is taking up into itself the object, is therein Will too, it wills to know, to realize itself as knowledge. No intellection, therefore, without volition.

On the other hand, there is no volition without intellection. When the Will realizes itself, there is implicit Intellect in the act; you know

ng which you have made, or imitated, you
nternalized it fully then. Children espe-
learn by doing, that is, through the activ-
the Will; they must imitate in order to
adequately. Thus the imitation of chil-
a kind of thinking.

act every sensation (which belongs to In-
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ent? As already set forth in the preced-
position, the fundamental fact of the Will
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This is the separative stage of the Psy-
which is the second, while the Intellect is

which is itself negative, in the sense that it is assailing something. This negative power of Nature is what man is to grapple with and make over through his own power of Will. Thus he gets control of that power and redirects it in accord with his own inner end. The world is a Will (or force) negative to mine, which it is my destiny to re-will, and thereby create a new world, which, in its supreme manifestation, is the world of freedom.

Here we may remark that the teacher stands on the highest principle of his vocation, when he fully masters the meaning of the Free Will willing the Free Will, and brings his school to that point of excellence, at which it is the embodiment and realization of the aforesaid conception of freedom. The supreme end of the school may be said to be the training of the pupil to be a self-determined Free Will.

Paternalism in the old sense of the term no more belongs to pedagogics than to politics. Particularly American instruction must take its cue from the prevailing institutional spirit, which is that of rational freedom. An educational system whose great object is militarism cannot be adapted to produce a citizenship which has just the opposite purpose.

Relation to Moral Will. The Ego as Psychological Will having completed its course in the self-determined Free Will, or the Ideal End,

ls to realize this Ideal End in conduct.
the sphere of the Moral Will, which is to
'reedom valid in individual action. The
nerefore, as Moral Will projects out of
ne Ideal End already designated, making
ne existent in moral conduct. Hence, the
sphere belongs to the second or separa-
ge in the total process of Will.

y act of life is to be transformed into a
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is ever present in the actions of men.
s the new motive, which we now call
the complete realization of a life which is
will power always calling forth the Free
This is the grand duty of the Ego as

nay, the grand motive of life which is to bring forth a complete realization of freedom. For thus I get physical sustenance to do my work; I keep my health, perchance, and do not exhaust my reserve strength without a fresh supply. Indeed, the hour of dining, the quantity of food, its quality also, the speed of eating, my dining in all its details can be governed and ought to be governed by the supreme end of existence. Thus it becomes a moral act, with its commands and its prohibitions; it prohibits me from dining too late or irregularly; that grand Ideal End transfigures all my action, my total conduct, into a means for its realization.

My life is made up of particular acts. I have to do every day a thousand things, but each smallest particular act, each microscopic deed of mine, born in the beginning of a second and dying at the end of that same second, is touched, transmitted, gets its character from that universal End, which is the moral one. My pleasures, my recreations, my joys and sorrows, receive tone and significance therefrom; they must all be transformed into duties.

This we call the moralization of life, every action is to be moralized by being filled with the Ideal End. It is well to distinguish between this kind of moralizing which is of deeds and the other frequent kind of moralizing which is of words. The latter is in ill repute both with

n and with grown people. The moralizer
rds) is, therefore, quite distinct from the
o moralizes his life; everybody should be
ve moralizer, moralizing every deed, filling
the Ideal End. If you are a teacher,
hool, your kindergarden, should be moral-
et with as little moralizing as possible.

is, in general, the sphere of the Moral
d its world, which world lies in the realm
vidual conduct. Not so with the Psychi-
ll, which we have just passed through; this
et purely internal, subjective, unrealized.
ue that the Ego as Psychical Will attains
plete internal process of freedom, but
ychical Will is still ideal, and it is next to

PART SECOND.

THE MORAL WILL.

This Part takes up the second of the three main divisions of the present work, and belongs, as already indicated, to the second stage of the Psychosis in the complete process of the Will. This is now to be seen producing its world which is the moral one, and in which the Ideal End takes on many forms of human conduct.

The procedure hitherto has been the unfolding of the Psychological Will into the Moral Will. The former showed the pure movement of the Will as psychical activity, showed its inner conception fully developed, which was in its final stage the self-determined Free Will. This is what the Moral Will is now to take as its con-

r Ideal End, which it is always seeking to
e in the action, conduct, and character of
dividual.

insight into the movement of the Ego as
etermined Free Will was the last point at-
by the Psychological Will. The Ego as
as, therefore, unfolded into its own com-
process of freedom internally; but now
rocess of freedom must be made real, the
al must be transformed into the external.
ndividual is to realize the self-determined
Will in himself, in his own Will, which
wills the Ideal End. The Ego in moral
always contains this Ideal End implicitly
licitly seeking realization.

real through Will the whole cycle of the psychological Self. Accordingly in him the self-determined Free Will, which in Psychological Will is the inner conception, is made manifest in Moral Will, and reveals itself in the outward conduct. The Moral Will has always within itself, consciously or unconsciously, the entire process of freedom.

The completely good man follows not simply his own inner Law as absolute determinant, nor, on the other hand, the outer Law as absolute determinant; he endeavors, in every possible way, to unite these two sides, which so often fall into contradiction. His inner Law (often called Conscience) is and must remain his subjective determinant, bidding him to will Free Will; yet not through himself immediately, but through the outer Law of the Institutional World, which in its turn also secures Free Will. Thus the individual in morality is ever performing the process of freedom; he as inner Law (Determined Free Will) wills the outer Law (Self-determined Free Will), which is for all and over all.

The inner Law is merely subjective or individualistic in its willing of Free Will; hence, it must will the outer or objective Law (whose end is also the willing of Free Will), whereby it makes itself universal. Thus the individual Ego can unite with all Egos under one Law.

self-determined Free Will as psychological
own us an objective world of Institutions,
returns to the subjective Ego and becomes
terminant to freedom. But in Morals this
tive Ego takes the whole cycle of self-de-
ned Free Will and realizes it as a total pro-
within itself, thus having as Ideal End this
alization. Such is the Moral Ego as Will;
s to embody in conduct its highest psychi-
lf.

person is called good who habitually has
ove mentioned content to his Will. The
is to be trained into being such a Will.
in the kindergarden the little child starts to
g its freedom through law and institution;

stitutions) constitutes the self-determined Free Will. Such is what we may in general call the process of freedom. Or, man, willing his freedom, wills the institutional world which wills his freedom. Now the Ego must have this process of freedom unconsciously or consciously in itself in order to be moral, or must seek to realize the same in conduct and life. Such realization of the process of freedom becomes its great object, is the Good. This process of freedom is the Ideal End, which is the driving wheel of all morality, and which moral science seeks to make explicit and to formulate.

So, back of the three factors which we have already noted as constituting the process of the self-determined Free Will, lies the Ego of the individual willing this process, consciously or unconsciously, as its Ideal End, and realizing the same in conduct. Thus it is that the Moral Ego is always *seeking* to attain and to bring forth actualized Free Will, or law and institutions; it is always *seeking* to make freedom an objective existence in the world. But the Moral Will remains subjective in its process of freedom; it has this process, but as internal, in the individual and not in the institution.. The Moral Will is its own inner institutional world; we may, therefore, say that it realizes, but does not actualize, the self-determined Free Will. It wills and internally objectifies that Will which

Will in the form of Duty, Conscience, the
, inner Law; it thus has a world of its own,
oral world, in contrast to the institutional
.

, we must not forget that the Moral Will
ays seeking to reach the latter, to attain
ity. Indeed, the Will by its very nature
vors not only to put something into the
, but to put itself as a total process into
orld and thereby become truly objectified,
y, an existent object which is itself Will
g Will. So the Moral Will is forever seek-
yet never fully attaining; it secretly,
sciously longs to get out of itself and
e an institution — which it will finally

Without the quickening power of its ideal striving, the whole institutional world would be in danger of sinking into the quagmire of corrupt reality. But the Moral Will is not the self-rounded, complete Will, though an absolutely necessary stage in the process of the latter. The individual Ego must first realize in the subjective Self the process of self-determined Free Will, then it can proceed to make the same actual; the man must be free himself before he can make the world free — he can only make the world as free as he is.

It is manifest, therefore, that the Moral Will has in it a breach, which it is always seeking to overcome, yet cannot, till it gets out of itself and reaches the institutional world. Thus it is the realm of separation, of difference, of self-opposition and struggle; hence it belongs to the second stage in the complete psychosis of Will. The Moral Ego has the primal division into subject and object, which doubleness has often the effect of making the Ego seem to have two selves; there is the individual self on the one side, and on the other the universal self, frequently called the higher or better self, which is the law over the first self.

In the expression *I ought* is seen the dualism of the moral consciousness; it implies two Egos, a present real one, and a future ideal one; the two are not in unity till the real Ego carries out the behest of the ideal Ego in the deed. So

is a commander and a commanded, both the same Ego; still each is distinct from ther and in a process with the other. What that commands? The Ego as Ideal End, hat end is ultimately freedom. I do my when I obey the command and realize what eal End prescribes. Duty is the Ego as Free commanding the Ego to be free in act. Duty t some abstraction, it is Ego; my Duty self giving the mandate to myself, and the nt of such mandate is, in general, that I mine myself to be self-determined, that I my freedom in my act. It is my Duty to te my child; who commands and who ? I as Free Will command, and I as Free

oughts — the process of freedom, self-realization, the Ideal End.

This Ideal End is also called the motive, which plays a very important part in moral science. Already we have treated of the motive under the head of Choice, which is determined by the motive; that is, the self-determined is the determinant. The true moral motive is an end, but ultimate and not finite, not a means for some other end which may again be a means; it is rather the end which has before itself the complete realization of the Free Will in the person, the moralization of his action and conduct. Or the matter may be put in this form: Your highest moral motive is to realize your best self all the time.

The diversified relation of ends may be seen in your present occupation, whatever it is. How many ends or so-called motives can you trace in yourself? My reader is likely to be a young lady who is studying the kindergarden; for what end? It may be to make a living, to satisfy some curiosity, or simply to play with the children for the fun of the thing. These are all finite ends, not immoral but non-moral; their outlook is not upon the Ideal End in the supreme sense. But if you study kindergardening with that end which makes moral every act of yours in the process of the work, you will seek in such a vocation to realize your loftiest conception of

own selfhood; then you will long to im-
to the children under your care all your
st attainments, and to make them like you,
s, like the noblest part of yourself. You
the true moral motive in your vocation
your end is to make real your best self
reproduce it in others. Not your faults,
shortcomings, do you perpetuate; you
vor to train yourself into the highest possi-
orth that you may impart that; so is your
e good. In the meantime, you interweave
ends — you are making some money out of
vork, you are gaining some distinction, and,
less, having a good deal of pleasure. But
choice of this vocation, rather than that of

ent to its mother; it has, then, not willed her Will, which is for it the good; it has been determined by some other content, some caprice, desire, impulse; it has not followed its moral imperative, and is well aware of the fact. But the man can also disobey the word of his mother in the universal sense, he can defy that authority which bids him will Free Will and therein be truly free. The mother or the kindergardner perchance, begins that moral training which is finally to unite and to reconcile the individual Will with the whole institutional world. Thus the man is not simply the citizen of the State (which is one institution), but he is the universal citizen, participating in all institutions, and his supreme virtue becomes the institutional virtue.

Looking back at the Psychological Will once more, we observe that its outcome is the simple process of freedom, of which the Ego becomes aware; but in Moral Will the Ego proceeds to realize in conduct this process of freedom. Such is the difference between the two spheres; a man can know freedom and still not be free; he can be conscious of the principle of moralization, and still not moralize his life. The expression of the Ideal End in moral action is the function of the Moral Will.

There is a movement in the Moral Will, which starting from its immediate stage, unfolds into complete realization, wherein the Ego recog-

the willing of Free Will as the Ideal End
moral conduct. At first this Ideal End is
it in the Deed, then it is separated from the
and sought for as particular end, finally it
ined as universal end, when it comes back
lf, and knows itself as the ultimate prin-
n morals.

se three stages of the Moral Will and its
l we shall designate briefly in advance of
ll exposition.

The Moral Will and its Deed. The Moral
as willing the Deed immediately is the first
thus the Ideal End is implicit in the Deed
oth its factors (End and Ideal).

h is the first realization of the Moral Will,

Still there is one element, the ideal, which remains implicit even when the End has become explicit. That is, the Ego as Moral Will now determines the universal End to be some particular End of its own.

Such is the second realization of the Moral Will, in which the individual begins to get conscious of his End. That is, the Ego in the moral process must know not only that there is such an Ideal (or Universal) End in the Deed, but must also know what it is, must give to it content, must determine this End consciously. If I am to be held responsible for my End or Motive, I must seek to discover what it is and to formulate the same. Here, however, is again a process. The Ego, knowing this Universal End to be its own, proceeds to make it some particular form of itself, such as Pleasure, Happiness, Benevolence, which move in a gradation toward the Universal End, but never quite attain it, since such ends are particular, and of the Ego's special determination. Such is the separation and contradiction in the present sphere of the moral Ego as Free Will, which, however, will now return to itself and take itself as content.

III. *The Moral Will and its Ideal or Universal End.* The Moral Will as willing the Ideal End, making both factors explicit, is the third stage. The Ideal End which was wholly implicit in the

(first stage), is now wholly explicit, un-
, declared.

is the third realization of the Moral Will,
npleted self-realization, which now has a
ous content. Yet this stage also has its
s, it has to show itself becoming fully
t, conscious, realized, through a threefold
ent whose phases we shall name Good,
Virtue, which will be developed and co-
ed in their proper place.

Moral Will has, in general to realize the
End in human action. Such is its total
which, however, is a continuous unfold-
m its unconscious and immediate to its
mediated and self-knowing state. The

is the complete process of freedom, though this is still subjective, in the individual and not yet actualized in the institution. Such is the supreme attainment of this sphere, verily the Highest Good of the Moral Will, in which the man makes himself personally and internally free, in which freedom is always seeking to realize freedom for self and for the brother.

N FIRST—THE MORAL WILL AND ITS DEED.

fundamental utterance of the Moral Will
e Deed. The whole sphere of human
s to be transformed by the Ideal End of
d thereby made moral; the isolated, par-
acts of an individual are thus endowed

with a love of money; it leads me to act, to sell merchandise, to manufacture some article, possibly to write a book. But this immediate act of mine is transformed by my Ideal End; this limits, this determines, changes the nature of what I do, and often interposes its veto; it forbids me to sell rotten eggs, or to manufacture wooden nutmegs, or to write corrupt or even pessimistic books; this Ideal End will go so far as to regulate my eating and drinking, my work and my pastime, according to its behest. It makes over my whole existence, the entire life series of my actions, into a means for its realization. Thus the Deed is *moralized*, undergoing a kind of transfiguration through the Ideal End; this it is which makes moral each minute act of life and the sum total of life's activity.

Such is, then, the imperial behest, the Imperative, the moral obligation, which is laid upon every rational human soul by itself — the making over of life according to the Ideal End, which End thereby becomes the supreme motive of conduct, and which life thereby becomes a true work of art, illuminated in every little nook of its activity by a central spiritual sun. Life has often been called a Fine Art; so it is and more, being the source and prototype of all the other Fine Arts so-called.

In the present sphere, the Moral Will and its

l, there are two elements always present, Moral Will (the internal, subjective) and the l (the external, objective). The movement rom simple or implicit Intention, through wledge, to the unfolding of the total internal ess in the Motive. Still this movement of Moral Will in its various stages remains in ediate or implicit unity with the Deed. The wing are the three main stages of the ent sphere: —

The Deed and Intention. The implicit onscious) Intention determines implicitly the l as moral. Here both sides are implicit, gh the Intention is unfolding toward wledge.

. *The Deed and Knowledge.* The explicit

it unfolds within itself, remains in implicit unity with the Deed. Such is, in general, the sphere of the Moral Will and its Deed, as here conceived and set forth.

It is manifest that the characteristic of the moral Deed is that it has implicit within it, throughout all the phases of its process, the Ideal End, or the self-determined Free Will. When this implicit state of the Ideal End starts to becoming explicit, and the Ego separates it from the Deed and makes it a conscious object of itself (the Ego), then we have passed out of the present sphere.

It now remains to give a fuller exposition of the three preceding stages, whereby their meaning and scope may be more adequately unfolded.

I. The Deed and Intention.

Any Deed, in order to be moral, must have in it the element of Intention, which is primarily the Ego as Will. For the Ego as Will is the originative principle in man, who through it alone is responsible.

The first thing in Morals is to consider the simple Deed, or the Deed in its primal simplicity, as it is in itself, taken in its own inherent nature. This simple Deed shows the Ego willing immediately, not knowing and willing, which is a later stage. It has its process, through which it unfolds into an inner and outer element, and then

ns into itself, thus revealing the movement e Psychosis. Through this movement the comes to know itself as Intention and to itself as such, and therewith to develop into dea of responsibility. Accordingly, the nt sphere will pass through, firstly, its diate stage, which is the Deed conceived; dly, its separative stage, which is the Deed mined doubly, from within and from with- thirdly, its returning stage, which shows the as a self-determined product, and hence s with itself responsibility. These thoughts ay illustrate a little in advance.

shall first consider the Deed as it appears diately in the world. It is the utterance of

responsible. It is my Ego which has separated itself within itself and uttered itself in an act of Will which has changed the world. With such a change my responsibility begins; the Deed is imputable to me, containing my Ego, or, as we say, my Intention. Also I am sometimes said to realize my Motive in the Deed.

The Deed, then, is projected into a realm of externality, which already exists in its own right, and with which the Deed is connected by many a subtle influence. A continuous chain of causation interlinks my Deed with this external world quite to infinity, and carries it far beyond any intention or conception of my Ego, which started the movement by flinging its act into the stream of Time. Again the question of responsibility comes up. Am I accountable for these results of my Deed in the world of externality? Are they imputable to my Ego? Note again this voice, the voice of imputation, a kind of judge proclaiming my responsibility, my guilt or innocence, after calling my Ego before his tribunal. Who is it?

That is an important matter to find out, and we may say here that the judge alluded to, along with his law, is intimately related to the Ideal End, of which mention has already been made. At the present time, however, we must show forth the process which is involved in the Deed as immediate; again, we shall find in it that movement of the Ego called Psychosis.

'e may now look at the general process of Deed and Intention. The separation indicated hese two words is at first implicit; the whole ement is to unfold this separation, and make onscious to the Ego, as we see in the follow- statement.

The Conception of the Deed; the purely rnal side of the Deed is set forth as conceived.

. The Deed and its Consequences; the Deed ttered from within by the Ego and deter- ed from without by the world calls up this sion.

I. The Deed and its Responsibility, which ngs from Intention. Now the Ego returns to f and becomes aware of itself in the Deed, ing itself responsible for the same.

through my Deed, it is not what it was before I acted. This difference between what was and what is must be referred to the Ego as Will, is its work and manifestation. Every moment, therefore, I as Will am changing the Universe. I take some wood and make a house, I put a new object into the world, transforming the old object or objects; this change or transformation of material is mine and contains my Ego. I intended to produce it after some plan or image in my mind, therefore it has my Intention (which is my Ego both as image and volition) in itself and reveals the same.

Thus the Conception of the Deed involves the immediate unity of myself and externality as conceived. The whole movement here is as yet subjective; still the Ego as subjective throws out the object in its internal process. We recollect that the Conception of the Will (in Psychological Will) was stated to be this: the Ego, conceiving itself as Will, was Will in that very act. The same thing is involved in the Conception of the Deed, but the latter demands in addition that the act of Will be conceived as impinging upon and uniting with an external world.

The Conception of the Deed has its process, which may be briefly given as follows: —

1. We must in the primal Conception of the Deed, conceive of it in its undeveloped, potential condition, before the separation within,

ore realization. Still the germ must be there, the Deed could never result; this germ or sibility is now to unfold and make itself real. present stage is the undetermined, which, ever, is to determine itself, it is the acorn ch is to burst its shell and become the oak.

. The Conception of the Deed demands sepa-on, utterance in the object; this is the stage in ch the Ego as Will manifests itself as the rmined; the Deed is conceived as externality, annot remain undetermined and be Deed. s the Ego ideally projects itself into the ld, and becomes a part or phase of that; igh internal it has to conceive itself external .

. The Deed is conceived as the unity of the

of the Ego, and hence is the latter's own; thus the Deed is moral and the Ego is accountable.

But, though the Deed be the Ego's own, belonging to internality, it is also the world's own and belongs to externality. If, on the one hand, it be determined from the inside, it is likewise determined from the outside, externally determined. This brings us to a new and deeper separative stage of the Deed, based on its two determinants, the Ego and the world, or the inner and outer.

II. The Deed as determined by the external world is distinguished from the pure Conception of the Deed which contains within itself the process of the Ego. We may consider this stage as the Determined Deed, and it corresponds to the stage of Determined Will in the preceding Psychological Will.

Thus the two sides of the Deed (or its two determinants) inner or outer, begin to separate, become opposed and antagonistic, yet both belong to the Deed. Let us note the fact more closely. The Deed through its utterance is linked into a chain of externality, which whirls it beyond the scope of my Ego. The Deed has consequences which I did not foresee or know; I separate myself from these consequences, and say that they did not lie in my Ego as Will, they are not *mine*, they contain not my Intention.

I go forth into the woods on a hunt; I shoot

quirrel, it was my Intention to do so, the mine. But the squirrel is external and is ted on many sides with externality; it e somebody's property, or the bullet may and hit an unseen person. Indeed, that I take to be a squirrel in the distance may fur cap of a man whose body happens to cealed by foliage. The man is killed by tion, yet I say the Deed is not mine, I did not do it, I had no such Intention, my ent out only into the killing of the squir- acquit myself of murder, the inner judge ms that I was not responsible, and the udge on due proof lets me go free, for this judge upon his bench is but the counter-

tended. It has come to know itself as Intention; what I intend, is mine when realized; what I do not intend, though it occurs in connection with my act, is not mine. Such is the penalty of all action: I may become involved in Consequences unknown, remote, wholly unintended. The result is often doubt, pain, possibly self-reproach. At first we may hesitate and interrogate our Ego sharply about its share in the ill result; but we soon rally and vindicate our freedom.

Thus the Ego divides its Deed, and this division we shall see passing through the stages of the Psychosis, which is again threefold.

1. The first or immediate separation made by the Ego in this sphere is into the Deed and its Consequences, or the part of the Deed belonging to itself (the Ego) and the part not so belonging. Acting in a world which is closely connected together, my Will breaks into the line of connection and causation, and sets a new cause to work in co-operation with that of nature. The result is an effect which reaches out beyond my immediate act. To light the spear of straw in a straw-stack is my Deed, immediately taken, or that part of my Deed connected directly with my organism, but the burning of the stack is the Consequence of the Deed. Now did I have the presentation of such a Consequence when I applied the match?

2. Thus my Ego begins to look at the Conse-

s and soon divides them into two kinds, tended and the unintended — those which present to it and those which were not, or nce the necessary and the accidental Con- ces. In such fashion the Ego, seeking for belongs to it and what does not, carries its n over into externality; having already ted the Deed into the inner and outer it now separates the outer side into the ortions, the intended and the unintended, expresses the relation of these two por- o itself. Did I, the doer, have more or stinctly the image of these Consequences me when I did the Deed? And was I stim- to act through such image?

But with this assertion of Intention rises another assertion, that of responsibility. If I, out of myself, can originate the Deed, or a part of it, then it is mine, is referable to me, and I am responsible. At this point, however, we enter upon a new phase of the subject, in which I not only return to myself as Intention, but to myself as Ideal End, according to which I am to deliver judgment over myself. I being self-determined, or self-cause of the Deed, so to speak, must hold myself accountable.

III. Thus we have reached not only the Right of Intention, but also its counterpart, the requirement of responsibility. The moral Ego is now the judge with his law, by which law he is going to judge my Deed with its Intention, and declare in how far it fulfills the Ideal End, which is the highest. We are to see that this third stage is a return of the Ego to its deepest self, out of its previous stage of dualism and separation. This is manifest in the statement: I hold myself responsible for what I have done. Responsible to whom? To myself in my supreme form, to my Ideal End, which is freedom.

Let us unfold the matter a little further. After the previous state of inner scission, the Ego returns to itself, asserting first the Right of Intention. I withdraw myself from the Consequences, though I still lament them and suffer from them in feeling though not

son; I cut off, as it were, the unintended
of the Deed as not mine, because I did not
into its results with my own selfhood, not
g them, and perchance not knowing them
en possible. The man whom the bullet
my gun hit, is indeed dead, but I did not
him. The law of the land, Public Opinion,
dge will confirm my own Ego in its declara-
of innocence. Such is the right of my Ego
its majesty, being the final lawgiver and
iary in the present case.

us it is my Ego as supreme arbiter that sets
my Ego as supposed culprit. We shall take
e of this arbiter who will often appear as
dge, the law, the accuser, and the liberator.
grounds of his judgment are indeed funda-

pass in review before the Ego in the case of moral judgment.

1. The Deed being done and the Consequences being present, I hold myself responsible for the *intended* Consequences, those which lay within the purview of my Ego, and which, therefore, belong to me. When I act, I utter myself in externality, in the Deed, which is the union of the internal and external, and which goes back to me as the original creative power that called it into being. Thus I separate myself from what I did not intend, from that part which the world with its energy or causation added to and intermingled with mine. Hence the second stage of my judgment.

2. I do not hold myself responsible for the *unintended* Consequences, those which lay outside of the purview of my Ego. Here in the most emphatic manner I assert the Right of my Intention, which is really the Right of myself, of my subjectivity. I cast away that which is external to me in my Deed, I judge myself and affirm my innocence. Thus I withdraw into myself as my own moral home.

3. This is, however, a return of the Ego out of separation, and in every such return it carries along with itself knowledge, consciousness. The Ego now knows that there is an external world in which it acts, that it, acting therein, is carried forth to consequences which it never intended;

ws the two kinds of Consequences, the in-
and unintended. So we have reached a
of the previous separation of intended and
nded Consequences, the unity in knowl-
both are known and taken up into the Ego.
result is, that the Consequence, at first
nded, becomes known and so is a constitu-
the Ego, hence it is no longer unintended,
least I am responsible for it, responsible
Consequence which is known to me, since
in my Ego. At this point responsibility
s its circle and embraces the unintended
quences of the Deed, which become known
h my experience; knowledge is now the
d not simply the immediate Intention.
s manifest that herein lies a return out of

into his Intention, into his own subjectivity, and there find protection. The Hebrews had cities of refuge for the person who had unwittingly slain his neighbor; he could not rightly be punished with death, nor could he be wholly absolved and still live in his community among people who had no such act hanging over them. Thus we see a kind of compromise between the Intention and the Deed, or the right of the subject and the right of the object; the separation above designated had not yet completely taken place, yet was at work. In Greek legend Oedipus slew his father and married his mother, both acts were great violations of the ethical consciousness of his people, yet he did not know that either person was his parent at the time of his Deed. When he comes to the knowledge of what he has done, he accepts the Deed and its penalty regardless of his Intention; he does not appeal to his subjective right, which had not yet risen in the Greek world, but heroically suffers for the guilt which Fate, in his opinion, has laid upon him. In like manner we read in the First Book of Herodotus the affecting tale of Adrastus, "the Doomed," who had fled to the court of Croesus from his native country, Phrygia, for having undesignedly caused his brother's death. Croesus purified him, and restored him, so to speak, to innocence; but Fate still pursues him, and again he causes a death undesignedly, this

the death of Croesus' own son and heir to throne. Adrastus, in his despair of escaping relentless pursuit of Fate, takes his Deed its Guilt upon himself, and ends his life ugh his own act. We would now say that astus was innocent, we would further say he ought to proclaim to himself, "I am tless, having had no bad Intention;" thus would escape Fate by taking refuge, not in e foreign city or country, but in his own r city, in his own subjectivity with its right. n the lifeless object such as a stone, which caused a death, was in Greece and other ntries, tried publicly, condemned, and with t ceremony cast out of the territorial limits the sea.

the Guilt and punishes within, seeking to scourge the discordant, rebellious Ego back into harmony with its own highest Self, which is the ultimate good.

Thus the Intention asserts itself in the Deed, I must have my Intention in it, else it is not mine; if there is any portion of it not containing my Intention, I am free of responsibility. Thus saith the judge. But I, having done the Deed and seen the Consequences, now know them, I can no longer plead ignorance before the judge, who begins to compel me to answer for the known Consequences of the Deed. Herewith begins a new stage of the development of the Moral Will.

Summary of Deed and Intention. In accordance with our plan, we shall now seek to mark more definitely as well as state more briefly the distinctions which have been laid down in the preceding account, and which have been allowed somewhat freely to flow into one another.

In the Deed immediately considered we regard the Ego as Will separating itself within itself, and projecting itself into the world. The Deed thus has the process of the Ego, and, in fact, of the Ideal End, though this be as yet in an implicit form. Thus, however, the Deed is moral, and the Ego, taking upon itself its own, is responsible. Three stages, in each of which is a secondary division.

The Deed as conceived; now we regard the
e conception of the Deed in its inner pro-
which, however, is to become externalized;
ubjective side of the Will which must be-
objective.

The immediate, potential phase, before any
ation within; the undeveloped state.

The separated, determined phase of the
in the Deed, conceived still within, yet as
tive.

The self-determined phase of the Deed as
ived. This is the inner process of the Deed
leted, the full Conception of the Deed.

The Deed as determined; it is determined,
ay say, doubly — from within by the Ego,
rom without by the world. Here, then, the

1. The first separation is into the Deed and its Consequences. To light the spear of straw is my Deed, immediately taken, but the burning of the whole stack is the Consequence.

2. The second separation follows, the separation of the Consequences into the intended and unintended. This separation goes back to the Ego as determinant of the act; did it have the image of these Consequences as its stimulant or not?

3. The Ego returns into itself out of the Deed and its Consequences and asserts itself as the determinant inasmuch as it is the self-determined. As such determinant it is called Intention.

I did intend to set fire to the single straw and to burn the stack, but I did not intend to burn the barn lying not far off. I withdraw myself from the unintended Consequence, and therein assert the right of Intention; I the self-determined, must be the determinant of the moral nature of my Deed.

III. The Deed as intended, consciously intended, for which, therefore, the Ego as self-knowing is responsible. That is, the Ego now knows the Deed as its own, and refers it to itself as cause. Thus there is in this third stage a return of the Ego to itself with its Deed, through self-consciousness. Here we have reached what may be called the right of Inten-

— it claims the Deed as its own and must
er for the same.

may unfold this process a little. The
l Ego as judge, having its Ideal End as law
ndard, adjudicates the Deed; it holds itself
ntable to its supreme end in the particular
nd its Intention. Did I intend to will the
st, or was I moved by some lower end of
wn? Still, in the present stage, this Ideal
s not yet developed, is not in full conscious-
though present and at work. The moral
is as yet more or less intuitive.

this present process of responsibility we
the three phases: —

I hold myself responsible for the intended

veloping through the intended and unintended Consequences, has reached the responsibility of the Will in Intention. But when the unintended Consequence becomes known as a Consequence of the Deed, a new responsibility enters through Knowledge. This gives a new stage of the moral Ego, which is unfolded in the Deed and Knowledge.

So at this point the process of the simple or immediate Deed is brought to a conclusion, and we pass into a new sphere, which embraces knowing as well as willing. I am asked for charity on the street, I give some money to the asker, with the Intention of helping him, but I find that he spends the money for drink, to his own injury. The next time I am asked for charity, my knowledge of the previous case enters as a determining element of my action: I am not to give the money unless I see that it is well spent. I cannot plead before the judge my good Intention a second time, after having had that experience, though I could so plead the first time and be justified.

Thus the Intention which was immediate, more or less impulsive in the simple Deed, must now be mediated by knowledge. Or, as it is often stated, we must think before we act; if we do not, we as thinking beings are held responsible. We must now wed our Intellect to our Will, our reflective to our volitional nature.

l even here a new separation takes place. ing united the intended and the unintended known Consequences still have to project d the known the unknown Consequences, which dualism the Ego has next to grapple.

II. The Deed and Knowledge.

the previous sphere of the Moral Deed we lered the Deed and Intention; in the present e we are to unfold the Deed and Knowledge, Knowledge belonging to the Ego knowing ll as willing the Deed. Or to make the ssion fuller, we are to look at the Deed ts Periphery of Consequences known and own, wherein the inner movement turns

tion quite to infinity. Not only each Ego, but each Deed of the Ego is a center from which flow results great and small through Space, Time, and Spirit, everywhither and forevermore. The act of Will is a creative point which changes the universe. Thus it has a Periphery surrounding itself on all sides, in which the Ego draws limits of its own; at present it draws the limit of Knowledge, for the purpose of finding its moral responsibility. Thus the present sphere embraces the Deed with its Periphery of Consequences known and unknown, forming a totality of which the Ego is the central point.

We may consider the matter in some further detail. The Ego has arrived at a consciousness of the Deed and its Consequences; it knows that it acts in a world of externality, and must henceforth take account of that knowledge. All experience carries with it moral responsibility; I know something which I did not know before, and am no longer guiltless; I have eaten of the tree of knowledge and have lost my paradisaical innocence. My Intention is able to plead ignorance no more, and is thereby vastly widened, my accountability begins to affirm itself commensurate with my intelligence.

In the Deed as immediate I asserted simply my Intention and cut off the unintended result, for which I refused to give a reckoning, inasmuch as I did not know of such a result. But

I know it, then I take it up into my Deed, is imputable to me; it lies in my Ego and or my responsibility. I cannot deny that w the Deed which I have experienced and is knowable to man. Here then blame , guilt; here the court opens with the Ego lge, judging by its own supreme standard nt, subsuming its own particular case under n universal law.

movement of the simple or immediate as hitherto set forth, has thus ended in mplete dualism of Intention as regards the and its Consequences, which are, accord- named the intended and the unintended nts, and hence are deemed the responsible

that previously the Intention got hold of the Deed and threw away the Consequences, but now the Deed with its Consequences is returning and is getting hold of Intention. The result will be a process which will take the form of a Psychosis with its three stages.

In this second sphere we may still say and think that the Deed has Intention, but the latter is conscious or explicit Intention; the Ego, having experienced the unintended Consequence, now knows it, so that after such experience it must be an intended Consequence. That is, the Ego now separates this knowledge and makes it explicit in the Deed, whereas in the previous sphere (of Deed and Intention) such knowledge, though present, was implicit. For instance, if my simple Intention was to burn the straw-stack, I knew already that the lighting of the single straw would produce the conflagration. Yet such knowledge hardly rose into my consciousness. Thus we see that Knowledge lies back of Intention and really constitutes its essence. At present, however, we wish to unfold conscious Intention or the known element thereof, which shows the following stages: —

I. There will be a primal separation, in which the known will be seen unfolding into the known and unknown — the dualism of the present sphere.

II. There will follow a second separation, in

the unknown, being taken up by the Ego, how a new dualism into the known and own.

The Ego therein returns to itself with the own — it comes to know the unknown as own. I have to know also that I do not ; thus I subsume under knowledge some- known and something unknown.

with such knowledge comes responsibility. e shall see in the following development I have to answer for Consequences to the that I know them to be unknown.

ese three stages will be better seen in a detailed development.

We start with the dualism which we have

but when I do the same or a similar Deed the second time, I know the Consequences, and so they lie in my Intention which proceeds from my total Ego, and I am responsible. Every increase of knowledge, therefore, is an increase of responsibility. I cannot acquire the most common experience without its affecting my moral nature. With advancing life I act more and more knowingly, and hence more and more worthily or more and more guiltily. As I increase in knowledge, the ideal end of existence becomes more and more explicit, and with it grows the imperative to moralize my whole activity more and more completely.

Accordingly, I must know myself as acting in an external world which is connected in manifold ways, in Space, in Time, in Causation. My Deed is not merely this single Deed in isolation, but has an environment of many relations; the little sphere of my Deed is surrounded by a vast periphery of externality, which I, as a rational, limit-transcending being, must be continually getting conscious of, and thus I must realize my destiny. If I set fire to a single straw, I must be aware that it will involve the entire straw-stack with which it is connected; the conflagration will certainly reach the adjacent barn and probably sweep to the house not far away. Though my little immediate Deed may be confined to this small object, to this one straw, my

as knowing and rational, embraces the
quences and holds itself accountable for
me.

e one begins to ask — accountable for all the
quences? Some Consequences I did not
could not know; does my responsibility
l to them? In the burning barn a man
e sleeping; if he perishes in the flames,
I to answer for his death? At this point,
rises a fresh distinction and separation.
act that I know calls up a new boundary,
y that I do not know; as previously my
edge swept away the limit, so now it posits
mit. That is, through knowledge I tran-
d the limit of the Deed and took in its

cannot answer for all the results of acting in a world of externality, in which other forces are at work besides its Will, yet the imperative insists that it answer for some of them; so the supreme judge with his inner law again begins to hold court in order to sift and discriminate the Consequences.

Often the distinction is drawn between necessary and accidental Consequences. In general, the former are those which follow from the very nature of the Deed, and which every rational Ego is capable of perceiving to be in intimate connection with the Deed. I, therefore, must know, or am held to know, the necessary Consequences of my action; I cannot plead ignorance of them without abjuring my rationality. If I set fire to one end of a single straw in a stack, I must know and be accountable for the necessary Consequences; I cannot limit myself to the mere act of placing the match at one small point. But the accidental Consequences are those which lie outside of my purview of the circumstances; not imaged in my Ego, they are not mine.

Still the Ego can never securely rest in its own bounds, not even in those which it has imposed upon itself. The unknown Consequences it begins to tamper with, and finds some that ought to have been known, some that could have been foreseen with care; hence comes the charge of carelessness. We often hear an act branded

oughtless, implying that the subject must
beforehand what are the probable, nay,
ossible Consequences. In such fashion the
begins to reach over and to embrace not
y the known, but the calculable, making
ame an element of the Deed for which
ning is to be rendered before the judge.
s the divisive principle in the present
e goes on to an indefinite length, revealing
tempt of the Ego always to get beyond its
We observe the double movement; the
s Will is forever positing a limit in the
al world, beyond which limit it as Inten-
efuses to take any responsibility, saying,
d not intend that;" on the other hand

ingly; but just thereby I come to know also the incalculable as such, that is, to know it as incalculable, and thus I take it up into the sphere of responsibility. Hence comes the immorality of hazard, when it is immoral.

A wonderful fascination the human mind has always felt for this incalculable element in its action. We grapple with the unknown, must do so, if we be limit-transcending beings. Gambling, financial speculation, even business, enter the world of hazard and endeavor to make it give up its secret. Often indeed we must take the grand risk and dare. We venture into the unknown sea, though nature hold us responsible for our temerity.

Undoubtedly a great difference in responsibility exists between different individuals according to their difference in experience and knowledge. The child does not know the results and the connections of his act; he may innocently set fire to the piece of straw and produce the conflagration. The savage does not know what is known to the civilized man; yet the Indian comes to find out the nature of whisky, and feels responsibility in drinking it. The servant who kindled the fire with Carlyle's manuscript of the "French Revolution," was answerable only for carelessness, possibly not even for that.

Living is truly a thing of responsibility, yet we must not brood over the fact, and be forever

g upon it with a microscopic introspection. eal End insists that we moralize every act perience, but does not insist that we cut es to pieces in making moral distinctions. e responsible for being too responsible; re be no moral excess, not even the excess ality.

before we go on, we may look a moment t we have reached in the present (or first) of the Deed and its Periphery. The Ego up into itself the known Consequences, as t from the unknown, that is, the element owledge is added to that of Intention. I ot intend to hit an innocent person when I at a burglar who runs toward a crowd of

known. This is the separation which must take place in the present sphere; the Periphery, so to speak, divides into two portions, one of which lies inside the Ego's world, the other outside.

3. The Ego returns out of the separations just unfolded, to itself with the known Periphery as against the unknown. Yet this distinction it brings along too; it has become conscious not only of the known Periphery of Consequences, but also of the unknown. Thus its consciousness embraces the limit, the Ego has taken up into itself the difference between the known and the unknown, and this difference is what it has next to elaborate.

What have we gained in this first stage of the process of the Deed and its Periphery? We have made the division of the Periphery into the inner and outer sides, or the known and the unknown, and we have become conscious of this division, with which we pass to the following stage.

II. The Ego's knowledge of the Deed and its Periphery is now twofold, divided; this dualism it is to work over into unity. The unknown is different from the known, yet this unknown element must somehow be brought under the known, and thus included in responsibility. The soul reaches out for the beyond, is by its very nature limit-transcending; it must know or be responsible for not knowing. This matter we may turn over somewhat more fully.

already set forth, the present is the d or separative stage of the Deed ts Periphery, the separation into known unknown Consequences having become nscious fact of the Ego. The move- is to bring these unknown Conse- es into the sphere of the known; the Ego n transcending the limit to its knowledge, n the same degree it will widen its responsi- . But first let us note the process of the overcoming the dualism between known and own.

The beginning is made with the previous , namely the separation of the Deed and eriphery into the known and unknown Con-

known as unknown. The great fact here is that the Ego has united the two worlds, the known and the unknown; it has taken up both into itself and knows both, to be sure, in different ways, which give rise to different degrees of responsibility, as we shall see in the next stage.

It is manifest, however, that the dualism with which we started in the present stage (the Deed and its Periphery) has been wrought over into unity — the known and the unknown have been subsumed under the one rubric of knowledge. This does not mean that the difference is totally destroyed; though subsumed, it still has its power just through that subsumption; there is still the difference between the known and the unknown even in knowledge.

But now we are to see the great moral purpose of this subtle movement: as knowledge increases, responsibility is compelled to follow. Thus we note the interplay between Will and Intellect; the Ego as Will, or especially as Intention, is always positing the limit and refusing to be further responsible, while the Ego as Intellect or Knowledge is always transcending the limit and forcing responsibility to keep pace with its advance. This fact we are now to set forth.

III. In the movement of the present sphere (the Deed and Knowledge), the Ego, having united the known and the unknown Consequence in its knowing, asserts its responsibility according

Knowledge. As in the previous sphere
)eed and Intention) the Right of Intention
the Ego responsible, so now the Right of
edge makes it responsible; in the former
withdraw myself from the unintended
quences, in the latter case I withdraw my-
om the unknown Consequences, which,
er, become known through the Deed.
ver, I, being able to transcend the limit of
norance, have a new kind of responsi-
— I must answer for that ignorance of mine
I have the power of overcoming.

us once more take a rapid sweep over this
I have become aware that every limit to
go which I posit I can transcend. This is

under a single predicate. It is true that the unknown is still unknown, yet it is known as unknown; when I act in that external unknown realm, I act in it as knowing it, and just this knowledge makes me answerable. If I engage to make a hat for a man, knowing my ignorance of hat-making, I am responsible for the failure, and it is my knowing the unknown which brings condemnation upon me. If I promise to guide a party through a country unknown to me and get lost, I am to blame because of my knowledge of my own lack of knowledge. To know the unknown, namely, that it is unknown, is a responsible knowledge.

All this has, doubtless, some appearance of being profitless subtlety or a mere play on words. Still we hope that the reader may be led to see through the appearance and to behold the meaning, which is that the Ego has in this sphere overcome separation, limitation, finitude, and has shown itself universal, taking up the total realm of externality, the known and the unknown, into its movement, and thereby making itself responsible for the complete circuit of its Deed.

Thus into Intention is introduced a totality of environment, of which I am conscious. My immediate purpose may be to chop down this tree, but I have to know whether it will fall on yonder house within its range, and I have to

ure what will be the Consequences to those
ng in the house. To be sure, these
quences are unknown; still I have to
them and all that lies in the peri-
of the action; what is unknown
e to know that it is unknown and
pregnant with possibilities, for which I
e held accountable. What is called crimi-
relessness means that I did not duly regard
nknown which I knew to be unknown, and
Intention is chargeable with unintended
s, since sins of omission bear the penalty
ll as sins of commission. Into my Inten-
also named Motive sometimes) the univer-
ement of knowing enters and brings with it

adjudicating the Deed, taking up the total Periphery of Consequences, known and unknown, and then applying the law, which is the Ideal End. The Ego tests the Deed by its own highest Self: Did I realize my own true being in that act? Let us distinguish the stages of the movement.

1. First, the Ego, having made the distinction into known and unknown Consequences, holds itself responsible for the known.

2. This separation involves the deeper separation of the unknown Consequences from the Ego, which does not hold itself responsible for them. I cast them away from me, they are not mine. Yet just this separation and rejection make me aware of them, I know the unknown as unknown, and with such knowledge responsibility begins.

3. Now I have returned to myself with the unknown, which I have embraced in my knowledge, which fact makes me answerable for the Deed and its Periphery of Consequences known and unknown. That is, I have to know my unknown world; no unimportant part of my knowledge is the knowledge of my ignorance. I have to know that I am ignorant of military tactics, so let me not get myself appointed generalissimo of an army, or even captain of a company. I have to know what I do not know in every activity of life. Socrates said that others did not know, or, more fully, did not know that they did not know, whereas he knew

e did not know; this he deemed a great
n the philosophy of knowing, and also of
. So the knowledge of ignorance is a great
ce beyond mere ignorance; indeed, to be
ant of your ignorance is often one of the
fatalities of life. You must know that you
t know how to manage this ship upon
we are embarked; if you undertake the
d cause a loss of property and life, you are
nsible, not by virtue of your ignorance, but
tue of your knowledge of your ignorance.
vith the Ego has taken up into itself and
priated to its knowledge the Deed and its
nery of Consequences both known and un-
and has made itself responsible in pro-

a new responsibility. Third, the Ego having canceled all the limits to its knowledge of externality, and taking up the Deed in its total Periphery, has become conscious of itself as this power of cancelling the limit, conscious of itself as being universal, and holds itself responsible for its universality, making the Intention quite co-terminous with the Deed.

The Ego, therefore, knowing itself as universal, must know and affirm the universality of the Deed. That is, the Ego must know its complete process in the Deed, must know the return of the Deed to the doer, or its total circuit

We may take the illustration already given and carry it forward into the present sphere. The immediate Deed is my setting fire to a single straw. But I am to know the Consequences; my act through such knowledge includes the burning of the stack, and I am responsible accordingly. But my Intention (or Motive) may be to destroy the property of another Ego; my Will is to destroy his Will in so far as the latter is realized in such a piece of property. Here enters the sphere of the universal Deed; I do not only the act, to which are joined its external Consequences, but also there is the return of the Deed to me, as I have assailed and in so far as I have assailed the Ego of another by my destructive work. As I destroy Will, so my Will is destroyed. Thus the Deed as universal comes back

when I will the Will of my neighbor or
assail that Will. Such is the circuit of
ed implied by universality, which circuit
know and so am responsible. The judge
pronounces judgment in accord with this
of the Deed, which is what I have done to
Ego.

nary of the Deed and Knowledge. The
now regarded as having a Periphery
nsequences known and unknown, not
intended and unintended. The intended
uence is, of course, known; then the
ded Consequence gets known as a Conse-
of a given Deed through experience.
intended but known Consequence of

1. The Ego simply knows the Consequences of the Deed, intended and it may be, unintended.

2. This known element brings up the unknown element as the limit to the known.

3. The Ego returns to itself, now knowing this limit, and therein takes up the unknown into consciousness.

II. The second separation or the unfolding of the unknown. The Ego as knowing brings back the unknown into the known.

Such is the process, starting with the dualism which lies in the Ego's knowledge of the Deed and its Periphery — this knowledge being both of the known and the unknown. The movement is out of this dualism; the unknown is somehow to be brought under the known, and thus included in responsibility. The Periphery of the Deed is to advance beyond the known and to take up the unknown into itself. I have to learn that the igniting of a match at a certain point includes in its Periphery the igniting of the can of oil, and this the igniting of the house. Then after such experiences I have to know generally that there is beyond the known, an unknown Periphery of Consequences, which, nevertheless, I must know as unknown and act according to such knowledge. Let us note the process here, too.

1. The start is made with the separation into the known and the unknown; the Periphery of

l has an inside which is known and an which is unknown, by the Ego.

t thereby the Ego takes up this unknown and finds that it (the unknown) has elements, a known and an unknown.

the Ego returns to itself with the un- nd subsumes it under the known. Thus nited the two worlds, known and un- embracing both in its knowledge, though ferent way. Still, from each kind of ge will follow a proportionate responsi-

s previously the Right of Intention e Ego responsible, so now the Right of lge makes the Ego responsible. That is,

3. I return to responsibility and bring along with myself a knowledge of the unknown, namely that it is unknown, for which knowledge I am again answerable.

Thus the Deed and its Periphery of Consequences, known and unknown, form an outer totality of which the Ego is the center, acting and knowing. The universe is divided for every Ego into known and unknown; when it knows both, it knows itself as universal, or as knowing the universal; it reaches over the limit of the known and knows the unknown, and holds itself responsible for such knowledge, as we have already noted.

But the Ego with its total Periphery of Deed and Consequences comes upon another Ego with *its* total Periphery of Deed and Consequence; the result is that a new moral relation becomes explicit, the relation of Ego to Ego. Or, one Will having an environment of action necessarily meets another Will having also an environment of action, nay, meets many such Wills; they brush against one another, they probably clash at first; what is to be the final attitude of each toward each? Thus we penetrate to the fundamental question of morals, really the relation of man to man.

The Ego, as already set forth, knows itself as universal; now it must make itself universal, in accord with its true, limit-transcending nature.

owing the universal, it must proceed to *do* versal. But the Deed with its Periphery ts limit in the Deed of another Ego; the collide unless they be reconciled in a com- rinciple. This appears when the Will wills each Will is to will Will, then all Wills are d harmonious in an universal Will.

ow the other Ego to be what mine is, I ize it to be such as I am. Now I am to this knowledge, to act it; I am to do as v, and as I know the other Ego to be what I am to recognize his Will to be of the validity as mine. I must not only respect do mine own, but also I must vindicate it o mine own, in case of necessity. My

through the three main stages of the Moral Will and its Deed.

First, I am responsible for destroying the straw-stack, as I intended such a consequence in setting fire to it.

Second, I am responsible for destroying the adjacent house, as I knew such to be the probable consequence of my Deed, though I may not have intended it directly. At least, my Intention in this second case is mediated through Knowledge.

Third, I am responsible for destroying Will, which has realized itself in a piece of property (here the straw-stack), as my Will has violated another Will, having assailed the latter in its product. Herein my Ego as Will has come back to itself as object in the world, and knows itself as destroying or negating the same, and thus is logically self-negative in its act.

Intention is manifold, embracing many finite ends; but Motive is substantially one, embracing the Ideal End or the willing of Free Will. The Motive, however, can be considered in a twofold relation, positive and negative, according as it seeks to affirm or to negative Free Will.

Hence we apply to the Motive the two moral predicates, good and bad, according to its positive or negative quality. The discussion of Good and Evil, however, does not belong in this sphere, but in a later one, when the Ego is becoming

us of its self-end and is seeking to for-
the same.

Motive, which is the completed process of
as Intention, is now the determinant of
d as moral. The Motive, though explicit
, as subjective, is still in implicit unity
e Deed, Or, the Ideal End is as yet im-
the Deed, and so we still remain in the
here of the Moral Will, in spite of the fact
tention has unfolded into Motive.

w myself to be Free Will and I know the
Ego to be what I am, namely Free Will;
the new knowledge which brings along
responsibility. Knowing the external,
o finally comes to know the external as

burn up the stack. This immediate Intention, however, gets its moral significance from the Motive. Ultimately, therefore, I answer for my Motive, and not for my Intention; responsibility even for immediate Intention has in it the Motive, though implicitly and unconsciously.

Observations. The foregoing introductory statements will, in general, be deemed sufficient to give the underlying thought in this sphere of the Deed and Motive. Still, some readers may find it to their profit to look at the matter in new turns of speech and in fresh illustrations. Hence we append the following remarks which extend to the outline.

We may first notice a possible difficulty. We have said that, in the sense here used, there can be but one Motive. People speak, however, of many Motives. A man commits murder, what is his Motive? Ambition, money, love may be assigned as different Motives of the Deed. These, taken by themselves, are merely states or determinations of the Ego, which can be manifold. But to transform any one of these mental states into a Motive, it must move the Will to assail Will. When I am moved to destroy the Will of the neighbor, that transforms any determination of mine into a Motive, which is thus the one essential thing amid all the Ego's states as special determinants to the act.

The Ego as Free Will knows Free Will in an-

, and knows that it is to will Free Will in
er, and still further knows that if it assails or
ys Free Will in another, it is responsible.
is the cycle of the Deed, or, as we now call
e Deed as universal, for which I as Motive
myself responsible.

nifestly this knowledge is the knowledge of
cess, of the Ego's process of Free Will.
there is the act of the Ego, the act of Will
separates and objectifies; second, there is
ject or the Deed as such, done to the other
third, there is the return of the Deed to
go which has done it, this return completing
rocess.

y should there be this return? Thus the

process of the Ego. Ultimately every act of mine bears upon the Free Will of the other, which I am, remotely or directly, to affirm and to secure. When my Will is fully moralized, the simple gesture, apparently accidental, but really springing from within, will make for willing the Free Will of the other and of myself.

At this point we may note the distinction between Intention and Motive, the latter pertaining to the sphere of the universal Deed. I intended to burn the straw-stack, but what was my Motive? Did I mean to destroy the property, therein assailing the owner's Will? If such was my Motive lying back of my Intention, then the Deed is to be returned to me in its negative form. I determine myself to destroy Free Will, such is the process of my Free Will or my Motive; really I determine myself to be punished.

In the case of correcting a child, my immediate Intention is to inflict the penalty, yea, pain, but this is not my Motive, which is the child's good. I wish through the penalty of its deed to train it into freedom, such is my Motive. Herein the Ego goes through the following process: My first or immediate Intention is pain, but I inhibit this Intention (unless I am angry in the act of punishment, which is thus bad and incomplete); then I inhibit this inhibition and pass into the new Intention which is really the Motive. My ulti-

Motive (or End) is to make that child a termined Free Will.

ay be remembered that we traced a similar s in the psychical Motive. (See the dis- of it under the head of Choice.) There it own that the total process of Desire enters e Motive properly so called. I desire to house in order to pay my debt, really, er, I do not wish to part with my house is my home; I primarily desire to keep it, nhibit such Desire, then inhibit this inhib- nd pass over to a new Desire, which thus es Motive. I prefer being a morally free keeping my home, where I would feel unfree, with debts unpaid.

the act henceforth is to be taken into account, some acts having little or no value, and some having an infinite value.

If I shoot a pistol at a rat or at a man, I must know the difference in the value of the two acts, which is determined by the difference in value between the two objects. If I destroy a moral being or a non-moral being, in the one case my act is absolutely contradictory and indeed self-destructive, in the other case it is quite indifferent, unless I hold some peculiar ideas about animal life. Externally both acts are the same — the shooting off a pistol. But if my act ends in the killing of the man, I commit murder, and I am held responsible for the universal value of my Deed. The judge is to serve up to me the law; as I have treated my fellow-man, so I am to be treated in turn. The universal result of my destructive action is, all would be destroyed.

The immediate Deed is, therefore, to be tested at last by its universal worth or value. My Ego, uttering itself in the Deed, has undone an Ego which is also the utterance, or the ability to utter itself, in the Deed. I, knowing myself as limit-transcending, have in my Deed destroyed the limit-transcending; what is the decree of the judge on such a Deed? Surely if the Ego as universal slays the possibility of universality, it slays itself. Thus the negative Ego forces into light the universal character of its own Deed.

contrary, if the Ego is positive and wills
universal instead of destroying it, the
not only preservative but self-preserva-

in we come back to the fact that the Ego
g itself as universal or limit-transcending,
know the other Ego as itself, that is, as
al or limit-transcending. The Ego thus
the principle of recognition, which is the
tion of men's living together in a social
Yet there will be conflict between the
n manifold ways; recognition, at least in
hest realized forms, matures only after
struggle.

an Ego knowing itself as universal and must be recognized as such. Your Will has to realize itself in a world of other Wills, which, while external to yourself, are just your Self, that is, yourself as universal. So the Imperative runs: Will that your Will be and will what others can be and will without self-negation. The Ego as Will thus recognizes and wills the other Ego as Will; I recognize and will my neighbor's Will to make an honest living, and he mine, though each of us makes it in a different way.

We have frequently noticed the Ideal End, which transforms the Deed into a means for the realization of itself, this End being the Self as universal. You are to realize in your conduct that the other person is what you are; you in every act are to recognize him, to recognize his Ego as also universal, such as you are; so your particular action as well as your whole conduct is filled with the Ideal End of human existence. Such is the transfiguration of life, having been made universal, not merely externally so, but internally as well. Where the Ideal End completely possesses your Deed, transforming and illuminating the same, you are *moralized*, all your actions being made universal and thereby harmonious not only with yourself, but with selfhood. The judge, whose law is the Ideal End, is not merely occupied with scourging the negative Deed, but also with approving the positive one.

niversal Deed will have its process, essentially a movement between the two ne Motive (inner, universal) and the outer, real). This process will reveal three stages: —

e moral Will manifests an immediate un- s unity of the Motive and the Deed. in general, the state of prescriptive mo-

ne second stage will show a complete sep- and conflict between Motive and Deed; l at first determines the Motive, then the and the Deed are in opposition and finally the Motive determines wholly the

with its Deed as universal, which it has now accomplished. The details of this movement are to be set forth in the following account.

Ere we begin, however, let us once more summon before ourselves the true significance of the Deed as universal. The question asked of it is, Does my Ego as Ideal End will the Ego as Ideal End, in doing this Deed? I, as judge, thus hold up my Deed to its law and decide the case. Or, to use the formula, has my Ego as self-determined Free Will taken itself as its own content, and willed itself in the other or all other Egos? If it has, then its Deed is universal, can be willed and done by all without conflict, has the end of all Will, namely, freedom, its own realization. Universal — it is all Will, and yet itself too. Such is now the Motive, the ultimate one, there being only one Motive properly in Morals, though we speak of many according to the different relations of the one. Ultimately, then, there is the one moral Motive, through which I am moved to will the process of freedom in my Deed.

But the lofty Motive, the content, is in a perpetual struggle with the form, the Deed. The one is the inner, the other is the outer; yet both belong together and each is through the other. The Motive may be called infinite, sharing in the limit-transcending Ego, the Deed is finite sharing in the external world. The present sphere will

struggle between Motive and the Deed,
er seeking to make the latter adequate

may first look at the universal Deed in
diate form. There is the natural un-
unity between the two sides, the Deed
Motive; the individual as Free Will wills
Will of the other Ego without going
he negative process. Such an individual
l naturally good, he needs not to go the
denial and of alienation; he does his
his fellow man by a kind of instinct and
ay from all temptation to the contrary.
in him we have to note the process,
is an Ego, and must move from his

such a breach and asserts its own Motive, which is to do the good, or to will the Ideal End. Still even in such an experience it has become conscious of the new situation, which shows the Ego with its Motive on one side and the Deed on the other.

II. It is manifest, however, that such a withdrawal of the Ego as Will away from the Deed cannot last, since the Will in order to be Will, must act and bring forth the Deed. But the Ego cannot return to the immediate unity of the preceding stage, its paradisaical harmony is lost, it has become aware of the separation between the Motive and the Deed. The Ego has willed the good of the other, but the act has not turned out in accord with such a purpose. I, willing the Free Will of my neighbor, have produced no result in correspondence with my inner self. Still I am held accountable for the externality; the Deed, asserting its universal nature, asserts the same of the doer; that is, it asserts that the Ego, as universal, as the complete process, has willed it, and that it belongs to such an Ego. The latter, however, asserts that it has willed no such Deed, and refuses responsibility, falling back upon its own conscious internality, or its Motive.

So the struggle opens, which, in general, may be named the struggle between the Motive and the Deed. The Ego with its inner, self-con-

ocess is on one side, the effect set a-going
tion is on the other. The result will be
between these two sides, which will
lly the character of the universal Deed.
Deed we take first, it is posited in the
an Ego, whose offspring it is naturally
to be. At the first look, what I do is
as mine. So the Deed implies primarily
be worthy, the Motive is worthy; there
this harmony between the inner and
rlds. In like manner, if the Deed be
Motive cannot be good. Thus external-
s at the start upon adjusting internality
behest.

then, is the first phase of the struggle,

principle, and is not to be determined from the outside; so it rises up against the Right of the Deed, asserting its own Right, the Right of the Motive; thus the Self-determined, the Motive, claims to be the true determinant of the Deed. This is the other side of the contest; the Ego as Motive affirms that if it wills the Free Will of the other, it cannot be held responsible for consequences which lie outside of its self-conscious volition. In the modern world it makes good its claim; to us of the present this subjective right of the Ego seems valid; so we are inclined to hold that the Motive determines wholly the moral character of an action.

Accordingly we soon reach a complete separation and opposition in moral terms between the Motive and the Deed. First, the Motive may be good and the Deed in its outcome may be bad, a holy purpose may bring forth a curse. I may give alms with a good Motive, but it may encourage idleness and beggary in the recipient and so have a bad effect. Second, is the reverse case: the Motive may be bad but the Deed may be good, a wicked purpose may bring forth a blessing. Christendom pronounces the Motive of Judas to have been bad, inexpressibly bad, but, as the story runs, Christendom would not have been except for that bad act of Judas.

It is manifest that in both these cases the Ego

e asserts its supreme prerogative of ing the moral character of the act. If ve be right, but the outcome amiss, it is oral action; then if the Motive be wrong outcome beneficial, it is none the less an action. Thus the Ego in its subjective claims the right of determining the moral of the man, be his Deed what it may. he Deed is reduced morally to something xternal and accidental by the Motive.

s the separation so far: The good Deed e a bad Motive, and the good Motive e a bad Deed. But now comes the third e Deed may have a double Motive, good

Thus the splitting-up of Motive and Deed may be carried out indefinitely. The good Deed may have both a good and a bad Motive, and the bad Deed likewise; on the other hand the good Motive may result in both a good and bad Deed, and the bad Motive likewise. At least we call Deeds and Motives good and bad in such cases, and the moral problem is real.

It will now be manifest that the Ego as Motive has divided within itself: it has its particular end or its personal element while willing what is universal. The man may give a park to the city and thus subserve public interest, and at the same time find his private interest in such an act. Is this particular element necessarily wrong or immoral? If there be allowed no personal satisfaction in the Deed, then we are always "to do with disgust what duty demands," as the poet Schiller has put the case in a famous epigram. The least pleasure in doing the universal Deed tarnishes it with a base admixture of a particular element. Such was an outcome of the Kantian view of Morals, though possibly an extreme. Thus the Motive splits into a universal and particular side; not only are the Motive and the Deed separated and antagonized, but the Motive divides within itself against itself, and begins to put down with its tyrannical imperative all its own particularity in the form of feeling, delight, interest. Herein the Ego as

e reaches its deepest point of self-opposi-
nd indeed of self-negation. For, after all,
o is this particular Ego, and, in its univer-
d, it wills the freedom of other particular
in assailing the particular element of
Will, it is assailing itself.

s the Motive in its dualism with the Deed,
egotten a deeper dualism, a dualism within
its outer conflict has become inner, a war
en two sides of itself. Such is its complete
ption within itself in this separative stage,
which it is to come back to unity with
and with the Deed. But before we reach
esult we must consider the third phase of
econd or separative stage of the struggle

but now the Motive determines the Deed. Thus the Ego as Motive returns into itself out of its scission and struggle with the external Deed and asserts its absolute mastery. And certainly this realm in its proper limits has its justification as a genuine phase of the moral process: the Motive does determine the character of the Deed.

Still, the result will be that, as the Deed once tyrannized over the Ego and had to have the limit drawn against it, so the Ego (as Motive) will seek to tyrannize over the Deed and will require some limitation of its power. The moral Ego, claiming an absolute authority in such cases, will begin to justify a bad act by ascribing to it a good Motive. The Deed is a mere appearance behind which I, this absolute self-determining agent, can put what purpose I please. Here is a young fellow who has committed a serious breach of school order and is called to account for his Deed, but his mother tells me that his Motives were right and she cannot be persuaded out of her notion. Here is a preacher of the gospel, and hence the teacher, the upholder, and to a degree the guardian of the morals of his community; well, he has done some morally questionable act; at once the attempt is made, sometimes by himself, sometimes by members of his flock or by both, to show that his Motives were high and pure, and are now the sole thing to be considered; as to the Deed it was acci-

l, some outward shape of illusion gotten up
he fiends to trouble the saints. So the
ral Deed is made to pass into nothingness
t appear as postively moral, by the Motive.
d still further, the moral Ego with its
ratic power will not only claim to make
ad Deed good, but also the good Deed bad.
ardly a certain action seems and, in fact, is
icial, it does good to the fellow-man. Still
Ego (of the outsider of course) can affirm
the Motive was bad, or self-seeking, and can
besmirch the noblest act. This man gave
e public a fine park, which was certainly
e public's benefit; still his Motive was
h and bad, since he enhanced by his gift

done by a Cæsar, Cromwell, Napoleon, by picking flaws in the Motives of the hero, usually those of ambition, revenge, fame. Such a view is antagonistic to good Morals and to good History.

It is manifest that in these cases the Motive has substantially undone itself. For it has no meaning unless it realizes itself in a Deed corresponding to itself; if it can turn the Deed inside out and outside in, totally perverting the same, making the bad good and the good bad, it has destroyed the very nature of Morals. The Ego feeling deeply its own inner scission and contradiction, will cast about for unity and reconciliation; it must, if it be Ego, return out of this separative stage to that of restoration.

Accordingly, the Judge will now appear with his law, testing and adjudicating the two sides, he will command that an end be made to the two tyrannies, the tyranny of the Deed over the Motive, and the tyranny of the Motive over the Deed. He will review the entire process of this second stage in its three phases, which are first the Deed determining the Motive, secondly the separation and conflict between Deed and Motive, third the Motive determining the Deed. The result will appear in a restored harmony between the contestants and a new assertion of the moral order.

III. In general the logical principle becomes

fest that if one wills what is universal, the
cular cannot be excluded; otherwise what he
illed is not universal. If I will the good of
d except my own good, I do not will the good
l as I too belong to the totality. You seek
ke happy many particular people, but your
cular self has some right to the gift even
h you are the giver.

e moral Ego is, therefore, to move out of
cond or separative stage into harmony, in
the preceding conflict of the Motive with
eed and with itself finds its solution.

The individual doing the universal Deed,
brings happiness, advantage, freedom to
s, has a right to his personal happiness,

will in the act simply its own self and selfish aim, disregarding the other — Egoism; then it may will in the act the other self wholly, disregarding its own self — Altruism; finally it may unite the two sides into one complete process of itself. In this last stage the particular and the universal elements previously disunited and in conflict are united in the harmony of a complete movement of the Ego, which is the Psychosis. That is, the Motive, determining the Deed as universal, must be in itself the total process of the Ego, for the universal Deed (as already set forth) must contain in itself this process, which was called the complete cycle of the Deed.

Such is, then, harmony of the Motive after its disruption, in general the restored unity of the universal and the particular, not, however, as a dead result, but as the living process of the Ego. But this inner harmony can be disturbed by a new discord or separation, that between the Motive and the Deed, wherein a new movement out of separation towards unity takes place.

2. We have seen the Motive not only asserting its right against the Deed in case of a conflict between them, but even making the bad Deed good and the good Deed bad. Thus, however, it has undermined the Deed as a moral manifestation of the Ego, and just therein also undermined itself, for the very meaning of Motive is what moves to action, its function is to

ate itself into the Deed. Unless the
e can clothe itself in reality, it is really
ıg. Its essence is eliminated when it is
ed to a mere subjective state of the Ego,
its essence is to move, to determine some-
in accord with itself. The Will, in being
a Motive and making the Deed an acci-
or mere appearance, has undone itself.
esult is we come back to a new assertion of
lidity of the Deed; the Motive must utter
n the Deed, and the Deed must manifest itself
Motive. Their separation and antagonism
cease and the hostile camps must unite in a
on principle; the Deed must tell the
e, and the Motive the Deed; the right of

forth a beneficent Deed, which, however, does not change the Motive, nor the moral character of the doer. All willful wickedness is doubtless overruled finally in the providential order. The Devil himself is the embodiment of malice, yet he is a part of the divine plan. Mephistopheles (in Goethe's poem) who knew himself very well, defines himself as "willing the bad yet working the good," of course in the long, long run of centuries or of myriads of æons.

We cannot, therefore, grant to the Deed the absolute power of determining the moral worth of the Motive, just as little as we can grant to the Motive the absolute power of determining the moral worth of the Deed. Yet we do grant a limited power in each case. Both sides, however, are stages of one process which is their harmony. Still the particular case is not always determinable, be it Motive or Deed, so a new process with a new harmony comes in and brings about a final unity; this is the process of the totality.

3. Not the single Deed alone, but the totality of single Deeds called life we must now consider; not the single Motive alone, but the totality of Motives called character we must likewise consider. If a man's life is made up of worthy actions, we must hold the man to be worthy; if his life is the reverse of worthy, our judgment corresponds. The totality of external perform-

st show what is internal. A man always
ood Deeds with bad Motives is an impos-
an, for man as Will has to realize his
elf in the totality of life; certainly there
eal difference between him and a good

the total circuit of Deeds determines
, and we also say that the total circuit of
determines the man; the two sides will
onious, the exceptions in particular cases
smoothed out in the universal rule. A
with a good Motive may call forth a bad
nce, but next time or the next dozen
e Deed will correspond to the Motive.
od Will becomes habitual, and the result

actions of his life into means for attaining the Ideal End, which is thus the grand Motive underlying the totality of his conduct. But to reach this End, to do the universal Deed, the Ego has discovered that it must know wherein this consists, it must have some insight into the nature of the object pursued. What is the Ego to will as its universal principle which is going to moralize the entire life? Such is the question which calls forth the next section.

Still it is the Ego which is to know, to will and to choose this universal End; thus the latter is mine and hence particular also. That is, this sphere has in it the dualism indicated by the foregoing terms; I who am a particular Ego with particular ends, am to know and to state what is the universal End. How am I to find out which End is the particular and which the universal? The moral Ego is now seeking to recognize and to formulate its fundamental principle as the End to be attained.

Summary of the Deed and Motive. The universal Deed can be done by the Ego only through willing the Will of the other Ego or Egos. I knowing myself, know the neighbor to be what I am, and must act in accord with this knowledge. I am not merely *to know* the universal, but *to do* the universal and realize the same in my conduct. The judge must finally ask: Hast thou, in this act, willed Free Will?

t has been thy Motive? Has it always
Universal or Ideal End?
result will be a process between the
(the inner, the Universal as such) and
l (the outer, the side of reality). The
nents of the Universal Deed, namely,
ersal and the Deed, thus show a process
h other.
ere is first the immediate unity of the
nents, the Motive and the Deed — of
within and its outer act. The person
ere in the realm of prescriptive moral-
wills the Free Will of others without
without question or doubt. Yet here is

sides, each asserting itself as the determining principle of the moral action. Which is the true ethical determinant, the Motive or the Deed? Here again is the process.

1. The Deed insists at first upon being such a determinant; if my Deed is good, my Motive is good and vice versa; the outer must correspond to the inner and show the same. The world judges me by my Deed, and has nothing else by which to judge. The Right of the Deed is this, which, however, may become the Tyranny of the Deed, crushing or ignoring the Motive.

2. But the Motive now rises on its side and asserts itself as having also a Right. It is the Ego, the self-determined principle within, and is not to be suppressed. So there rises between the Motive and Deed a struggle for supremacy. Such is the present stage of scission and contradiction which may be seen in the following three forms of separation between Motive and Deed.

(1) Deed may be good, but Motive bad.

(2) Deed may be bad, but Motive good.

(3) Motive may be both good and bad (universal and particular).

Thus the disruption is complete, even the Motive (the Ego) dividing itself into two opposing camps.

3. Still the Ego is one, and returns to itself out of its own self-separation and asserts itself. So the Motive (the Ego's side) gets the upper

declares itself to be the absolute deter-
f the moral action. Such is now the
the Motive, which in its turn becomes
ny of the Motive.
makes the bad Deed good.
makes the good Deed bad.
has therein undone itself as the moral
nt since it has upset morality.
sult is that the Ego must return to the
rescue it from the destroying activity
otive, bringing the two Tyrannies (of
of Motive) as well as their conflict, to
reconciliation.
e Deed and the Motive are to be har-
as two phases of the complete moral

Thus each side has become universal or a totality, and both harmonize therein; the total man as Deed (the circuit of his Deeds) is one with the total man as Motive (the circuit of his Motives). The Ego always willing Free Will as its universal Motive, must have as its result the universal Deed.

We have now brought to a conclusion the present section, which we have called the *Moral Will and its Deed.* The stress is placed upon the Deed, in which the Ideal End is implicit. Still this Ideal End has often been mentioned in the preceding discussion, for the purpose of explanation. The moral nature of the Deed cannot be understood without taking into account this its ultimate End, which is what constitutes its morality. The Deed is not the Word, but may be supposed to contain implicitly the Word, which must become explicit when the Deed gives an account of itself.

Still, the content of the Ideal End has been already set forth in the Psychological Will, whose highest result was the self-determined Free Will. This is what the Moral Will is to realize in conduct.

The Ego (in the foregoing account) has found that there is a Universal or Ideal End in the Deed, or that the latter has at bottom but one total Motive. What is this one Motive or Ideal End? Such is the problem now before the Moral Ego.

D SECTION — THE MORAL WILL AND ITS END.

might designate this caption as *The Moral d its Ends*, making the latter plural, since e stress is upon particularity, separation, icity. We shall find the Ends to be many, each claims to be the one ultimate End, e true basis for morality. This multi-

the Deed, in which we have found the Ego lurking as Intention and as Motive. But in the universal Deed the Ego found itself to be that which gave universality to the Deed; it came to know itself as universal, as its own process, in the realm of action. It grew aware of having the universal or ideal End within itself; so it knew itself as responsible in thinking and willing the Deed. The Ego, therefore, holds itself to accountability for the universal nature of its action; if I steal from my neighbor, I must know and stand for the complete circuit of my act. Still further, my life is composed of a series of such actions, for which I, as universal or as the total process of the Ego, am responsible; I become aware that all my Deeds must be universal, or I am to blame.

Thus the Ego has gotten conscious that it must have an universal End in moral conduct. Its next question is, What is that End? In what terms can it be stated? Can I formulate the idea which is to moralize all my actions? In the universal Deed the Ego may act instinctively and be moral without reflection; still the time comes when it asks for the principle which underlies this instinctive morality. Language is the expression of what is universal to the spirit, so when a universal principle dawns in the mind, it seeks to be expressed in language, and not simply in action, whose form is particular. Thus

ve now to pass from the Deed to the Word; the latter again we return to the Deed, with the idea or the universal principle of action.

herefore, this particular person, with my rsonal or particular ends, know myself as an universal End, which I am to realize conduct. All my personal ends are to e filled with the great universal End, which noralizes my entire life. Moreover, this sal End I am to endow with a voice and er the same, which is to endow it with n which is universal, that of language. rises a new struggle of many gradations cess, the struggle for the adequate expres-

Still we must see the limitation of the present sphere. The Ego is a particular person, with his own particular ends, motives, desires, ambitions — in fine an Ego containing whole universe of particularity, any phase of which may rise and assert itself against the universal End. But the Ego knows already that this is the End which is to be willed and which is to transform all particular, finite ends; this knowledge, too, is what makes the Ego responsible. And yet it is this particular Ego which is to know, will and choose the universal End, which End is thus a determination of its own; the Ego subjectively determines and formulates what such an End shall be. Hence, the Ego, knowing itself as the determinant of the universal End in the present sphere, will determine it to be some particular form of itself. Here, then, lies the difficulty and the dualism which we shall now encounter. The Ego, in seeking to find and to state the universal End, makes the latter particular, usually some determination of itself. When I say the universal End to be Happiness, for instance, that is a particular phase of my Ego, which I through myself make universal. But another person may take a determination of his Ego different from mine, and designate that as the universal End — let it be Benevolence.

In the present sphere, therefore, we shall have a complete working over of the moral Ego in its

pt to formulate what constitutes morality. kinds of particular ends will be taken and p as the universal End; but they will all a common difficulty. The object is to n a Theory of Morals which is founded on gle general principle; yet this principle is Ego's own determination, or the Ego as par- r asserts itself to be universal. Of course reat inner movement in the history of moral lation is the overcoming of this dualism, , however, does not take place in the nt sphere of the Moral Will and its End. the search is kept up, and the result will be cess which will reveal the Psychosis. Its s we shall designate briefly.

is stated to be your End, yet my Pleasure is certainly not your Pleasure. So each man may formally utter the universal End, yet he puts into it his own particular content, which is really his own, namely, Pleasure.

So we say of this sphere (The Moral Will and its End) that the particular End is explicit and real, while the universal End, though present, is implicit and ideal. This particular End or determinateness of the Ego (embracing implicitly the universal End) will be the central fact of the present sphere, and will show a movement which is the Psychosis.

The Ego determines the Ideal End to be one with its own particular End in three ways, forming a triple process:

I. The Ego determines the Ideal End to be one with its own particular End as determined from without, or as given to itself more or less externally — *Hedonism*.

In Hedonism the outer stimulant is always present, stimulating the organism through the senses, which stimulation, when desired to be lasting, is Pleasure, and is taken as one with the universal End.

II. The Ego determines the Ideal End to be one with its own particular End as determined from within, or as given internally — *Intuitionism*.

The determinant is now inner, indeed the Ego

which takes its own particular determi-
ess from within as the universal End, and
ecomes the moral Imperative.

The Ego determines the Ideal End to be
ith its own particular End as determining
Egos —*Benevolence* (which wills the good
ers, and determines what is their good).
Benevolence the determinant is still inner
Intuitionism), and is imperative, yet to
mperative Ego now comes an outer deter-
t, namely, another Ego, which moves the
go to its Benevolence, which is thus a pro-
etween two Egos, benevolent and recipient,
hich unites the outer and inner determi-
of the two preceding spheres, Hedonism

olence, whose processes are to be more fully set forth in the following exposition.

I. Hedonism.

The word is taken from the Greek, and its meaning suggests Pleasure as the principle; herein the suggestion is doubtless correct. Still the total sphere embraces a good deal that lies beyond immediate gratification, such as Happiness, or the Greatest Good of the Greatest Number. This total sphere, in accord with prevailing usage, we shall term Hedonism.

We have already found under Impulse and Desire that the Ego is induced to perform an act through an outside influence; or, the Ego is determined to be self-determined, which is a statement of the general principle of Determinism. But now in the moral sphere the Ego makes this Determinism of itself to be the universal End, which it is consciously to pursue and realize in conduct. Such is, in general, the standpoint of Hedonism, which is thus in its very origin strongly deterministic, wherein we see the reason its supporters are, on the whole, ardent determinists. Some form of my particular determinateness I am not only to will, but to think and express as the universal End, which is to moralize my whole life.

Still I must have, in the moral sphere, this universal End, which is, as already indicated,

ocess of the Ego, or is the Self-determined. ery fact that I set up such an End implies edom. But this End in Hedonism has, as t, not itself, not its own free action, but outside determination, and is thereby un- Say, I have as my universal End some re of mine, let it be gain; gain, the mak- money, transforms every act of my life, as the universal End ought to transform the g of money into a means which helps such universal End.

e, then, lies the difficulty, the grand breach donism, which becomes manifest in the ent that the Ego takes the particular as de- ed from without, and subjects to the same

tent, I make it realize something directly opposite to it, I subordinate it to my particular End, and still further utter this subordination of the universal End as my principle of action.

But just this dualism of the Hedonistic view is what will tear it to pieces at last, and compel it to a higher position. Inasmuch as it sets up the Determined to be the Self-determined or the universal End, it implicitly contains and is even pursuing the latter. Explicitly it declares Pleasure to be the universal End, but such a declaration implies the underlying effort or search for the universal End. Thus the process of overcoming the dualism begins; the Ego finds out that what it has gotten is not what it was seeking for, that the thing attained does not correspond to the end pursued. In other words, the content, when stated and thought out, will always be found inadequate to the form, which it seeks to fill. Hence will follow a new and possibly better statement, which, however, will be vitiated by the same trouble in this sphere.

Hedonism will, accordingly, show a number of statements or formulations of its principle, which will reveal the process of the Ego in trying to get rid of the contradiction inherent in this sphere. Recollect that the Hedonistic Ego demands universality of End, must do so in order to be moral, but into such an End it puts its own particularity in some shape, and that too

rmined from without. Whatever from side can move the particular Will to take n particular determination as the ideal versal End, calls forth the principle of sm. Something stimulates my organism I wish to last forever — that is Pleasure. ernal stimulant moves me to make such tion my supreme End, my highest Good — um Hedonistic.

ughout the whole sphere of Hedonism main this element of Pleasure, though it come more and more refined as it ap- s nearer and nearer the Ideal End. But e Ego completely conquers its own exter- erminant or its outer stimulation, then

termines the stimulant (being an Ego) as one with itself. These are the three stages of the Psychosis of Hedonism which we may designate distinctively as follows:—

I. Pleasure in its immediate form, or organic Pleasure; the outer stimulant comes through the senses to the Ego, which yields to it and takes such stimulation as its universal End. The process of the organism, roused from the outside and intensified, perchance, determines the Ego externally, and the latter makes this determination of itself its universal End. Still this organic Pleasure will have its process with its negative, called Pain, and the Ego will be invoked to control the latter. This leads to the next stage.

II. Happiness, which is no longer Immediate Pleasure, but Reflective Pleasure, mediated by the Ego. That is, the outer stimulant still stimulates the Ego, but stimulates it to turn back and control its own outer stimulant. This control of the Ego over its stimulant will pass through three stages, expressing the quantity, quality, and duration of the stimulant.

In Happiness, therefore, the Ego keeps asserting more and more strongly its freedom, reacting against its determination from without, and seeking its determination from within, and affirming the latter as the universal End.

The Ego in the sphere of Happiness having determined its determinant as something sepa-

rom and opposite to itself, comes to know
or Ego) as the determinant (or stimu-
Consequently when the other Ego ap-
I do not determine it as something
t from myself, but recognize it to be the
s myself, to be Ego. This brings us to
d stage.

Utilitarianism; the greatest Happiness
greatest Number is taken as the universal
Herein lies the return to unity: the other
Egos) is now the external determinant,
Ego does not determine it (as in Hap-
, but regards it as one with itself. The
eeks a kind of universal Pleasure, grant-
boon to all or to the greatest number of

Hedonism into Intuitionism. Still it must not be forgotten that in Intuitionism also the particular determination of the Ego is taken by the latter as the universal End, which is, therefore, not yet explicit in consciousness.

At present we shall proceed to unfold the various stages of Hedonism, which doctrine has played such an important part in the History of Ethics both in ancient and modern times, and may be called the primary movement of the moral Ego.

I. When my Pleasure, or that which gives me Pleasure, is declared to be my great object in life, there is usually meant the affection of my organism which goes by the name of pleasant. My body is a vital process, and when this process takes place unimpeded and quickened, the result is physical Pleasure, which becomes a determinant of my psychical condition, of my Ego. Then the Ego, being pleasurably determined by nature as it were, sets up this determination of itself from the outside as its supreme content of Will.

Doubtless the origin of such a view comes from the fact that most men must be chiefly employed in satisfying their wants, in making a living. We all have to eat, drink, be clothed and sheltered; such is the demand of physical existence merely, while physical comfort demands still more. So there is a sphere in which

s as his end the gratification of his appe-
esires, impulses. To a certain extent he
e egoistic in order to be at all.

Pleasure, just this organic Pleasure, will
process and will seek to transcend itself as
ate. It will run upon Pain, its opposite,
the hot pursuit of itself, and will therein
limit.

e natural gratification of nature's de-
gives Pleasure, as the healthy unfettered
nt of the organism. But this Pleasure
comes the End which the Ego pursues,
universal End; so the requirement must
greatest amount of Pleasure of the mo-
Though each moment be different, hav-

nistic standpoint of Hume, who says (in his treatise on Human Nature) that "Reason is and ought to be the slave of the passions," administering to their supremacy and not seeking to subordinate them to itself or to transform them according to its purpose and pattern. The world-poets have all treated this theme, each in his own peculiar manner. Goethe portrays such a world, in which Reason is the slave of the passions, in his *Witches' Kitchen* (see first part of *Faust*). Dante has shown the same in his monsters of the Inferno, which are commingled animal shapes, yet endowed with human intelligence which they have used in the service of their passions. Homer brings before us a Calypso and a Circe and also a Polyphemus in a similar vein. All these poets, however, shadow forth such a world as the absolutely perverted one, and its inhabitants as monstrosities from the human point of view.

2. But Pleasure when gratified ceases, its fulfillment is its undoing. No sooner is the want satisfied and the Pleasure reached than the limit is also reached; the Ego is by its very nature (as limit-transcending) dissatisfied with the limit or will be shortly. Thus the very attainment of satisfaction is the beginning and source of dissatisfaction. So we become displeased with Pleasure, which, as an End, refuses to be universal, or to persist for any length of time.

often been remarked that the way to
easure is not to pursue it. We are to
some other End, best of all the Ideal
d Pleasure will fall in by the way.
reatest pleasure-loving city on the planet
bly Paris; the world goes to Paris for
. Still, the expression most commonly
n its streets from pleasure-seekers is
uie; one hears it when nothing else can
l, at theaters, at cafés, at balls. The
ion of the outer want only sends us
deeper inner want which is still left
ed.
ur principle at present is Pleasure, and
have the greatest amount of it, as it is

3. Out of Pain, then, we return to Pleasure with a new experience which gives what may be called the process of Pleasure. This does not remain in its immediate form of seeking the greatest sum of gratification for the moment, but takes into account the avoidance of the sequent Pain which comes from excess, from breaking over the particular limit inherent in Pleasure. Thus the End has become not mere Pleasure or immediate gratification, but Pleasure in a process with its own opposite or negative — Pleasure limited by shunning Pain.

It is manifest that the Ego when it now pursues Pleasure, puts a limit upon the same, and therein determines Pleasure. Plainly the Ego is beginning to assert itself as End, it refuses to be determined wholly from without and to yield to that external stimulus which is simply pleasant. It declines to suffer the consequences of the greatest amount of Pleasure of the moment and so turns to regard the total process of Pleasure, which also involves the avoidance of Pain. But therewith the Ego has started to determine Pleasure, so we enter a new field of Hedonism, passing beyond the sphere of Pleasure proper which has hitherto held sway over the Ego.

II. The second stage of Hedonism is what may be, in general, termed Happiness or Endæmonism. Pleasure still remains the substrate, the thing given; but the Ego directs, determines,

it in many ways. In fact, Happiness will
nd to be a process, else the Ego would not
ppy in Happiness, nay, this process con-
struggle of the Ego to master Pleasure as
as an outward determining principle which
upon controlling the Ego.

piness is, therefore, the universal End at
t; this End demands most distinctively
include Time. Not the greatest Pleasure,
greatest persistent Pleasure is the require-
already in the preceding stage of Hedo-
ve have seen that the Pleasure of one
t is not to be followed by the Pain of
r moment, especially if the Pain is greater
ore prolonged than the Pleasure. So the

my primal object in the present sphere. To be sure, I may have to diminish the amount at one moment to avoid Pain at another. Thus I seek a permanent quantitative Pleasure, and I adjust the volume and the intensity of it according to the totality. It is to be observed here that the Ego is the one who makes the adjustment and does the measuring; the Ego manifestly is determining according to its own End the given Pleasure, diminishing or increasing the quantity by a standard of its own.

Hedonists have often sought to make a kind of calculus of Pleasures; the latter can be compared in amount, and this comparison is capable of a numerical statement; two or more Pleasures can be added together and their size made equal to one big Pleasure. The ground of such mathematical relations is that an external force is producing an effect which is proportionate to the force, and this effect is held to be Pleasure, and so suggests measurement.

Such is the first control of the Ego over unmeasured Pleasure — the quantitative, measured control, important yet by no means final. Note that some Pleasures are more intense than others, and so of a different kind. Even the quantity I must make of a certain quality; I have already put a limit upon Pleasure and made it equable; moreover I find the quantity of some Pleasures, being greater or less, changes their nature, their quality,

hus quantity always projects its counter-
uality. The keenest delight, by a quan-
excess, goes over into a qualitative
. Quantity of Pleasure easily becomes
enemy. So we have also the quality of
re insisting upon consideration; we
not only the greatest amount but also
ghest kind of Pleasure. Thus a new
n enters: What constitutes the highest
Often two classes are mentioned in con-
Pleasures of body and Pleasures of mind.
of the most famous of British Hedonists,
ill, in an oft-cited passage (*Utilitarianism*,
uts the following stress upon the quality
asure: "It is indisputable that the being

the most perfect kind, of Pleasure, as the universal End. The Ego, therefore, determines the quality of Pleasure, and grades it as high or low, according to its approach toward the self-determined process of mind. But even the highest quality must have some amount to be at all; so we return to the quantitative.

3. This return, however, is the complete process of the present sphere, which we have called Happiness or Pleasure determined by the Ego from within. For the Ego has determined both quantity and the quality, and now it determines these in the process which is its own, and which has become the universal End. This process is involved in the statement: the greatest amount of the most perfect Pleasure at all moments for my Ego. It is manifest that the Ego has herein determined for itself the three elements of Pleasure — quantity, quality, and duration; furthermore it has united them in its own process, and made the same its universal End.

The outcome of the pursuit of Happiness is supremely Egoistic, more so than the pursuit of Pleasure, since Happiness involves the Ego determining all for its own end. Pleasure is the immediate determination of the organism through nature; Happiness is the determination of Pleasure itself through the Ego for its own sake. Such is the culmination of the Ego in the present sphere; through being the universal End of its

ular self, it has become aware of its inner
n, which we may call its state of supreme
ness.

ordingly, the Ego will proceed to overcome
ualism by including other Egos, or by the
t to make itself as Ego universal. We
already found that in the stage of Pleasure
ersalized time and sought to make Pleasure
omentary but enduring; while in Happi-
t took charge of all the elements of
re and determined them through itself,
them into its process. But now it
s to itself previously left out and univer-
itself as Ego and puts itself into the
s of Pleasure, not simply as this particular

Self then controls the determinant, but what if that determinant be another Ego? Logically if Self assert itself absolutely as the controller of Pleasure, then this other Self must be recognized as the controller of its Pleasure. Consequently when this other Ego appears as pleasure-controller, I cannot subject it or determine it as something different from myself (which is my principle in Happiness), but I must give it validity as having the same essence as myself. Thus through the other Ego I come to recognize and to affirm my end as Pleasure to be universal, the end of all Egos.

Now, the happy Ego must advance out of its own selfishness, and in principle must not disturb but must forward the happiness of other Egos — the greatest happiness of the greatest number of them. So we reach Utilitarianism.

III. Utilitarianism is the name usually applied to the present form of the moral consciousness, though the propriety of the name has been questioned. Its leading principle has become almost proverbial in the maxim: The greatest happiness (or good) of the greatest number. We read that recent Utilitarianism is getting shy of this maxim, which can only mean that it is getting shy of itself. Certainly it is rapidly developing out of itself, for it too is in the process and is itself a process.

But the pivotal point is reached in the fact

he Ego has now included in its universal
ther Egos, "the greatest number" of them,
quite all. Thus it has made the attempt to
rsalize itself, not, however, with absolute
ss. The End is still Happiness, the greatest
which evidently means the greatest quantity
highest quality of Pleasure through the
st time, not now for my Ego alone, but for
eatest number of Egos.

y important is this step, as the conception
iety or even of humanity begins to work in
articular Ego, which now wills that other
be free to do what it does; they can have
iness as their End and can follow their own
minations in the form of desire, ambition,

right; in asserting and legislating for this right the services of Utilitarianism have been great. Political economy has also been benefited by the movement of Utilitarians, most of whom have shown an economical bent in their theorizing. Still its fundamental thought has been ethical, furnishing the groundwork for its practical endeavor.

Utilitarianism has been a movement, it has gone through its stages, which have been at bottom the stages of the Ego itself in its process. This we may now look at.

1. The first and most immediate form of Utilitarianism may be called the Egoistic, as the Ego finds its own greatest Happiness in willing the greatest Happiness of other Egos. There is as yet no scission between pursuing its own particular End and the universal End, as Happiness. This is naive Utilitarianism, unconscious of the coming breach; it is not Egoistic Hedonism (as designated by Sidgwick), in which the Ego has Pleasure for its End, without regard to other Egos, but Egoistic Utilitarianism.

The separation, however, which is inherent in the present stage, soon makes itself manifest. I will the greatest happiness of other Egos, and I determine in what that Happiness consists. But the others do the same thing; each wills the greatest Happiness of other Egos, including me,

termines in what that Happiness consists.
all these Egos agree not only in willing
neral object, which is the greatest Happi-
the greatest number, but also agree in
ticular thing which realizes that Happiness
en time, then certainly the greatest Hap-
principle is a reality. But suppose they
e not in the universal End but in its
application? At once a new phase comes
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his is the sphere of division, separation,
, and the greatest Happiness of many
ar Egos is all broken up into a mass of
ng individuals. Still each may will the
Happiness of the greatest number, but

ness of a few people can be summed, and the small Happiness of many people can also be summed; in case the two sums are equal, which side is to have the preference? Is the quantity of Happiness to be the test or the quantity of Egos? In the case of trouble, are we to choose the greatest Happiness of the lesser number or the lesser Happiness of the greater number? Six men of a community want a public road made by the public through their landed possessions for their own advantage; their sum of Happiness at having such a road will be greater than the sum of Happiness in the community at not having the road made. Generally, the community is indifferent, but the particular Ego is alert and buoyant, overflowing with Happiness too often at others' expense.

Our principle, then, the greatest Happiness of the greatest number, has become disrupted within and is in a conflict with itself. If we say that Happiness is the universal End, then the greatest Happiness is to be realized, though it be confined to a few or even to one man; all society, all humanity is to will the one man's Happiness if it be greater than the sum total of others' Happiness. But what has now become of the Happiness of the other Egos which the Utilitarian in his definition included in his principle? Clearly it has denied itself, and so we must go back and take as End the

y of Egos, even if their sum of Hap-
be less. Thus, however, the greatest
ness as quantitative or even as qualita-
no longer the universal End, and the
no longer holds.

Utilitarianism as universal End goes over
rticularism in its attempt to subsume the
The Ego at last uses the universal End for
particular purpose, though it may claim
lieve that it is seeking all the while the
t Happiness of the greatest number.
ness is indeed something very personal and
lar; as universal End it is a soulless ab-
on, which the Ego is strongly inclined to
soulful and concrete by putting its own

The former maxim of Utilitarianism, the greatest Happiness of the greatest number, has vanished into the background, and instead of it the declaration is heard that each man is to seek the Happiness (or the Pleasure) of all men. The universal End is to dominate the individual in his special interests, ends, desires. This is the "universalistic" side of the present doctrine, and it looks at the first glance as if the individual was to give up his special Happiness for the general Happiness.

But no such thing is meant; if it were, Hedonism would have reached its conclusion. On the contrary, Pleasure is still considered the great object, the only thing which is in itself desirable, and we are to choose the greatest attainable Pleasure. Of course, each particular Ego is to determine this Pleasure for itself, which is its own special End. Thus the old dualism makes its appearance.

Still the universalistic Hedonist says that the Happiness of others is to be taken into account, is to be regarded as of equal validity with our own. We are to recognize the other in his Pleasures, nevertheless we are to pursue our own. Thus two Ends are acknowledged, the universal and the particular one, and are acknowledged to be of equal right, even in their mutual opposition. Herein the dualism inherent in all Hedonism has become explicit, has

itself out to consciousness and recogni-
The words put together in the term
ersalistic Hedonism," suggest just this
wofoldness and contradiction.

latest and most important representative
stage of Utilitarianism, Professor Sidg-
eems to acknowledge this dualism in his
le, deeming that the science of morality
up in "an ultimate and fundamental
liction," and that we shall have "to
n the idea of rationalizing it completely."
rue that the Professor speaks with the
t caution, guarding his words with so much
at his meaning, to us, at least, gets ob-
see last few pages of his work *The Meth-*

apparently brought itself to a conclusion, having unconsciously ripped itself in twain by a kind of hari kari.

We have had little to say of the so-called evolutionary Ethics, since its expounders seem to range through the various stages of Hedonism, as above set forth. In regard to their method, it is derived confessedly from Physical Science, and externally applied to the moral movement of the Ego. The result is a continuous discord between their procedure and the matter to be ordered, or between form and content. The evolution is, accordingly, a forced one, in which the tyranny of the ready-made system flings the free activity of the moral spirit into a prison-house of alien categories. Right, Conscience, Obligation, terms which the human race has elaborated to utter its moral nature, are tortured and whipped into line with a remorselessness which often makes the reader intercede for mercy.

Yet we believe in evolution. It must be, however, spiritual evolution, that of Ego itself unfolding into its moral heritage. Every page of this book is a witness for evolution — not the best witness possibly, still a witness. The old metaphysical morality, with its cut-and-dried distinctions and definitions brought in anywhere without inner connection, must be supplanted by the living, soulful, genetic process of the moral

Evolutionary Ethics have done good by
ing evolution in the moral sphere, but
olution must be an inner, not an outer,
e an evolution not of physical organisms
to the spirit but of the spirit itself.
the evolutionist is likely to be Hedonistic
noted in Mr. Spencer's celebrated for-
f Justice: "Every man to be free to do
hich he wills, provided he infringes not
al freedom of any other man." This
nt is based upon the utilitarian doctrine
faire. It is, accordingly, merely a nega-
finition of Justice. The truly just man,
r, must be positive in his Justice, he must
rely refrain from infringing "the equal

piness is, the Ego must see and settle within its own mind, must internally determine for itself. The Ego is no longer determined from without, but determines from within.

That is, the external stimulant (or determinant) which we found dominating the Ego in Pleasure, has quite vanished into an internal determinant, which is some form of the Ego itself. From looking outward, the Ego has turned to looking within for its moral determinant. Not an outer organic sense, but an internal sense is declared to be the means for realizing the universal End in conduct. The universal element in "Universalistic Hedonism," is the controlling one, and is Intuitional more than Hedonistic.

This is, accordingly, the transitional stage to the next, which is explicitly Intuitionism, the nature of which is now to be briefly unfolded.

II. Intuitionism.

The moral Ego as intuitional takes some determination of itself (the Ego) from within as one with the universal End. As Hedonism springs from an outer sense, so Intuitionism springs from an inner sense, which is often called the Moral Sense or the Moral Sentiment.

Throughout Intuitionism the Ego has a particular determination of itself as the universal End,

is also its own. That is, the Ideal End is itly one with the special determina- of the Ego, now coming from within not from without as in Hedonism. dingly in Intuitionism the Ego is the nined, yet also the determinant, both in oth subjective. At first these two sides e in immediate unity, but the process of onism will separate them and finally the vill assert this inner determinant of itself Moral Imperative.

ugh Intuitionism gets rid of the dualism we saw in Hedonism, by making the nination of the Ego wholly internal, still it evelop a dualism of its own, even deeper

pleasure, its satisfaction, and very naturally does not seek much after an Ought. Bentham, the most influential of modern Hedonists, was right from his point of view when he said that *Ought* ought to be abolished. Still there is a school called Ethical Hedonists who declare that Pleasure or Happiness ought to be pursued as the universal End. Such a statement, however, is a contradiction in terms.

The initial fact of Intuitionism lies in the view that the Ego knows the nature of an act, its rightness or wrongness, by intuition, by immediate insight. We are simply to look at the deed, square in the face, as it were, and its moral nature will appear to our vision. Man has this power or faculty of seeing or intuiting the moral element, which the deed on its side reveals.

It is manifest that such a view in the beginning at least, dispenses with the universal End. Every moral act is right or wrong according to its own inherent nature and not through any End outside of itself, not as it tends to produce Happiness, or Perfection, or Freedom. Still we shall find that it contains such an End implicitly and will develop the same into a form of statement. Intuitionism, in its most immediate phase, needs no doctrine of moral action, needs no reasoning or thinking about the deed, whose character it sees by direct insight. Plainly with such a view there can be no science of Morals which is the

: to express in some formulation the Ideal
ich is to moralize man's life.
tionism, however, is a formulation of the
e moral principle, and so is, at the very
n a deep contradiction with itself. I am to
ectly in view of the deed, according to my
perception, without regarding the conse-
, without any formulation of an universal
Still just this statement is an universal
rmulated. When I say I have no principle
dance, I have expressed my principle.
Mirabeau said: "I have swallowed all
as," that was his formula, and he made it
versal rule of his conduct. The intuition-
xpressed, unconsciously, the End which he

Hedonistic view. Though it asserts immediacy in moral action, such an assertion is a rebound, an opposition to the preceding stage, and so belongs to the second or separative stage of the present Psychosis.

Undoubtedly men often act from an intuitive perception of right and wrong. In fact prescription and habit tend to make the Ego immediate and intuitive, not needing reflection and doctrine. Already in the Deed we have seen the Ego acting in this way, without thinking or uttering the universal End as a conscious principle; finally in the universal Deed it was aware of such an End, yet did not assert it as a doctrine, still less did it proceed to deny it as a doctrine. Every moral act has an immediate element, an intuitive step; even Hedonism must at last be seen immediately by its follower.

Intuitionism is, therefore, not intuition, but is a statement, doctrine, utterance, that all moral conduct rests upon intuition as against the universal End; the Ego is to transform the particular action and build up the grand structure of moral life intuitively, whose architecture is instinctive like that of the little bee constructing its honeycomb. Thus however we are intuitive consciously and with design, not directly intuitive.

In Hedonism there is always an element of Pleasure, which signifies an external stimulus or

inant of the Ego. But in Intuitionism
an external determinant is expressly
: the Ego out of itself, without any
l stimulus, sees and even determines for
hat is right and good in conduct, the deed
not for the sake of the Pleasure or Hap-
following it, but because the Ego deter-
it as the right thing to be done. Hence
itionism the element of self-determination
e emphasis, and the intuitionists are
libertarians; on the other hand, in He-
the Ego is more or less determined from
side, and so the Hedonist is naturally a
inist. The attitude toward Free Will
fundamental test of every school of

If we look into the history of Moral Science we observe, in illustration of the foregoing statement, that Intuitionism usually appears with or soon after Hedonism, as its counterpart and antidote. In ancient Greece Hedonism was the principle of the Cyrenaic school whose leader was Aristippus; this early Hedonism was also of most immediate kind, taking Pleasure as the good, and that too the Pleasure of the moment. Alongside of this Hedonism rose the Cynic school of moralists headed by Antisthenes, who assailed Pleasure violently, intimating that it was worse than madness. The Cynic sage, in his positive doctrine, was essentially intuitive; his own wisdom was to dictate the law which he was to obey, hence he was to follow insight in his conduct. In the later Epicurianism and Stoicism we observe the same two principles as opposite tendencies taking possession of the Greco-Roman world. Coming down to modern times in England we find the Hedonism (strongly Egoistic) of Hobbs stirring up a movement of Intuitionism in the seventeenth century; and in our own century, the Utilitarianism of the Benthamites has called forth its emphatic counterpart in a new school (or schools) of Intuitionism.

From the preceding it becomes manifest that Hedonism and Intuitionism, while in one sense opposites, yet are in a process with each other,

ɔth together form a process which is their
unity. The refutation of Hedonism by
onism, or of Intuitionism by Hedonism,
e holding fast to one side against the
can never quite bring us to the truth of
The form of argumentation in these
s must be changed; both the mentioned
es must be seen and justified not by them-
but as stages of one movement of the Ego,
sychosis involving both.
each stage, separately, is a movement of
o, and so reveals in itself the stages of the
ɔsis. Such has been the case with Hedon-
we have just seen ; now we are to witness
ne thing in the case of Intuitionism, which
o have its movement within its own lines

universal End (in the form of Right, Duty, the moral Law) am the determinant of my conduct, of my real self, all of which will show the process of the Ego as the ideal determinant of itself.

I. Immediate Intuitionism; I intuit the universal End immediately as my determinant of conduct, or as the right thing to be done; my direct intuition of the right determines me to make it real. This is the primal state of unity between the two sides of the moral Ego.

II. Regulative Intuitionism; I intuit the universal End mediately, through a rule of right which I realize in conduct. The moral rule (regula) now determines me, externally, as it were authoritatively to moral action. This is the separative stage of Intuitionism, inasmuch as the universal or ideal End as determinant is separated (abstracted) from the Ego and set up in the form of an abstract rule or maxim over the Ego. However, the particular Ego will require a multiplicity of rules for the particular cases, inasmuch as the unity of the universal End has been lost through abstraction. But this very multiplicity of rules compels a pursuit of their common principle, and so we have the next.

III. Imperative Intuitionism; I intuit the universal End as the one moral Law which unites all rules and maxims. Now the one rule of Right

nines all particular rules of Right which
nine my Ego. Thus we have returned to
but not to that of the first or immediate
the universal End is the determinant of
go not directly but through the universal
Imperative or Law.

l this Law is intuitive, is seen as the deter-
t of the Ego in its particular conduct. The
of Intuitionism is, therefore, when the
End is taken as the Moral Imperative de-
ning the Ego to moral action. The next
s to pass from the Law to the Law-giver,
Ego as determining the Law — but there-
ve have moved out of the realm of Intu-
m. First, however, some details on these

as distinct, not as consciously separated from that act. Every moral agent is gifted with such an intuitive power of beholding the right, and he acts in the special case only, as it rises before him with its demand.

2. But next the moral agent becomes doctrinal, and affirms that there is no universal End, in fact, no general rule of guidance. For Intuition rests upon such a denial; it refuses to take Pleasure or any other principle and affirms that there is no formulation of such principle.

3. Yet just this is a formulation, as stated above. The intuitionist declares that he acts without regard to the universal End, which statement thus becomes his formula of action. In saying he has no rule of guidance, he has certainly laid down one rule of guidance, and a very general rule, out of which will grow necessarily other rules. The man who says he has no Ideal End, cannot help himself; he still has an Ideal End, which he seeks to realize by having no Ideal End.

Such is the movement of the Ego in the first stage of Intuitionism, which finds that in its very denial of the universal as End is lurking the affirmation thereof. Such an experience leads the intuitionist to take a new position, which we are now to observe.

II. Intuitionism next declares that we can behold the validity of certain rules of conduct

ively. Not only the particular case of theft
ve intuit as wrong, but also we can intuit the
l essence of the general rule or law which
res "Thou shalt not steal." Thus the im-
ate act of intuition as confined to the par-
r case is widened. There is still a more or
explicit denial of the universal End, which
mes all rules, whose multiplicity and separa-
Intuitionism in the present sphere asserts.
The intuitionist uttering rules for particular
, has begun to generalize and to think.
he asserts that the rule is known by intui-
even though he picks it up as a maxim of
nt morality. It may be given him by the
lar consciousness or from the storehouse of

to how to apply it. So questions of casuistry will come up even in the realm of Intuitionism, which in the beginning, at least, proposed to banish them through its immediate insight.

3. Out this conflict the intuitional Ego will seek to bring order by some arrangement of manifold elements in proper relation and subordination. This, however, involves a new rule which is superior to other rules, a kind of rule of rules, which is, of course, intuited both in its own nature and in its application. Thus we have tabular statements of motives, virtues, maxims, externally ordered according to some principle of precedence or relationship.

Herewith, however, we have implicitly reached the idea of the universal rule which is to control all rules, and finally all particular actions. Thus Intuitionism itself has abstracted its determinant from its immediate phase and made the same into a rule of right which is now its determinant; but this rule becomes necessarily many rules, which are finally unified into a system of rules by some external rule, which is more or less arbitrarily taken, and according to which the other rules are arranged.

But such a rule must not be arbitrary and uncertain, but universal and ultimate; hence the new search.

III. The intuitionist at this point will begin to seek for a statement of the internal, underly-

inciple which has sytematized the rules
axims of conduct, and united them into
ler just mentioned. He asks, what is the
ng law which is thus to reach back through
les and to moralize conduct? Such a law
e universal and supreme, the Imperative
gives the moral command to the subject.
such an Imperative must be an intuition,
o be seen immediately by the Ego, and
ized in its authority. This final stage of
onism will also have its process.

The first form in which this intuitive act
's is often called the Moral Sense. This
mean simple intuition of the particular act
has already been unfolded in the first
of Intuitionism. But here it means the

means the same. Thus into our unity of Moral Law a new separation comes, and now we seek to find the Law of all difference in this sphere, the authority which is absolute.

3. At this point we come upon the Categorical Imperative, thus called by the philosopher Kant who gave it a well known formulation, which runs as follows: "Act only on that maxim or rule which thou canst at the same time will to become a universal law." Herein three elements are introduced in a kind of ascending order: the particular act, the maxim or rule pertaining to that act, and the universal law applying to the maxim. For instance, the Ego may think of stealing this hat, then it calls up the maxim or rule against theft, as Thou shall not steal; finally it grounds this rule by thinking it as universal, by supposing that all men should steal, and thus really destroy theft by destroying property. Kant's formula is in its essence a test of the negativity of the deed; make your deed universal and see whether it negates itself; if it does it is negative in some way. It can tell us often what not to do; but as to telling us what to do its utterance is by no means so distinct. Shall I go as a missionary to Asia? Make the maxim universal: "Go ye into all the world;" who would be left at home, where there are also duties? Shall I devote my life to the slum, to helping those who cannot help themselves?

t universal; shall we all betake ourselves
slums? Who then will do the work of the
which is assuredly something different?
itionism has thus manifested in Kant its
ation and end; it sets up a universal law
he Ego intuits as universal, and applies it
st both to moral maxim and to moral act.
uitive Ego no longer affirms that it sees
iately the moral nature of the deed, it on
trary affirms that it sees the moral nature
deed through the Imperative of a universal

in we have come back to the open state-
of the universal End in the form of the
Imperative. The particular act must be
realize itself as such an End, which all

Imperative, which has the note of severity if not of tyranny. For I can become a tyrant over myself.

Still there is validity in Intuitionism up to a certain point, and it has always been attractive to the idealistic moralist, who is apt to maintain it in some of its many forms. Right, Duty, Obligation, Conscience, are some of the ideal terms with which it conjures. Still it does not make explicit the Ideal End inherent in all its moral action; not even the moral Imperative states such an End, which is freedom, or more fully the self-determined Free Will. Accordingly the moral Imperative has not yet made explicit the idea of moral freedom, though it is an important stage on the way thereto, and represents a necessary phase in the total development of the moral Ego — that of inner authority.

It is a noteworthy and curious fact that Sidgwick, in his criticism of Intuitionism, divides it in the threefold manner, calling its divisions perceptional (or ultra-intuitional), dogmatic, and philosophic Intuitionism. These divisions correspond in essence to the process of the Ego, or the Psychosis, which Sidgwick in general does not recognize; in fact he seems not to be aware of it as the inner ordering principle of all ethical phenomena, since he does not organize his great work, "The Methods of Ethics," by any such

enetic movement, as far as we can see; on
trary his procedure seems to rest mostly
external grounds of convenience or of
cal arrangement.

outcome of Intuitionism is that the Ego
itself as the Imperative over the Ego,
over itself. Now the next step is to be
the Ego asserts the moral Imperative not
over itself, but over the other Ego in its
lar determinations, and determines these
ng to its own Imperative. Thus the Ego
rom being the Law over itself into being
wgiver over others; it wills their good
termines what their good is; it becomes
lent. Herewith we enter the third stage

determinant (the external Ego) determines me (the internal Ego) to return to it and to be its determinant, according to my Ideal End, or according to my conception of duty. Thus I am its Imperative, which determination of mine it, however, has stimulated, determined.

Thus we see the general process of Benevolence: it has first the self-determined determinant (other Ego); secondly, my particular determination, in which my Ego specially manifests itself; thirdly, the Universal or Ideal End, or my moral Imperative, which now commands me to determine the other Ego according to its principle. I moralize myself by determining the other Ego according to my Imperative.

I am benevolent, willing the good (*bene, volens*) but I determine what that good is for other Wills; I am the imperative Ego (*imperator*) not only over myself but over other Egos.

In Benevolence I embrace the other Ego or Egos in my act of Will; I may have their Happiness as my End, but I determine for them what that Happiness is. So we may call this by the name of welfare or well-being, inasmuch as it is different from Hedonism. That is, the Ego wills not the Happiness of the individual, but the welfare as determined by the Ego of the agent who wills. In Happiness, I will the Happiness of the subject, according to his own determination, not mine; I will what he deems to be

ppiness. But I see that what he does is his own Happiness; I also see wherein s true Happiness; so I will that and ne it for him. I am herein the superior, perative, so to speak, to his Ego, while he nferior. The equality or the *laissez faire* itarianism is set aside; I assert myself as terminer of his welfare, and possibly the tyrant thereof. In Utilitarianism I have what he deemed his Happiness, I led the same; but in Benevolence I com- his welfare even against his Happiness. benevolent principle, as here used, has in ide of authority.

uch for the relation of Benevolence to

the negative act. The positive result, however, is that I am to will what all Egos can will without injuring one another; and I am to abstain from doing what injures others. My End, therefore, should be their welfare, which I as universal law and judge must determine. Still in Intuitionism the Ego applies the universal law intuitively, as something given, not knowing the same as its own and indeed as itself.

But through the process of Intuitionism, culminating in the Categorial Imperative, the Ego becomes aware that it makes the universal law, is the lawgiver, as well as the law's adjudicator, that it determines the Imperative and so determines the End, which is the fulfillment of the law. Thus the Ego prescribes the End, knowing itself to be the law, judge, and executor — wherewith we have passed out of the sphere of Intuitionism into that of Benevolence, whose End is the welfare of humanity, as dictated by the benevolent Ego. In Intuitionism I determine the act to be right or wrong immediately out of my own subjective insight; but finally I make this subjective Imperative of mine, which is implicit in my first intuition, explicit in the objective law for all Egos, and thus reach the Categorical Imperative, still given intuitively. When now I recognize and assert myself as the Imperative determining the End or the Law for other Egos, I have passed into the sphere of Benevolence. The

lent Will in individual or society or church,
l always has been imperial, autocratic,
eering, in spite of its sympathetic feeling;
upposes in the other Ego some defect or
y which it supplies, else such Ego would
ed Benevolence.

general character of Benevolence may be
d thus: another Ego moves me (or my
o be benevolent to it, that is to will its
which good is ultimately its freedom (or
termined Free Will). Thus in Benevo-
here is a continuous inter-relation between
gos, the Giver and the Receiver of the
starting with an immediate unity between
, passing into their scission and opposition.

latter, through a stage of opposition inner and outer, to an external unity or compromise which takes place between the two (Giver and Receiver), each retaining a part of his claim, the one a part of his Imperative, the other a part of his freedom. From this state of separation they pass to the mediating principle for both Egos — the Institution.

III. Institutional Benevolence, in which the Giver is the benevolent Institution with its Law standing between both Egos and reconciling them. Especially it seeks to secure freedom to the Receiver, and even to supply him with Will when this is wanting. But the benevolent Institution will also have its process, being at first determined by the individual Giver, then determining the individual Giver, and finally making all citizens of the State Givers, thus universalizing Benevolence and removing it quite out of the sphere of individual determination.

It is manifest that now the benevolent Ego has reached its destination, having actualized itself in an Institution. It has no longer to will the good of the recipient Ego, but to will the Institution whose function is to look after that good. Nor is the benevolent Ego determined any longer by the need or suffering of the fellow-man, who must put himself under law and thus get his relief. It is not said that this condition has yet been attained, but such is the goal to-

which the benevolent spirit of the ages is
ng.

the moral Ego in the present sphere finds a
arly rich experience and discipline, having
nsform its subjective Imperative of Benevo-
into the objective Institution of Freedom,
nerein passing from its inner individual Law
outer universal Law.

s process, already suggested in outline, we
now follow out in more detail.

The first stage is Benevolence in its simplest
that of the Giver who is stimulated by his
gs to a benevolent act through a suffering
The sight of pain moves the man to alle-
it; he has sympathy with his fellow-man in

Benevolence, both being determinations of him from without. Still both Pleasure and benevolent Emotion have their place in his soul.

The movement, therefore, of this first stage of Benevolence (the immediate) will be from the Ego of the Giver determined by that of the Receiver to just the opposite, namely to the Ego of the Receiver determined by that of the Giver; or from the external determination of the benevolent man to his internal determination, while the recipient moves the reverse way.

There will be three stages in the above process: the purely emotional and unitary, the separative and conflicting, the return to unity through the subordination of emotion. A word upon each of these stages.

1. Emotional Benevolence is best seen in almsgiving on the street. The man of suffering (real or simulated) appears; there is the response in the sympathetic spectator. Pain in the one excites Pain in the other, and then follows the determination of the spectator to get rid of his own Pain by getting rid of the Pain of the one whom he beholds. This Hedonistic element is in Benevolence, yet it is by no means all of Benevolence.

It is soon discovered that Emotional Benevolence may not be very benevolent. It is at bottom selfish and then it makes the man unfree. He soon finds out that in many cases he is

ized, and he comes to the conclusion that
nevolence often does more harm than good.
enevolence which responds to every appeal
etermines at once the Ego to the act of
, soon shows itself to be a very inadequate
ple of moral conduct. Thus a reaction
, bringing forth a conflict in the Giver.
This conflict lies between Emotion and Re-
n, or the Ego of the Giver struggles between
determined from without and being deter-
from within. The benevolent man now
o himself: I shall first investigate whether
pplicant for my charity deserves it. Thus
ving Ego refuses to be determined imme-

Benevolence to help out. So we react against our reaction, and seek to harmonize the two conflicting elements.

3. The unity is brought about by the Ego determining its determinant. I seek to prevent the ill effects which I have seen following my yielding implicitly to Emotion, to the external determinant, which is an Ego soliciting my help; at the same time I seek to give help, to keep alive my human sympathy, to retain my Benevolence. Accordingly, I resolve not to give till I find out what is the need, and determining through myself its degree and even its reality. Thus I return to my determinant, the soliciting Ego, and determine its claim to determine me to give.

Thus the Ego of the Giver has made itself the Imperative over the Ego of the Receiver. It is still determined by the soliciting Ego, but it turns back and determines its determinant ere it be moved to the act of Benevolence. Thus it has asserted its freedom or self-determination.

But how about the other Ego, the recipient? It has manifestly lost its self-determination, and the result must be a new struggle for its freedom. Thus the Ego of the Giver, after having harmonized its own inner conflict, is whelmed into a new conflict with the Ego of the Receiver.

II. This brings us to the deeply separative stage of Benevolence, the conflict between the

gos, the Giver and the Receiver. The first
evolent, but therewith is imperative, de-
ing the free activity of the other, who is
cipient of Benevolence, but who becomes
n enslaved or subjected in his Will. Yet
re self-determined Egos and possibly liv-
a free land, whose essence is to guarantee
m. What will be the outcome? Each
ill go through a process within itself and
ach other, the purpose of which is to get
the conflict and to come to harmony.

process now lies chiefly in the recipient
which seeks to vindicate its self-determined
against the Imperative of the benevolent
For the Receiver too has his fight for

the kind occurred in the old Church, especially in Italy.

But the Ego, even that of the alms-seeker, is by its very nature self-determined, limit-transcending, freedom-asserting; so it will rise against this external determination of itself and seek to counteract the same.

2. The recipient Ego, therefore, resists the Imperative of the benevolent Ego, though accepting the Benevolence. There is the inner resistance: the Receiver yields outwardly to the command of the Giver, but thwarts it through deceit. The tyranny of the Imperative begets hypocrisy in the subject. Thus Benevolence can make the man not merely a beggar, a solicitor of alms outwardly, but inwardly a liar, a hypocrite, a totally perverted soul, which perversion, strange to say, results from the Receiver seeking to keep his freedom. He will secretly foil the Imperative from the outside, and determine himself from within. Thus the man gets corrupt and corrupting morally and socially.

Sometimes the resistance of the recipient Ego becomes open, undisguised. The ancient populace of Rome demanded both food and amusement, "bread and the circus," they were not going to be determined by the Giver; though recipients of the gift, they were masters not only of themselves but of the Givers. Similar notes have been heard at times in modern societies.

is the extreme negative result of Benevo-
out of which both sides seek some retreat.
ipient Ego must find that its triumph is
truction, having destroyed in essence the
eans of Benevolence. If the beggar can
ine my giving, I have no longer anything
, I cannot be benevolent through an act
own.

o the benevolent Ego and the recipient
e one in order to give and the other in
o receive, have to come together in a new
The Giver now gives and the Receiver
ceives, not the release from work but work
The Receiver can thus earn his gift, and
ree, partially at least, of the external de-

him working. His Ego, the self-determined ideally, is really dominated by another Ego, which limits him, subjects him, enslaves him to its own behest. Accordingly he rises to the demand for a new kind of Benevolence, which will not only give work, but also secure freedom.

III. This is institutional Benevolence, in which the Giver is not an individual but an institution. Thus the Receiver is free from the caprice and uncertainty of the particular Ego that gives; the institution is based upon some kind of law which is universal, though it too be imperative. The Giver, on the other hand, is relieved of the conflicts springing from his Benevolence; an organized, objective Will has taken his place, and is doing his benevolent work.

The institution is itself a Will, whose object is to secure Will, here the Will of the recipient Ego, which is in danger of being suppressed by the Will of the benevolent Ego. Moreover the Will of the recipient Ego, by the very fact of its requiring assistance, is likely to be weak, inadequate, perverted, and needs to be helped out by an institutional Will.

Thus between the two individual Wills, giving and receiving, is placed a third Will different from both yet mediating and reconciling them in their continuous struggle. Hereby the unity is restored not by a compromise between the two sides but by an institution whose object is ulti-

to preserve each Will, giving or receiving, integrity. That is, the end is now to the freedom of both individuals from an domination of one over the other, such as e seen manifesting itself in the two pre-stages.

this institutional (or objective) Benevo-as its process; the benevolent institution mediating power will show a development reveals the Psychosis, being itself a Will. he Private Benevolent Institution comes it springs directly from and is supported vidual effort. The single Ego finds that ot by itself cope with the problem of lence and so organizes a society whose

olent Ego. So the private Institution is apt to be determined by private influence, and all the old conflicts of the Giver and the Receiver may again arise, though an institution stands between them. Each side seeks now to use the organization as its weapon of defense and offense, and the institution is lost in the contention of opposite parties.

The Private Institution must, therefore, separate itself from this immediate connection with the individual Ego and its dominating influence, and must form an alliance with an organization whose ruling spirit is the objective Law. Thus dirempted from its immediate subjective factor, the Benevolent Institution falls into the hands of the State.

2. Thus we have the Public Benevolent Institution organized and supported by town, city, county, State, Nation. The great fact about all these benevolent institutions is that they spring from and belong to the great Institution, the State, whose object is to secure freedom, to will Will through Law. The Giver of Benevolence is now the State, giving according to Law, which means that it gives to maintain Free Will. The recipient Ego whose Will is defective from any cause is supplied with Will by the State, whose ultimate end is to secure Will. The blind, the deaf-mute, who are deprived of senses which are the implements of Will, the helpless poor and

are endowed, so to speak, with a new Will
e State, whose inmost soul goes back to the
lness of Will and hence its preservation,
when defective.

us the State through the Public Benevolent
ution has brought freedom to the recipient
not capricious freedom but freedom through
aw, which has no private end of its own,
ne one great objective end of making valid
go as Will.

The State now must be seen coming back
other Ego, the Giver, and not letting one
e benevolent but compelling all men (who
s citizens) to be benevolent through taxa-
or the Public Institutions of Benevolence.

objective Law whose end is the security of freedom to the recipient Ego.

Thus the process of the benevolent Ego has run its course and reached its fulfillment in the Institution. What next? The benevolent Ego must now rise out of Benevolence; it is no longer to dominate the Will of the recipient Ego with its own Imperative, but is to will the Institution whose object is to secure the Free Will of the recipient Ego. The Giver thus passes from being forced to be benevolent to willing freedom through the Institution. So there is a return to the Ego which now has a new purpose: the Ego as Will hears the call to will freedom through an institutional world, and obeys.

Herewith we have come to that stage of the Moral Will in which it receives a fresh content, namely the self-determined Free Will. That is, the Moral Will has reached its third realization, seeking to embody in conduct the complete process of freedom, or to realize the Ideal End. Moreover this Ideal End has become fully explicit, and we pass from *the Moral Will and its End* to the next stage, which is *the Moral Will and its Ideal End.*

If we look back at the general sweep of the section through which we have just passed, we see that the grand labor of the Moral Ego is to get rid of its particularity of End and to reach a

universality thereof, which is in the Free
taking itself as its own content or object.
endeavor of the moral person to grasp and
rmulate his End is what has called forth the
us Theories of Morals in past ages, the suc-
ve record of which constitutes the History
hics.

SECTION THIRD—THE MORAL WILL AND ITS IDEAL END.

The Ego as Moral Will has not only the End but the Ideal End explicit in this third stage. In the simple Deed both factors (Ideal and End) were implicit, then the End became explicit in the form of particularity; but now the Ideal End which is universal, is to unfold itself directly in its own process.

This Ideal End has often been spoken of in the preceding phases of the Moral Will, since it is the one great End which makes morality and brings the moral world into an harmonious order. But previously it has been simply the inner potential force, which is at present to be realized and shown in its own express movement. The lurking principle in all conduct is to come forth into daylight and manifest its own self-revelation. It has been the secret law to which the inner judge has appealed in all the foregoing cases of responsibility. That law and that judge must now move out of their background and show themselves unfolding themselves according to their own inherent character.

s Ideal End may be also designated as self-
ince the Ego as Moral Will is to make real
on and conduct its own universal selfhood,
g back always to itself as universal. In
esent sphere our freedom is constructing
m, giving to it reality; our Free-Will is to
ree-Will and is to make this spirit over
ur moral possession. Thus we become the
Samaritan in the best sense, who acts not
from sympathy with human suffering
n undoubtedly has its claim), but whose
is to will the freedom of the fellow-man.
see my neighbor struggling in a wreck or
ngle, from which he cannot extricate him-

In such an act we begin to catch a glimpse of the Good in its complete meaning.

It must be said, however, that this term, the Good, applies to all the preceding ends of moral action, such as Pleasure, Happiness, Well-Being, to Egoism as well as to Altruism; they all have their validity in their sphere, and each may be called a Good. Yet each is relative, finite, and, if willed absolutely as End, becomes self-contradictory, suicidal. Hence rises the demand for the Highest Good (*Summum Bonum*), the Good which overarches and includes all others in a universal moral harmony.

Such is the ultimate Good, or the End of the Will when it seeks to realize Free-Will. The limit to it is seen when the Will of the neighbor is not universal, is not itself Will realized, but is still particular or capricious. A person who wills the Good in the true sense cannot simply will the gratification or the indulgence of the neighbor's Will, which may not even be its well-being, but decidedly its ill-being. Hence the first Ego, as Will, must exercise Intellect also, must have insight and reflection as to what is best for the second Will. It makes itself judge over the content of this second Will, and must at least see that such content is truly well-being and not an injury. Still, when it has done all this, it has not attained the highest End, not the supreme Good which is freedom. When I will the well-being of others,

ell-being is the content, motive, End of my
but when I will truly the Good of others in
preme potence, I must will their Will in its
tion, just as that is my own Good at its
Thus I can make their Will the content of
ill, my freedom I will to be their freedom.
sure, this implies that the neighbor's Will
tained the freedom here indicated, that he
alized the rational Self in his act of willing.
of course, may not be, and often is not,
se.

will the Good of my neighbor and settle
myself what that Good is, it is evident
his Will is determined by mine, he is not

externally, but separated from his own freedom, we might say, from his highest selfhood. This, as already set forth, is specially the field for Benevolence.

The form of paternal government with its fatherly kindness assumes that all men are in this unfree condition, another Will than their own must look after them and prevent them from hurting themselves. Such is specially the view of the Orient, and holds good for many in the Occident. In every society there is a class, children and incompetents, who are unfree and come under the law of being determined through an outside Will.

Accordingly in such a condition neither Will, neither mine nor my neighbor's, can be truly free, neither has a Content of the Will which is adequate to the Will itself, or to its Form. But when I can will the ultimate Good, this Content is just the Form or the free, self-determined activity of the Will; it is Free-Will willing Free-Will. I must not only will my own Free-Will, but that of my neighbor, I must recognize him as a self-determined being, and I must vindicate his freedom, if assailed, as strongly as I do my own, for it is my own in essence. Or, to use the above nomenclature, my Form of Will must take his as its Content, then it has a Content adequate, co-terminous, in full equivalency with itself. Therein we see that the Will has

as end, or is self-end, which it now real-
for this realization can take place only
ving such Content, namely freedom. Such
process of the Good, for it must be seized
process finally — Free-Will perpetually
ing itself on earth.

be sure, such a consummation of the Good
es that the neighbor also has a truly free
and is not determined from the outside by
n, impulse, Egoism, even by Happiness or
olence, all of which furnish a finite or
quate Content to the Will. If the neighbor
ot Free Will, I cannot will it, since it does
kist. For instance, if he insists upon being

the discipline. Punishment is indeed the grand liberator, if rightly accepted and employed; it is an inherent part of the process into freedom, its very object being to call out of servitude the Free-Will, which I in turn must will in its complete movement and fulfillment.

Am I my brother's keeper? is an old question. In one sense I am and always shall be; in case he needs a keeper, and the call comes to me personally, the behest of Benevolence must be obeyed. But it is better that he should keep himself, and that I should support him therein; the ultimate Good as End is to will him to be his own keeper.

In like manner I am to will Free-Will in myself, and not be determined from without by passion, pleasure, or any content inadequate to my own Free-Will. Suppose I am controlled by revenge, the control comes not of my Self, but of what is outside of selfhood. "You have done that mean thing to me, therefore I shall requite you, I shall pay you back in the same coin." That is, I revenging, am controlled by your action and not by my Self; nay, I am controlled by your mean action, and that, too, by an action which I myself know and characterize to be mean. Thus do I give up my own freedom in revenge, my very selfhood, since I am not self-determined, but am determined from without to an act which I condemn as bad.

ce Dante in his Inferno plunges the wrath-
o are also the revengeful) into the Stygian
fetid water and mud, which impedes all
and likewise perfect vision, suggesting
l's mire. On the other hand Kent in
peare's drama of *King Lear* refuses to be
led by revenge, and so maintains his free-
nder the most trying circumstances; his
aster banishes him guiltless, yet he will
op to revenge, not even to indifference,
l return and serve in disguise that master,
y and loyalty demand. Thus Kent is
ined from within, from his own Self, and
deal of a morally free man.

the Moral Will is still subjective, though

independence of the other, so that each is free in a new sense, each individual Will being established and willed by an actualized objective Will. Such is what we shall call the Institutional Will, and it is the sphere beyond the Moral Will, yet is its necessary complement and fulfillment. In the moral sphere it is still I who do the willing — I will the Good, for instance, that my neighbor be truly a free man, determining himself to be the self-determined; but in the institutional sphere there is an actualized Will, an institution, whose function is to will both my Free-Will and that of my neighbor.

What is, then, the situation at present? When I will the supreme content, the Highest Good, the act is still individual, capricious, not truly universal in form and cannot be. But when I will the actualized Will, the Institution, whose function is to secure and make actual in law and authority just this Free-Will of mine and of my neighbor and of the whole community or perchance of the whole commonwealth, I still have the Highest Good, Freedom, as content, but not in the subjective form of individual willing; it is an objective reality not dependent upon my particular action or even my particular existence. So far at least has freedom now become truly free, being released from its subjection to the finitude of the individual Will.

It is well to state this matter in a somewhat

nt way. In the moral sphere I will the
mmediately, in the institutional sphere I
e Good mediately, that is, through the
on of an actualized Will existing in the
My neighbor's freedom in the one case
nmediate End of my volition, in the other
is the mediate end — I will it through
the Institution, which returns, as it were,
ablishes both his and my freedom.
in the moral sphere, I, this individual,
the Good, have realized in my own
lar Ego the Ideal; I have, so to speak,
ed the same personally and subjectively.
must rise to the institutional sphere also,
individual participate in the objective,

universal; my Free Will is to will and to make real the Free Will of every self, as far as possible.

The condition of living together in a social order is that each member positively wills the freedom of the other members and holds himself always ready to act on their behalf with this end in view. The basis of good citizenship is not Benevolence, but the willing Free Will, in relation to other citizens. The free man does not ask your Benevolence, he can help himself if he only has freedom; this is what he requests you to assist him in securing when it is assailed. And I must aid him fully as much for my own sake as for his sake, since I too am a Free Will, whose freedom has to be secured in the same way. Benevolence (as already unfolded) implies more or less of external determination, and hence is at bottom antagonistic to the full development of Free Will in the social order. The free citizen cannot be an alms-taker, and he ought, just as little as possible, to be an alms-giver. Slavery, if it be not a good thing for the slave, is not a good thing for the master.

The Moral Will as the Ideal End will have its movement in realizing this End, which, in its full formulation, has been called the self-determined Free Will, the three terms of which indicate the triple process of freedom. This process is what the individual is seeking to embody and to

in his life throughout the entire sphere of
. The stages of the movement we shall
ate briefly in advance of the main expo-

Good — the unity between the individual
Will and its universal Content which is the
process of freedom before mentioned —
ity being as yet unbroken. I am good when
ee Will wills directly and immediately the
tion of Free Will, or when my Ego's
m acts to bring forth the universal free-
of action, through Instinct, Duty, and
ence.

Evil — the preceding unity is broken and
d by the Ego which turns against Good.

habitually, not once and with effort, the process of freedom. Virtue is thus the final moralization of the individual in character.

Such are the three stages of the moral Ego willing the Ideal End explicitly — Good, Evil, Virtue — constituting the Psychosis of this sphere. We now name the Deed good, implying that it embodies the Ideal End by that term. Or we may name the Deed evil, implying that the Will negates the Ideal End, which is really its own. Finally we call the Deed virtuous when the moral Will has overcome its negative condition and has returned to Good, which, however, is not the immediate paradisaical Good, but that which has been mediated through the process of Evil.

I. Good.

It is not easy to put the term *Good* into prescribed limits, for its meaning ranges over a wide and often indefinite field. Already it has been used and variously applied, in preceding portions of the present work, according to popular usage. At present, however, we shall employ the term to designate the Will before its lapse and passage through the negative state of itself called Evil. There is a primordial conception of good Will, as, when God made the world, it is declared that he saw his work was good.

When my individual Will wills the universal

le of itself, or the process of its freedom, t passing through the stage of alienation, ood immediately; it is positive without to overcome the negative; what it wills good. I have experienced as yet no deep scission between myself and the Ideal End is the content of my Will; I am still inno- f the Bad which in this sphere is not willed. ood man as such has the good purpose in city; he lives and acts in unity with him- not yet rent in twain by Evil, though tionably in the process toward the same, h the very movement of Free Will.

process of Good, or of the good Will, into s what we are now to consider. In the

back to itself and asserts itself as the determinant of Duty, of the Ideal End.

Such are the three stages in the process of Good, in which the Ego as moral Will unites with the Ideal End immediately, that is, without going through the act of negating the Ideal End. This negative act, however, is what comes next.

Is the child by nature good or bad? Is the infant an angel or an animal? Or is it both? Or perchance neither? Such questions have played and are still playing an important part in the educational world. It is Rousseau who has brought up the discussion by maintaining the original goodness of man, who has been corrupted by the social order. The same doctrine had its influence upon Pestalozzi and Froebel and other educators. It is the counterpart to the doctrine of total depravity, which has also had its strong hold upon mankind. We may say here that both sides belong to the total process of the moral order, as we hope to make plain further on.

At present, however, we shall direct our attention to the triple process of Good, as above outlined, it being the immediate stage of the Moral Will willing the Ideal End.

I. Natural Goodness is an activity of the Will in which it determines itself immediately as one with the universal End. Thus we say that man is good by nature; he remains in harmony with the true or higher self naturally, quite instinct-

he does not consciously will the self-
nined Free Will, still this is the native
t of his volition. His Ego, in doing the
l act, does not follow some particular bent
of its own, but obeys the injunction of the
nplicitly.

s condition of the Ego has been presented
Hebrew Mythus of Eden. Man was pri-
ally placed in Paradise, where he dwelt
his fall, before his act of disobedience,
was the grand separation of the individual
he universal Ego, and the self-assertion of
rmer against the latter. Hereby evil arose,
usly not known. The child has to start
again in this Paradise, but, true to his

Prometheus story coupled with that of Pandora, the Greek Eve; it has also portrayed a time of Natural Goodness in the Golden Age and in the Saturnian Kingdom. The imagination in our modern epoch is still at work on the same line; we have books describing paradisaical societies, Utopia, Oceana, Icaria, in which man is brought back to his primitive condition of Natural Goodness, the period of his innocence, which he cannot know while he is in it, being quite unconscious of Good or Evil, till he makes the separation above noted.

Notwithstanding, the Ego is at work, must be at work, for its essence is to be always engaged in its own process. The Ego as Will, therefore, even in the paradisaical state of Natural Goodness, has its movement; otherwise it would not be Ego. There is not yet the complete separation or the lapse to Evil, still there is and must be the second or separative stage, such as is found in every Psychosis.

1. We conceive of an immediate Good of Nature which may be called enjoyment or pleasure. This as an object of the moral Will has been already discussed under Hedonism, which seeks to make it the universal End in a theory of Morals. In the present case, however, we start with it as that harmony of the physical man which indicates the unobstructed activity of the human organism. There is an external stimula-

there are appetite and desire; there is also ufficient response to such stimulation, there due gratification of desire and appetite. such a gratification, which keeps the organ- n harmony with itself, is a Good, as far as s, a Good of Nature. It is primarily the est state of enjoyment, it is Eden with its furnishing the means for satisfying the first ; it is the most immediate form of happi- the organic in equilibrium between need s satisfaction, without excess on either side. is indeed the primal natural Good, we may t health, still a grand condition of man's ness and achievement in the most highly or- ed society. We must look after it, else it will

when the latter does not act in conformity with its own true being. What causes this violation? Sometimes the Will, sometimes not; the organism may be born disordered, and it is always exposed to external accident, to the Fate of Nature, for which it is not directly responsible.

The general function of Pain is manifest, it is the organic totality seeking to right itself, to negate its negative; destructive it is, yet destroying therein the deeper destruction; it is the vital process fighting against obstruction and death. The sentient organism suffers that it perish not; the Ego suffers also, because it has sinned and must recover from sin.

There are many forms of suffering as it moves from without to within. Bodily suffering, mental suffering; we suffer through ourselves, we suffer through others. Thus, our immediate Good, which is, in general, our pleasure, runs upon an inhibition, which is some form of suffering. The Good of Nature is met by the Fate of Nature, its negative counterpart in this stage.

3. The Ego as moral Will must now assert its limit-transcending power, and triumph over suffering. This is the mastery of the Fate of Nature, in which the soul of Natural Goodness reveals its highest potency. Can you digest Fate swooping down upon you from the outside, without any known fault of yours? Can you work over and transfigure misfortune, making it

cipline unto perfection? We must still, ering and through suffering, will the Ideal nd thus rise above suffering.

destiny is that we be Fate-compellers; we t to be determined morally by what is al, but we must be self-determined, and he Self-determined. This is not mere nce, not mere Stoicism. It is true that st bear; then we must forbear and forgive, senting nor revenging; but the final act is onstruct that which wrongs us and makes er, causing the same to do right and to be Thus we reach over the fateful bound e-make, after the Ideal End, which is m, that which assails it and us. Such is

travel through the same experience of his race, and transcend the limit of Barbarism in his own heart.

Through suffering which has its cause in the Fate of Nature, and through the mastery thereof within, the individual has become aware of himself as master or ruler in his own inner world; he gives the command to himself who is to obey even against the presence of external Fate, which is not to determine him but is to be subordinated. That is, Fate has become internal, is itself an act of the Ego controlling, determining, commanding the Ego. Thus arises the phenomenon which is called Duty, an inner Fate, which, however, is really no Fate; an authority which seems to be distinct from myself, yet is myself as imperial, ruling all determinations inner and outer. This is the next stage of Good, the second, which is now to be considered.

II. Duty makes the dualism explicit which in Natural Goodness was implicit. It rests upon the twofoldness of the Ego, which, in mastering external Fate, has become conscious of itself as master or law over itself. I, this particular Ego, have been made aware of a universal principle within me, to which I must subordinate my own particularity. I am commanded by myself to subject pleasure, desire, even benevolence to a higher end.

This is also expressed in the phrase *I ought*.

an imperative, an inner voice which bids thus and thus. It is not an external law, not in this form, yet it is authoritative; it may come into conflict with external Evidently the command is what is first n Ought. From whom and to whom goes his command? From myself to myself. my Self is dualized in the Ought; two appear, the one commanding, the other nded; the one is Will as lord, the other as servant, carrying out the behest of the Moral sovereignty and moral obedience re twain, yet united in one Ego: the nd of the moral sovereign is executed by

emphatic thing in the famous lines of Emerson: —

> So nigh is grandeur to our dust,
> So near to God is man,
> When Duty whispers low, *Thou must*,
> The youth replies, *I can*.

Duty is here apparently an outside commander whom the youth obeys. Still such a separation is only in appearance; the two sides are in reality one Ego and its process. For every time you say *ought*, or speak of Duty, you have more or less implicitly the process of the Self-determined Free Will. First is the Ego as potential, it is able to do the act; the youth says *I can* primarily. Second is the law commanding the Ego, here its own law, objective yet internal. Third is the fact that this law is to realize Free Will; you are not free unless you obey the law and do your Duty.

So the process is as follows: The Ego as youth must first say *I can*, which is to declare that he is potential Free Will, has the ability to do; then comes the command of Duty *Thou shalt;* finally is the reply of assent and unity, *I will*. The whole is the Ego's process of Free-Will.

Still the Imperative puts the stress on Duty. But Duty as such is a form without content. When I am told to do my Duty, I am supposed to know what are my Duties. If not, I call for information; I ask, What are my Duties?

I seek for specialized forms of the gen-
; I have to demand the particular. This,
r, brings us to the second stage of the
tive, which we may now look at.

he one grand Imperative, accordingly,
up into many, Duty differentiates into
, each of which is a command. These have
nown in the moral history of mankind as
ndments, of which the most important
fluential summary was the Jewish, desig-
s the decalogue. Their form in the Old
ent is external, they are the mandates of
ion's lawgiver, and their fountain head is
h. Still they must also be regarded as
ing the consciousness and moral aspira-

being truthful and true, which is verily the truth of his being; the lie makes action abortive, it nullifies Free Will.

But now follows the limitation of the special Commandment, which brings forth the conflict of Duties. The State, for example, puts me into the rank of its defenders, and bids me slay its enemy; which Commandment shall I obey? My life is suddenly assailed; there is a new behest which enjoins me to destroy life, if there be no alternative. Again: I am bidden to take the loaf of bread belonging to another in order to save a person dying of hunger. There rises, in regard to the last Commandment above given, the old-new question: Is a lie ever justifiable? Did Penelope do her Duty in deceiving the wicked suitors and thereby preserving home and country for her absent husband? It would seem that every particular Commandment runs upon its limit through being particular and the Duty is not obedience but violation.

In such fashion these moral Commandments fall into opposition with one another, and we behold the disturbed realm which is often named the Conflict of Duties. My Duty to my country commands me as a soldier to employ a ruse against its enemy, which command is in violation of the injunction against lying. The great poets are fond of portraying these ethical collisions; in fact, the latter usually are the axis of the poetic action.

Odyssey is full of them; the *Antigone* of
cles is eternal through the intense yet clear-
llision which it unfolds between Duty to
y and Duty to State. The final ground of
speare's genius is reached only when we
e conflicts of the Ethical World as the deep-
undation of his dramatic procedure.

al Science in its development has acknowl-
the existence of this Conflict of Duties, by
to formulate a new set of Duties for the
on of Duties, a kind of a new decalogue
reaking the decalogue. Thus the Com-
nent turns against the Commandment, and
ontradiction begins to throw the whole
world into confusion. That department

in some way be generalized; the particular has undone itself and is calling for the universal, which is its essence and its complete process. Already we may have noticed that the Commandment against murder means that I must not destroy Free Will in my act; also the exception to this Commandment has essentially the same meaning: I must not destroy Free Will myself, and I must not allow it to be destroyed.

3. Herewith we have returned to the Imperative, which, however, is not exactly the old one: Be a Free Will thyself and regard thy neighbor as a Free Will. All the Commandments and all the exceptions to the Commandments have the one great end: the realization of freedom. The Free Will thus has itself as its own object and content. My supreme Duty is that I determine myself to be self-determined through the Self-determined. My act (or Free Will) is to will the Free Will of my neighbor through the Imperative, whose End is Free Will. Duty bids me to will myself a free man through willing the freedom of another Ego. There is no complete liberty for me while my brother is a slave.

Such is the process of the Imperative of Duty which in this last stage commands the Ego to realize itself as Free Will. But this Commandment is still in form external to the Ego, which begins to question the authority giving the mandate. Who prescribes to me my Duty? What

right to lay upon my Ego its Imperative?
the challenge now heard, and the Ego
for the source of the authority of Duty,
at last to be in itself.

This third stage of Good, in which the
urns to itself out of the external Impera-
d asserts itself as the law, is called Con-
. When the Ego knows itself as the de-
er of Duty it is Conscience. I now settle
myself what I ought to do; the Command-
as to pass my scrutiny and be accepted
given case. Moreover I know myself
which determines the act and hence am
ible.

cience is, accordingly, consciousness, but

itself what right and duty are, and to recognize nothing as Good except what it sees to be so." (*Phil. des Rechts* s. 176). On account of this absoluteness of Conscience, it has been often claimed as the direct communication of the Will of God, which the individual must obey or be punished by Conscience for violation of the divine injunction. Says the Quaker moralist, Jonathan Dymond: "In most men, perhaps in all, this sense of obligation refers, with greater or less distinctness, to the will of a superior being. The impression, however obscure, is fundamentally this: I must do so or so, because God requires it" (*Essays*, p. 56, Harper's Ed.). The authority of Conscience is ultimate, because it is God's authority. Intuitionists specially have dwelt much upon the immediate dictates of Conscience, and usually such absolute dictates are referred to the absolute ruler of the Universe, who alone would have the right and the power to exert such an unlimited sway, especially in a constitutional monarchy like England, or in a republic, like America. "Conscience is felt to act as a delegate of an invisible Ruler" (Blair's *Sermons*). Heathen moralists had the same idea: "He who is well-disposed will do everything *dictated by the God*," who "has given to every man a particle of Himself for guidance" (Marcus Aurelius). Similarly Epictetus and the Stoics, as well as touches in Plato and Aristotle;

the demon of Socrates has been identified
Conscience. Hegel, however, declares, that
cience belongs to "the standpoint of the
rn world, which was first to reach this con-
sness, this going down and disappearance
tself (*Untergang in sich*)."

is manifest that Conscience, being Ego and
ctive, must have the process of the Ego in
ll intensity, and manifest therein the differ-
tages of the Psychosis.

Conscience in its immediate form has no
h with the Commandment, which it knows
wills as its own. It knows what Duty is,
s it as binding, and proceeds to do it. I
man in difficulty, I hear the command

other judge in the interpretation of the same law, and may differ from himself at different times and under different circumstances. Thus the Ego will inject all its particularity and difference into Conscience, which is, indeed, just the Ego asserting itself in its absoluteness, in its complete process.

2. Conscience will, therefore, manifest the separative stage of the Ego in all its variety, being just the realm of individual self-assertion. Millions and millions of infallible Egos, each within its own little world (microcosm) determining what is Right and Duty — certainly there will be conflict enough. The history of religions (perhaps not of Religion) is largely made up of these conflicts of Conscience. The Patriot and the Quaker may both accept the Commandment, *Thou shalt not kill*. But is yonder enemy of the State to be slain? The Conscience of one says says Yes, the Conscience of the other says No, and thus a new struggle opens. In fact, the Conscience of the one may bid him suppress or inhibit in some way the Conscience of the other, possibly by law, whereby it begins to get self-destructive, seeking to root out its own Self. So the Quaker and many others had to suffer for Conscience' sake just through Conscience.

But the dualism of Conscience, or the separation between its form and content, becomes most striking in Conscientiousness, which is Conscience

d out rigidly into action and conduct. The
ientious man is absolute in his self-assertion,
ay be in the wrong, and even persistently
g-headed. What is to be done with him in
ganization or a society? There is no doubt
his perfect honesty, and yet that honesty
strongly against the order about him.
espeare has portrayed such a character in
s, who, on account of his conscientiousness,
the noblest Roman of them all," lofty in
e yet foolish in act. Paul, the persecutor,
s conscientious, according to his own state-
, as Paul the apostle; still there was a
y difference in the respective deeds; the

We must look into the content of Conscience, and not merely regard the form, which is by itself merely the self-assertion of the Ego.

The man who with so much fervor appeals to his Conscience gives no proof of having done the right thing, though many make such an appeal with the belief that it is a complete vindication of their conduct. Not altogether so; we must likewise ask, what was the man so conscientious about? Some universal, or some particular end? Conscientiousness may become selfish; it is, in fact, exposed specially to a danger of that kind, since it is so strongly self-assertive.

So, the question becomes loud, With what shall we fill this activity of Conscience, which, taken by itself, is quite empty? Only through some adequate content can we save Conscience from itself.

3. Conscience must, therefore, return out of its mere subjectivity to objective law and institutions for its content. The institutional world is to put a filling into the empty form of Conscience; what that institutional world is in its completeness is unfolded in the third part of the present work on the Will. Here, however, we may say that it is Will actualized, existent, objective, whose function is to secure Will, and, hence, among other things, to secure Conscience to its individual possessor in its rightful sphere. The State is not to suppress Conscience but rather to

ıard it; on the other hand, Conscience is
suppress State and Constitution, as it has
imes sought to do.

l even here the process begins to manifest
The institutional world may become per-
l, disordered, inadequate; it may no longer
its end, which is to actualize Will, one of
shapes is just this Conscience. What then
e done? Undoubtedly in such a crisis there
otten the deepest conflict of the soul as well
history. The supreme man of Time is
n up to the surface of events, he is the one
ees the new order needed and coming, sees
jectively, and in him it takes the form

Ego's process, of re-incarnating the new spirit, which is also a higher freedom. The Ego as moral Conscience must be forever seeking to transform institutions into a more complete expression of Free Will; it now sees its supreme end to be the actualizing of the Self-determined Free Will. It still knows itself as the determiner of the Imperative of Duty; but this Imperative is to will freedom. That is, the Ego as moral Conscience is aware of itself as Free Will (subject) willing Free Will (objective in law and institutions) which is to return and secure Free Will. Such is the culminating process of the present sphere.

But the Ego in its freedom can also inhibit such a content, and can also be aware of such inhibition. The Ego as Free Will is free to negate just this content of Free Will; as absolute self-assertion, the Ego can deny its own principle; if it is free, is must be free to turn against its own freedom. Thus, however, we have passed out of the realm of Good into that of Evil, which has likewise its source in Free Will, nay it has the same root as Conscience in the absoluteness of the Ego, just as Cain and Abel sprang brothers from the same womb.

All Good comes of the Free Will of the individual willing the universal principle of itself, which is the process of its freedom. We have just seen that Conscience may develop a negative

ent within itself and become hostile to its tive content, which is, in general, the insti- nal world. Still therein it does not need to into Evil, since it may continue to will Will, and yet oppose the existing Law in ttempt to realize a better Law.

nifestly, there can be two opposite kinds of violation. Christ and the two thieves on ross furnish the eternal example of the two of violators of Law, for all of them had ted Law. The one, however, had willed the through his Free Will, the others had l the Bad through their Free Will. The ought to preserve and to improve the old by the new Law; the others sought to

Will it may will the opposite of Free Will. Thus it becomes truly the destroyer, yea the self-destroyer, destroying Self in the very germ of its being. Through this gate, truly that of Inferno, the Ego enters the realm of Evil.

II. Evil.

It is often declared that Evil is the great mystery of the Universe. In a sense we can see how this is so; Evil is connected with the original act of Will, which is the primordial diremption of the Ego, and has no ground but itself, its own self-energy. Hence, it may be deemed unfathomable, since this term implies or calls for an external ground, which absolute origination must exclude by its own nature.

Evil, unquestionably, is to be referred back to the Ego as Will, which is the primal breach, the first separation in consciousness. The necessity of the act is primordially the necessity of Evil. It is true that Good springs from the same root, even that developed form of Good which we have unfolded as Conscience, wherein the Ego is thrown back upon itself as the determiner of conduct. The Will, being such determiner, may choose not to follow the command of Duty, but to obey its own caprice or appetite, which moves it against the Law; thus, it wills not Good, but Evil; or, the particular Self, determined from without in the form of impulse, desire, appetite,

rice, subordinates the universal Self deter-
ed from within in the form of Duty, Law,
ht.

ood and Evil, therefore, have their common
rce in the Will, which must act in order to
itself, and whose separation must take place.
is good only in so far as he can be bad; he
oth the positive and the negative and their
cess; he cannot be one without being the
er, as well as the movement of both in him-
. God is good, yet has in Himself the pro-
with his opposite; the Divine Will must
yet contains in itself the negative poten-
ty of all Will.

iantly in the ancient Greco-Persian war, which may well be called the opening of History. For History is the conscious record of the great deeds of men, of the mightiest manifestations of Will, but Will means Evil to the Oriental mind. Hence the Orient has no History in any high sense of the term, having really no Ego for it, or deeming such an Ego sinful. To the Occident, therefore, belongs History, while, on the other hand, to the Orient belongs Religion, whose great function is "the broken and contrite heart," the subjection of the Will and the expiation of the Deed. The Occident with its Will has had, accordingly, to receive its religious discipline and, in fact, its Religion from the Orient. This damnation of the Will as the source of all suffering, wrong, evil, has brought certain Occidental writers, otherwise not religiously inclined, into a peculiar sympathy with the Oriental, especially the Hindoo mind, whereof a notable instance is seen in Schopenhauer and his philosophy.

At present, however, we are looking at that which may be called Moral Evil, which springs from the Ego as Will breaking with Good. That is, man, being free, is able to will the opposite of his own freedom, to will the negation of the Self-determined Free Will, which is his Ideal End. The bad man realizes his Self, but by destroying selfhood; such is the Self-destroying contradiction in his conduct.

il will show itself in the process as this self-
ion, which will have, as usual, three main
s manifesting the Psychosis.

The principle of Evil, which reveals itself in
may be called the universal sin; the Ego
ts freedom to destroy freedom; the Free
turns against its own essence, the Ideal End,
herein seeks to realize the negation of the
etermined Free Will. The sphere of the
ral thus has its place in the science of
lity.

The system of Evil, in which the preceding
iple or universal element of Evil differen-
itself, showing the varied forms of negative

how kept outside of the ethical movement, yet it has to be taken into account, and so is permitted to slip in unheeded, till the reader is of a sudden surprised by its presence. The poets are in this respect far completer in their treatment of the subject than the professional moralists, and hence are far more instructive. To mention the four of first rank — Homer, Dante, Shakespeare, Goethe — they all include Evil or the negative element in the grand development of their themes. Indeed their chief problem is to show a human soul overcoming and transcending its own negative condition, which is an inherent part of the poetic movement, inner and outer. Accordingly illustrations taken from the poets are in general more telling and more profound than any other kind.

The three above-mentioned stages in the total sweep of Evil, we shall now unfold in more detail, and thus indicate its significant place in any complete view of Moral Science.

I. The first stage of Evil is the Ego as Will willing in some form the negative of Free Will. It is the stage of separation in which the Ego as particular self separates from and antagonizes its universal self. The free man employs his freedom to will the opposite of freedom; he refuses to realize in his conduct the Ideal End. We shall look at his separative act in three phases.

1. Man is bad by nature, it is said, and this

counterpart to the statement that man is
y nature. He breaks with natural good-
that immediate unity with rightness he
s, he turns away from innocence and dis-
Thus he is driven out of his paradisaical
through a primordial disobedience, really
h his nascent act of Will which begins to
its freedom even in Paradise. The poten-
go, which is innocently good, passes into
ed and gets bad.

eover this primal natural Will is determined
without by the stimulation of nature, and
lows appetite and passion; it yields to
inism instead of asserting its freedom.
tural man is innocent as a potential man;

his prescriptive realm, and through Free Will becomes disobedient.

The commandment, being external, provokes the act of volition which is bad; still, such an act is the assertion of Free Will in the individual. Yet the commandment has just the object of realizing Free Will, though its form be unfree, imposed from without. So the Free Will gets wicked, undermining, defying, violating just that which is seeking to preserve and safeguard Free Will universally. It is Free Will negating the realization of Free Will in itself and in another, in the individual and in society.

3. The acme of this negative condition is reached when the Ego as Free Will denies the moral order of the world and seeks its overthrow. Therein is the separation complete and the negative spirit has become universal. The religious as well as the poetic imagination has always sought to embody such a spirit in a character and to hold it up before the eyes of mankind. The mythical soul of the race has given to it many forms, most imposing of which is that of the Semitic Satan. Back of the fall of man is projected the fall of the angels, whose chief stood next to God himself. Still in this highest realm the separation had to take place, and it carried with itself the separation of man from the Highest. In like manner Mephistopheles in Goethe's *Faust* is the universal negative: "I am

spirit that denies," while as Will he is
ays willing the Bad," seeking to destroy
norally ordered Universe in thought and

this last case we have reached that complete
ngement of the soul which in religious
age is called sin, Dante's "dark wood
e the straight way was lost." The ethical
ssion of it, however, must be found in the
Will which wills to destroy the Self-deter-
l Free Will in every form of its realization.
is the final principle of Evil in its fullness,
the absolute process of negation and
uction.
us we have seen the three phases of the

Dante unfolds in the lower circles of his Inferno, and which culminates in his arch-fiend, Satan, eternally fixed at the center. Milton's conception of the Destroyer shows the same trait when the latter says: "Evil, be thou my Good."

But the one great sin, this deepest separation of the spirit within itself against itself, is generative of many sins, calling forth many kinds of separation in the particular acts of Will. Herein we move forward to a new stage.

II. The universal sin specializes itself into manifold forms of itself, which are ordered after the process of the Ego and thus reveal what may be called the System of Sins. Such a System is not made externally by putting together classes, but is truly produced by the inner movement of the Ego, who is the final orderer of every division of the spiritual cosmos. All these Sins have the same general character: the Free Will has become destructive of its own self-realization in the individual, in institutions, and in the World-Order; it is consumed with a burning hate of itself, and suffers an eternal malady of dying without death.

Many have been the attempts to bring something like order into the vast chaotic multiplicity of man's sinful nature. For even in sinning the Ego is the sinner and makes the Psychosis of sin. The Free Will is always some kind of an architect, though it be "the architect of ruin;"

s an order into the destruction of order; Pantheon, divinely constructed, stands on posite shore of the Universe the Pande- n, diabolically constructed. The archi- spirit of Satan is one of the first matters ed in *Paradise Lost*, which is itself a vonderful temple of negation with the ver as its central constructive idea. Note e with his devilish cohorts rises from the g lake and starts to building their infernal But the greatest of all these architects is unquestionably Dante with his Inferno, s mathematically put together according to ements taken from the Earth's diameter. ante has also his ethical Inferno built in

ions of the Will, we need not tell the attentive reader. At present we may name the stages as the Sins of Indeterminism, of Determinism, and of Self-determinism, in the order of the Psychosis.

1. The sin of Indeterminism is, in general, when the Will does not act, though it ought. There is the command but no response, nay a refusal to respond. The Will persists in remaining potential, inactive, not asserting its own nature, out of fear or selfishness. The great crisis is on hand, the great principle is at stake, but the undetermined Will wills not to determine itself.

A class of indeterminates, the neutrals, is put by Dante into his Inferno, just inside, in the Vestibule of the subterranean temple of Evil. They were "those who lived without praise or blame," quite will-less, undetermined; in the grand conflict "they were neither rebels nor faithful to God, but were for themselves." A high dignitary is here, probably a Pope, "who made the great refusal," refusing evidently to do the important deed laid upon him by his time.

More decisive is the condemnation which Shakespeare in his dramatic way places on those who "make the great refusal." Hamlet is such an indeterminate; a duty he deems is laid upon him, the avenging his father's murder; but he delays, shirks, excuses himself from its perform-

till he pays the penalty of the sin of Inde-
nism by his death. In like manner, Banquo
kes the great refusal;" he is called, and
s he is called, to right a great wrong in the
; but he does not act, he remains undeter-
d; the result is that guilt sweeps him into
t and he perishes by a tragic fate. The sin
nission may be as deep as that of commis-
the not-doing may assail the Free Will as
gly as the doing, or the Will not to do can
destructive and as self-destructive as the
to do.

e have already noted that the Orientals have
dency to get rid of the sins of the deed by
g rid of the Will itself, which is primarily

2. Second in the present sphere is the sin of Determinism, in which the Free Will allows itself to be determined by something outside itself against itself. Thus the self-controller, the Free Will, is controlled to the destruction of self-control. Whatever be the determinant — Impulse, Desire, Motive — we are not to be determined by it, when the supreme End calls us to assert that which constitutes its essence.

Not all Determinism is sinful, but all is which runs counter to the realizing of Free Will. Even the high motive may become unworthy when it sets aside a higher or the highest. The young man is going to College to get an education, having a lofty purpose to develop his manhood in a certain direction; but the call resounds through the land for defenders of freedom, which has been assailed. He must quit his studies, he must march forth to battle. What has produced this wonderful change? His Free Will is attacked in its very soul and protecting power, namely, in the State; not till that is secured can he study in security; so he drops everything else, he eschews every content of his Will, and through his deed wills Free Will. Thus the studious youth of 1861 responded to a call ever memorable.

During peace also there is the loud demand upon the citizen to vindicate Free Will. A modern brigand may descend upon him and

nd pay of him for the privilege of attending
s business. The cheapest way might be and
lly is, to buy off the brigand; but the good
n, at great outlay of time, expense and
ble, resolves to catch the offender and punish
thereby vindicating Free Will. Thus the
citizen is determined to an action which
res him to be a free being willing his
om.

e sins of Determinism are multifarious, run-
through the stages of that sphere which we
l Determined Will. (See under Psycho
al Will.) Appetite may become a sin, though
a certain point one has the right to gratify

Nor can we here omit to mention what may be called the intellectual sin of Determinism. In sensuous indulgence the Will yields to the external determinant in the form of passion or appetite; it allows itself to be determined by its lower nature and thus is guilty of moral violation. But this very indulgence may become a doctrine, a principle of life; a man may say: "There is no truth in the world except what these senses give; therefore enjoy, enjoy." The tendency of such a doctrine can only be toward the perversion of our moral nature. It is the intellectual sin of Determinism, which debauches the spirit and then the body. Thus all systems of philosophical sensism, from Epicurus down to Spencer, not only fail to account theoretically for morality, but tend practically to lower the standard of moral life among men.

3. The sin of Self-determinism is the supreme form of Sin in the present stage. I deliberately assail the Free Will of my neighbor in some way; I take his property, injure his body, even destroy his life with intention. That is, I "make up my mind to do so," I determine myself to an act which is destructive of his self-determination. Such an act is usually said to be done with "malice aforethought;" the Free Will wills to destroy Free Will positively, maliciously.

In the previous stage the sin of Determinism

more through the passivity of the Free which permitted itself to be determined he outside; in the present stage, however, is the third, the Ego as Will returns to and resolves out of its own free power to y Free Will. Hence the sin of Malice is deeply tainted than any sin of mere De- ism, being the internal active work of o. The point is now reached at which the termined determines itself to annihilate lf-determined, and may rise up not only t the individual but also against Law and tion, indeed against the whole sphere of zed Free-Will.

deeply negative condition of mind as

Order. Aristotle did not have, could not have, any Hell; though he condemned, he could not damn the immoral, in that Greek world of his; he showed that Incontinence and Malice were hurtful to the person guilty of them, and to society also, that is, they were personal and social vices, not sins which violate "the Will of Heaven." In Christendom the Free Will of the sinner can commit a far deeper violation than in the Greek world; so he, the sinner, must create a Hell, in due response and counterpart to his own Free-Will. Such is the tremendous conception of Dante's Inferno, which is not to be abolished, but is to grow deeper with the deepening of man's freedom.

In fact, Dante's whole poem, the *Divine Comedy*, has, in its six centuries of existence, asserted itself most emphatically as the greatest ethical product of Christendom. It is deserving of study not merely for its wondrous literary beauty, but for that deeper excellence, the moral, which makes it, when truly taken up into the soul of the reader, a sacred catharsis, a holy pilgrimage of purification through the realm of the spirit. In a far profounder sense than any abstract treatise on Morals is it an ethical book, recording the soul's journey through all the stages of its fall, rise, and restoration, till it reach the presence of God Himself, which is the final goal of its freedom.

ordingly, the next stage which we have to
ler is this purgatorial process, the purifi-
ordeal, through which the Ego has to pass
ler to free itself of its deeply negative,
ral condition and to become reconciled with
sitive, moral order of the world.

The third stage in the movement of Evil
return, which means that it comes back to
and serves itself up to itself. Thus, Evil
overcome, undone, indeed self-undone;
is verily its ultimate outcome: it undoes
it is evil to itself. The Ego, being this
process within its own activity, has thereby
wer of getting rid of its own evil nature.

it is Free Will negating Free Will, and therein logically negating itself. So we have this third phase in the process of Evil, which is essentially the inhibition of the inhibition, or the removal of the inhibitory element of Evil.

It is manifest that the Ego, which as Will had become negative, inhibitory, destructive, is now to be treated to its own character, and therein is to find out what it really is, in its inherent nature. If I use my freedom to assail or destroy the freedom of others, I am to be served with my own deed, and thus I begin to discover what I am. I may refuse to accept the penalty, but then such refusal becomes a new violation, for just through my suffering I come to know what I have done.

This inhibition of the inhibition is the movement of the Will toward self-mastery, which fact we have often observed already in the development of the Psychological Will. Such is the chief meaning of Evil in the spiritual cosmos; it is a training out of limitation, inadequate conduct, sin; the Ego must always be transcending its bounds of weakness and wickedness and rising toward the perfect, which is freedom.

We shall notice this inhibitory movement, which is the undoing of Evil, in its three phases.

1. The evil deed as such or in its externality is inhibited or negated. Through his Will man puts his act into an external world, this act is

he is to get back. This is the underlying
of Justice. As you do, so you receive; if
deed be negative, it is brought back to you
vely. Such is the Law, in fact the arche-
Law of the World's Order.

ere is a special institution whose function
return to the doer his negative deed, when
been made external and a reality. But
d the State there is existent in the world a
ncy which makes for the punishment of the
d deed, though unwitnessed, or done by the
me authority. It is often remarked that
higher powers" interfere and bring home
guilty person the consequences of his act,

in its own native character, and made itself felt in its full negative intensity. Punishment bears in itself the seed of all progress, it is the gift of God, not of the Devil, unless you choose to change its true purpose and make it diabolic. Divine Justice is the foundation of the Divine Government of mankind.

The poets never tire of showing forth this Divine Justice, how it realizes itself in spite of apparently insuparable obstacles. Institutions may fail, still Justice must bring back to the doer his wicked deed. Shakespeare in many a play reveals what he calls "God's Justice," how it smites the guilty king who, by being head of the State, deems himself to be above all responsiblity, and out of the reach of all punishment. In the drama of Hamlet, Claudio, king of Denmark, though no one has witnessed the murder done by him, and though he be monarch and the source of Justice, is nevertheless overtaken by Justice. In like manner, Macbeth, though successful at the start, gets his own at the end.

We have already alluded to Dante's Inferno as giving a very striking account of Evil organizing itself in a System of Sins. The Will which is negative to Free Will, "which Heaven wills not," is thus seen in a very complete order. But the great object of Dante's Inferno is to set forth "God's Justice" which is the return of

ed in punishment. It is the negative act
Will which creates Hell and all its varied
ies corresponding to the character of the

now the Ego is to take up this external
ment of the deed and is to make it internal,
of its own process. The result is a scission
soul, which is often called remorse, or the
punishment of itself. Here the Ego is
stly twofold, divided within itself; it
back upon itself and figuratively bites
(remorse) for having done the deed. Thus
nalty becomes internal, self-inflicted, and
go performs before its own tribunal the
ete process of Justice. Thereby that

or on the road to freedom; he takes within himself the punishment which Justice hands him for his faulty conduct, accepts the same as his moral discipline unto freedom, and therein rises above the weakness and sin which have caused the lapse and its punishment. In the process of moral purification Repentance cannot be left out, and in any system, code, or science of Morals, Repentance occupies a most important place. It is certainly a profoundly moral act, though the Church has especially laid stress upon Repentance, establishing its rite and insisting upon its necessity.

Still every moral being, church member or not, must repent after having been involved in Evil. He must go through the inner process of undoing the spirit which led him to his negative act, he must get rid of his perverted Will, or he must negate his own negation.

That is, the Ego as Free Will in Repentance must not only inhibit the outward act, but must inhibit the motive, the content or the spiritual condition which led to the act, and which lies back of the same. The Ego must say to itself not merely, "I shall not do so again," but also, "I shall not wish or be tempted to do so again." If you are punished for a sinful deed, you must repent of the sin of which the deed is only an external manifestation. If you are punished for lying, you ought to be determined by your

hment to get rid of the disposition to lie, ust that is the significance of punishment in oral order. In like manner not simply the l deed is to be repented of, but the lustful ht is to be extirpated from the heart, ere ntance has reached its true fruition.

e function of Justice with its penalty is, fore, to bring forth Repentance in the hed soul. Then in the Moral Order appears y or Forgiveness, which accepts the repent- ne, and the whole process may be called of Divine Love, which has established e, Repentance, Forgiveness, as the disci- of man unto perfection.

ery sort of penalty can have this discipline.

estly and fully the meaning of your penitential ordeal, you will at once start with a new resolution and a new life, rising above the old limits and the old transgression. But if you take your penalty as undeserved and unjust, if you refuse to see your own shortcoming in the light shed by affliction, you may come to curse your punishment, and blame the Moral Order in which it takes place and of which it is a part. That is the infernal disposition, is what puts men into the Inferno and subjects them to hellish torments; it is the awful condition of those whom punishment for their sins only makes more diabolic.

Opposite to this infernal is the purgatorial disposition, which draws out of all the trials of life the purification of the Will from its negative condition. Thus it wills purely freedom. For when you can give up that open or disguised passion which has made you unfaithful for years to your ideal, you have attained a new freedom, you are not determined from something outside the Free Will, but your end is the highest Good — the self-determined Free Will.

But this self-opposition and self-punishment in which the Ego finds itself in Repentance must finally vanish having performed their function. In such an inner conflict and separation the Ego is in its second stage, out of which it must pass into the third stage, that of return and reconciliation. Repentance is not to go on forever, else

ind lapses into brooding and unnecessary
rituration, and the soul, in getting free of
wound, inflicts upon itself another and
ly a deeper. There must be the judgment
he punishment, there must also be the pain
he contrition, yet there must finally be the
ation, as the object of Repentance is to
he person by destroying the sin.

We are now to have the return out of the
m involved in Repentance. This is the
e when the inner disposition to Evil is
ted of, is undone, and the rent soul is
ht back to harmony with itself and with
oral Order.

e Ego, therefore, inhibits Repentance or

repent in this world. Like every other kind of inhibition or prohibition, it must come back to itself; the prohibition too must at last be prohibited, else temperance itself may become intemperate.

Thus we have reached not only the inhibition of Evil through Repentance, but the inhibition of this inhibitory process, whereby the mind attains a new freedom. It is the mastery of Evil; the Ego has now the ability or inner capacity to meet temptation, sin, indeed all the negative elements of life, which it knows itself able to negate. Undoubtedly the man can drop back out of Repentance into transgression again, but the true and complete movement of his Ego is to advance to the mastery above mentioned, in which he can negate not only Evil, but negate this negation, and thus be getting free of the negative.

Such is the moral reserve of energy, the stored-up power which the soul is to acquire and lay away within itself by passing through the total process just described. A mastery of the Ego over all its negative elements we have named it, the ability to inhibit the ill disposition when it threatens to rise and to assert its supremacy. "I crown and mitre thee as master," having gone through the foregoing purgatorial process, the purification of the negative in the form of appetite, envy, pride, passion, and

ly the purification from this negation itself. as it has been repeatedly stated, we must the inhibition of Evil, and then the inhibi- of this inhibition, as the Ego cannot remain l forever in its own inhibitory act, since that ld be unfreedom.

ill we are to see that even this last mastery negative mastery, it is simply a negative er over all forms of the negative, even its ; in inhibiting the inhibition the Ego is inhibitory. The latter may cancel every of vice, and then cancel even its own ellation, but all that does not make it tively virtuous. So we are to pass out of negative mastery into the positive mastery,

in the *Iliad*, through a double Wrath to a double Reconciliation; and the *Odyssey* has a movement of the same sort in the soul of its hero Ulysses. Such is the earliest European poetry, and the latest, in the case of *Faust*, its greatest example, takes explicitly the negative soul, "the spirit that denies," as its leading character. But the best poet of the purificatory process as shown in Repentance is Dante in his *Purgatorio*. He is himself the soul of his own song and its hero, who passes through the various grades of the Purgatorial Mountain (the second general stage of the process) till he reaches the Terrestrial Paradise (third general stage called in the above exposition the negative mastery), where he is washed in the fountains of Lethe and Eunoe, and is made ready for the ascent to Heaven (the abode of Virtue or Blessedness). Herewith, however, we have come to the final stage in the present exposition of the Moral Will unfolding towards its Ideal End.

(The author may be permitted, in this connection, to refer to his Commentary on Dante's *Inferno* and *Purgatorio* for a much fuller treatment of the preceding subjects than is here possible.)

III. Virtue.

rtue we may call the positive mastery of evil, e previous process of repentance ends in the ive mastery thereof, which gives the ability virtuous, the potentiality but not the reality. e implies Evil, the negative of Good, yet the inhibition of Evil, the power over it gh the Will.

e may give the same thought a somewhat ent turn. Virtue is Free Will, yet Free overcoming the negative of Free Will which Free Will. Such is the process implicitly plicitly taken up into Virtue, which presup-

from Evil to Good constitutes Virtue. Such a habit has been attained through the oft-willed repetition of the process unto Good; it is, nevertheless, a free habit, the only possible free habit, since it has Free Will willing Free Will as its content and end. Such a habit, therefore, does not enslave, but really liberates, making the man truly a free man for the first time, since his Free Will is now absolutely subject to nothing but itself.

It is an interesting fact that one of the oldest poems of the world, the Odyssey, calls itself a Return, and in its deepest depth images this process of virtue. Ulysses is essentially what may be called a Returner, seeking in his long wanderings to get back "to sunny Ithaca and prudent Penelope," to country and family, to his institutional life, from which he had been externally separated and internally alienated by the Trojan War. The poet casts into mythical shapes the many experiences of that Return, which indeed has made the poem one of the great educational books of the race, educating every reader who takes it to heart, into Virtue, specially that form of Virtue which we shall call institutional.

To take another analogy from one of the Literary Bibles of our Occident, the Divine Comedy — Virtue attained is the Paradiso, in contrast with the Purgatorio or the Inferno, through

n in some form the man has to pass with
w in order to reach the great fulfillment.
ere was no other way," says Dante in the
alluded to; the road to Paradise lay
gh the negative or infernal and the purifi-
y or purgatorial realms. Such is, indeed,
omplete movement in the universal man,
ever exceptions there may be in the case of
iduals. But mark! this is not the original
lise of Adam and Eve at the beginning and
nocence; it is the Paradise attained at the
by going through all the fires of negation and
gh all the pangs of repentance. Dante has
formed the Mythus of Paradise by making
t the starting-point but the conclusion "of

special form a return to Good, it is Free Will mastering the negative to Free Will willing Free Will, and asserting the latter positively. When I will my neighbor's freedom as my own, it is a virtuous act, but this is to be not once, but continuously, it is to be my habit, my unconscious soul-movement; I cannot do anything else without a reversal of my nature. Such is the habit of Virtue, which habit, however, is freedom itself, being Free Will which is willing Free Will.

This is, in general, the outcome of the moral Will as Ideal End with its threefold process of Good, Evil, Virtue, of which the last has in itself the return out of Evil to Good, and thus is the total process.

Many have been the attempts to define Virtue by the different writers on Morals. Such definitions undoubtedly have their value, as they tend to bring into relief some phase or side of this much-embracing and elusive term. Also the relation of Virtue to Good has exercised the ingenuity of subtle definers. But we do not believe that mere definition is the method of bringing clearness into this subject; the living process of the thought must be seized and unfolded; the movement of the Ego in the act of Virtue must somehow be set forth, so that Virtue is seen in its own self-development. In other words, the Psychosis is the pulse-beat of Virtue

ell as of Good; Virtue and Good are to be
ped in their own inner process as well as in
process with one another. A dead, process-
definition cannot reproduce the self-active
gizing thought to the thinking subject, who
nself just the self-active Ego.

rtue is the Ideal End perpetually realizing
f; or we may call it self-realization in the
est sense, the supreme end of life is to
ze your best self in conduct. This means
merely the individual self; you are to un-
all the society around you which has
uced you. For you never made yourself
lectually or morally; your institutional

You can realize your best self only through the social organism around you, which has made you possible, and so you must make it possible. You will develop in Virtue according as you take up and develop the institutional spirit. If you rise to a new insight, you must transform not merely yourself, but your institutions according to your new knowledge.

Virtue, then, is a practical matter, having its life in the eternal Now; it is not some future Golden Age, or far-away realization; it is made real by the virtuous deed willing freedom daily, hourly, momentarily. The doing, not the done, has the stress, though the done must not be omitted. Virtue or Good is not stowed away in something which is to be, but lives in its own activity. Nay, it is to descend into the lower realm of our nature and transfigure that; it is to become impulse, desire, motive, and therein make over our whole psychical life, even to the dim borderland of our least developed instincts.

Virtue being supremely the inner development of the Ego, will have the psychical process of the Ego, and will pass through the following main phases.

I. Conception of Virtue — which is Virtue conceived in its essence, revealing itself therein as the habitual overcoming of Evil or of the negation of Free Will. Thus it is the positive willing of the Good or of the self-determined

Will, showing itself in three stages, as
ıct, Knowledge, and Character.

System of Virtues — which unfolds this
eption of Virtue differentiating itself into
fold forms throughout the ages and accord-
› the diverse relations of life. There will
ıe Ancient, Medieval, and Modern Systems,
ıe Heathen, Christian, and Renascent Sys-
, each of which will have its own organiza-
of Virtue.

. The Institutional Virtue — all the Virtues
ck to the one universal Virtue, generating
ame in its fullness, yet generated out of the
. This source as well as end of Virtue is

ative to Free Will; it is the Ego having its own free-acting energy as content of the deed, from the lowest impulse up to the highest rationality. The Conception of Virtue is the soul's primordial creation of Virtue, the generative act of the Ego which calls forth Virtue, and is the original spiritual germ out of which all virtuous conduct grows. This Conception is the creative source, the original virtuous act of the soul, the truly universal Virtue, mother of all the special Virtues. (Note the usage of the word *conception* here, not the modern English one, but that of Shakespeare and the Bible.) It may be said once more that this original germ is laid in the Ego by the institutional world, while the Ego's creative power is shown in unfolding it into the reality of Virtue.

So this Conception of Virtue will have a process, just the process of the Ego, which now we may see passing through its three stages.

1. There is, primarily, Virtue in its most immediate form, as an instinct, feeling, sentiment; as yet it is undeveloped; it has nevertheless the Ideal End of the moral Will, though wrapped up in the bud. This is the undetermined stage, yet capable of determination; man can act virtuously from instinct or sentiment; indeed some writers on Morals have held that this was the original source of moral conduct.

As an instance of this stage we may take the

of the child, which is not blank, as it might
, is not a white sheet of paper upon which
ng and culture can write whatever they
e, though it appears as if nothing were
en upon it; that child-soul is really written
and over as well as through and through in
athetic ink by all past time and all past an-
y; it has all the acquisitions and possibili-
f its race inscribed there in latent symbols,
n require the warming, fostering power of
tion to bring out into reality and visibility.
hought is there, the characters are there,
he very language, still this all has to be
ed, has to be made over, recreated, so to
t by the new citizen of the world, who in-

stand. Such a term is Virtue often, which the full-grown man may not *realize* adequately, though he may unconsciously act from it throughout his life. The child and the man, hearing words coming out of the social environment and expressing the same, are trained by them to an institutional order.

But this instinctive, unconscious state, in which the moral Ego is one with its environing society, must change, must separate within itself and become conscious; it must not only be Virtue, but also must know Virtue — whereat a new phase of the process makes its appearance.

2. Virtue, in the full process of its Conception, will show itself as self-knowing, which is verily the path of wisdom. The Ego as Virtue must know itself as such, in order to mount to higher ways; the universal Virtue is not to be limited to instinctive action, else it were indeed not universal; it must go through the self-separation, which is the condition of knowledge.

Every improvement in knowledge ought to bring with it, does bring with it in the virtuous soul, an improvement in virtue. Thereby you realize your new insight in conduct; but you also realize your limit-transcending spirit which is freedom, this being the true moral realization. The thing attained is just the attaining, is the moral process of the Free Will which continually wills Free-Will. Virtue is the realization of the

hosis (as Free-Will) in action. You must
v, know the excellent, then transcend it, then
this transcending power as your end, as the
perfection of the Self.

was a great epoch in the history of man, the
f epoch in his moral history, when he began
parate Virtue from its immediate instinctive
y in conduct, and to look at it abstractly, as
in itself. Specially the time of the old
k philosophers was such a period, of which
culmination was reached in Socrates, through
n the movement passed to Plato and Aris-
. For all Virtue and all the Virtues are an
raction from the concrete institutional life
he time, and they were to a large extent de-

arisen, and with it a new life, separated from all particularity, a truly universal life. For Virtue, being held apart from its particular manifestation, is imageless, an abstract term; then it is also universal, being thus elevated out of the particular. From this fact it comes that moral science is imageless, abstract, universal, and is the expression of an inner universal life of the Ego.

Still the self-knowing Ego as Virtue, having wisdom, cannot remain within its own internality, but as truly universal, must go forth into the world and again do the deed, which is not now its instinctive working, as in the first stage, but is its self-conscious, purposed activity.

3. Virtue as character has both sides, knowing and doing, the inner wisdom and the outer realization in conduct, in the deed. The virtuous character is the Ego not only willing the Good or the Ideal End, but also aware of itself having such an End and so being virtuous. Still in such a character wisdom likewise becomes a habit, a kind of unconscious activity, which, however, is no longer a merely natural instinct, but a habit which has wisdom in it determining the total man. Such is the wise man, doing and knowing, uniting the practical and theoretical, action and knowledge, in the conduct of life. In a character of the present elevation, there is no divorce between Will and Intellect, or between practice and theory.

now, as such a character knows itself, s what constitutes its inmost nature, it can hat it is, it can impart itself to others not by example but also by speech; thus it be- an expositor and promulgator of its own ce; in other words, it becomes a teacher of e. It refuses to be cooped up in speculation or in action alone; the virtuous character share its good, and help transform the world s own image; by its own inner necessity it t rest till it makes others like itself.

virtuous character does the virtuous thing hinks the virtuous thought; but what is greater, it imparts itself as universal, as not alone by example, but in the univer-

acters in our Occident have towered over all others, Socrates and Christ, who have been the exemplars and the teachers of the moral life, as well as of its science. Each has had his special sphere of Virtue, the one developing that of secular life, the other that of religious life. From both issue streams which have poured down through time and which are still fructifying our own moral life in the present.

But this suggestion brings us to a new fact: this one character being the embodiment and realization of Virtue as universal, must act in the world, must relate itself to the particular affairs of the world, that is, it must differentiate itself into many activities, each of which is filled with Virtue and indeed is a Virtue. Thus the stage of separation enters the present sphere, the universal Virtue or its Conception divides itself up into many Virtues, all of which, however, have in them something of the common principle. Thus while raying out in every direction into the practical world, they can be organized, having this principle of order.

II. THE SYSTEM OF VIRTUES. We have accordingly come to the stage of separation in the sphere of Virtue, in which the one Virtue differentiates itself into many Virtues. This is a necessary phase in the development of the Ego; particularly does it spring from the Ego as Will, which has to act in all the diverse relations of life,

thus, as virtuous, has to manifest itself in
e relations, which take the form of special
ues. The virtuous character acting realizes
f in deeds; from such deeds the Ego ab-
ts this character, which is thereby an
raction and is named a Virtue, and is fur-
more knowable in its universal nature.

gain we must emphasize the truth that the
ice of Morals deals in abstractions necessarily,
must be finally grasped by reflection, by the
ract faculty. Virtue is such an abstraction,
g separated from its living embodiment in
act, and held up by itself for the under-
ling. The same is true of Vice. Such an
f abstraction must be regarded in itself as

plicity of Virtues. One of the leading questions of Ethics is, How shall they be ordered? Or, antecedent to this, can they be ordered? Some writers maintain that they cannot, with any degree of success. Still that would be a very serious surrender of a most important portion of the science. All systematic schemes have their difficulties, but they also have, in general, their merits, which more than counterbalance their drawbacks. In fact, no science of Morals can be complete without some kind of a system of Virtues. Undoubtedly the subject is very complex, as complex as human activity, still it must be capable of an order if mind, of which it is a product, has any such capability. The old Greeks grasped the problem aright on this side, they sought to find the order of the Virtues, and to embody the same in life. We moderns cannot leave out of account their work.

Every age, as is well known, has developed its characteristic Virtue and Virtues, which, once born and realized in the world, have not been lost to man, but have been transmitted as the precious moral inheritance of the spirit, to succeeding ages. To be sure, every such Virtue, unfolded into its primal life in one epoch, takes a different form in another later epoch; for instance, Temperance is not now what it was in the ancient Greek world. One of the functions of the science of morals is to trace this develop-

not only of Virtue but of each single
e; all have gone through the inevitable
tionary process and have been transformed.
ultimate ground of such transformation can
ound only in the movement of the Ego
.

behooves us, therefore, to try to classify
reat moral process of the ages, which has,
speak, precipitated in its passage all the
es now possessed by man, according to
istorical order. This means not merely
outer adjustment to Time, but the inner
ment in Thought, of the Moral Idea. As
y as the new Deed is called for and is

2. The Christian System of Virtues.
3. The Modern System of Virtues.

This last we shall not attempt to develop into anything like a system, inasmuch as it has hardly yet developed itself. Still its outlines may be noted as well as its fundamental Virtue. The Heathen and Medieval Christian Systems, on the contrary, have crystallized themselves into definite shapes, in spite of numerous diverse elaborations. Accordingly we may look at the development of the world's leading Virtues in their historical order.

1. *The Heathen System of Virtues.* This was developed in ancient Greece, specially in Athens by the great Attic philosophers, Socrates, Plato, and Aristotle. Before them a beginning had certainly been made by the Sophists, and after them the development of Moral Science was carried on by the various Schools of Philosophy, particularly by the Stoics and Epicureans. There were many different classifications of the Virtues, but the one which has lasted longest and which has had the most important influence in organizing the moral nature of man, is that of Plato. In his *Republic* he divides the people into classes; in like manner he makes a division of Virtue into four chief Virtues, which have received many names, and are still called often the Cardinal Virtues. These are Wisdom, Courage, Temperance,

ce, and have descended in full force to the nt time, as a valid phase in the ordering of irtues.

this line, then, the science of morality nfolded in a most important aspect. We endeavor to give not merely the abstract tion of these Virtues, but (what is far more icant) their process in itself and with nother, as well as their movement out of ity into the present.

) *Justice.* The great Virtue of the Heathen d was Justice, whose nature was seen by its , and made actual in Law and Institutions. nost famous definition of Justice ever given bably found in the Pandects: *Justitia est*

to be as just to himself as to his neighbor, and as just to his neighbor as to himself.

Justice accordingly implies always the other Ego, and is founded upon the recognition of it as Ego. Justice has primarily this process: (1) this Ego, mine; (2) the other Ego, not mine; (3) the identification of the other Ego as mine in essence, which is their ideal unity. Its symbol from time immemorial is the balance with the two sides which are to be made equal by the Ego weighing or balancing internally. So Zeus, the world's Justiciary, weighs the fates of Troy and Hellas in the Iliad. The Golden Rule is based upon this equality of Egos, which we are commanded to recognize in our conduct.

Justice, therefore, in its pure form is quite identical with Virtue itself, is indeed the universal secular Virtue, something of which manifests itself in every particular Virtue. Justice may be found in Temperance, in Wisdom, in Punctuality, in the sense of Honor. Still it must have its own special manifestation, and so we shall regard it as the return of the Deed to the doer, the treatment of the Ego according to its desert, this desert being measured by what it has willed. I, as just, invoke the equivalent of my Deed upon myself; in like manner, I, as just, invoke the same equivalency upon the other Ego, thus regarding it as identical in essence with mine. Be just; have this process ever present in thy

when thou art dealing with others or with
elf. The return of thy Deed is thy deepest
, and thou must have it, whether thou de-
t it or not; it cannot be refused at last either
within or from without.

stice as the return of the Deed has in it the
e process: it is, first, positive, giving to the
Will the reward of the good; it is, sec-
y, negative, punitory, giving to the bad act
eturn in punishment; thirdly, it is remedial,
intended to be so in the long run, though it
not be so in particular cases, for that de-
s on the individual punished. He may
ne to take the just penalty, and blaspheme
moral order of which Justice is an integral

the soul of the state. There is a World's Justice which takes in hand the nation, scourges and may destroy it, in return for its deeds—so saith History.

Plato in his *Republic* (Book IV.) makes Justice the pervasive Virtue, the fundamental element of all the other Virtues. In a similar thought Aristotle (*Eth. Nic.* Book V. 1. 12) declares Justice to be the most excellent of the Virtues, "perfect, because its possessor is able to exercise it toward another person, and not only in reference to himself." In the Athenian democracy, the citizen, who was a kind of a general judge both in public affairs and in private litigation, had a great field for exercising his sense of Justice. But this individual Justice of Greece was raised out of its subjective capricious condition and made universal and objective in Rome through Roman Law. Yet here too a capricious element entered in the Emperor, who was above the Law. Of this dualism the world has struggled long to free itself, and to bring the ruler also under the law as well as the humblest individual, which final act of Justice seems to be most completely accomplished in the Constitution of the United States. Thus there has been a great development of Justice from the old Greek Republic to the modern American Republic, from the ideal thought of it in those Athenian philosophers to its realization in the institutions of these days.

The fundamental Virtue, Justice, is now ferentiate itself into three leading forms or es which are distinct from itself yet par- of its essence. These are Courage, Tem- ce, Wisdom.

tice, as already said, goes back to the nition of the equivalency of Egos. When justly by you, I recognize your Ego as of worth with mine. When Justice gives you your Deed, it declares your equality with her Egos, who are subject to the same law. e asserts your freedom, it wills the self- mined Free Will. Now this universal e whose end is freedom is going to particu- itself in three forms, each of which will be

(*a.*) There is, first, the immediate impulse on the part of the Ego to rush forth and to defend itself against assault. The response to the external stimulation is direct, instinctive as it were, and gives rise to that phase of Courage which may be called Valor, which, however, being uncontrolled by wisdom, leads to an excess, to recklessness, which must be put down.

(*b.*) There is, secondly, the inhibition of this valorous impulse, which drives outwardly; the blow, seen to be unavoidable, is allowed to take its course. This is the Virtue of Endurance, the other side to Valor; it is the Courage of passivity, of sufferance, and is often greater than the explosive courage of impulse. In an army the soldier must have both, he must be able to make the charge with impetuosity or to stand the charge without fear or panic.

(*c.*) This demands the complete possession of both Valor and Endurance united in a higher Virtue, which we may call Fortitude. Such is the supreme Courage, which accepts pain, misfortune, suffering, but will not let them determine the soul internally; this still asserts its fealty to the moral order, and does not drop down to pessimism or to despair or even to indifference. Nor is this Courage mere Endurance or Stoicism, it is active and works over misfortune into a new life. Old pictures of

tude are Eumæus in the Odyssey, and at his
he Psalmist.

us we note the never-ceasing process of
e in Courage, which is itself a specialized
e, but, being the Psychosis, still further
lizes itself into Valor, Endurance, Forti-
In such fashion Virtue is self-defined —
eparating yet self-unifying.

mperance. Connected with this Virtue is
otion of an inhibition, more or less ex-
, which pertains not so much to an external,
an internal determinant. With Temper-
therefore, the moral world starts in a pro-
ced manner, inhibiting Impulse, Desire,
ce, and all subjective determinations which

terpart and corrective of the sin of determinism, which has been previously considered. Here, too, we shall find a process, which indicates, like that of Courage, the Psychosis.

(*a.*) There is the immediate inhibition of the determinant in the form of appetite, passion, pleasure. Such is the phase of Self-denial, at least in its first crude manifestation, which violently suppresses all gratification. Asceticism, monasticism, and other similar doctrines take this view of Temperance, in which the inhibition is prohibition, and so Self-denial in its excess reaches out toward self-negation. But such conduct is seen to be really intemperate, and destroys what it seeks to further; hence it in turn must be negated, inhibited.

(*b.*) Then Temperance arrives at the inhibition of the inhibition, whereby the Ego possesses the ability to indulge or to stop indulgence. This is not yet the positive, but only the negative mastery of Temperance, the power of permitting or vetoing the determinant. This we may call Self-possession.

(*c.*) But the positive mastery must be directive, is Self-control, which has the power of choosing its determinant in view of the supreme end of freedom. Temperance also must have and must manifest the ideal purpose of all Virtue, which is the realization of Free Will, and this it does in Self-control, which asserts itself over all

rminants, selecting the right one, and inhib-
the rest.

ch is the process of Temperance, the great
ue, which unfolds itself into the cycle of
erate Virtues — Self-denial, Self-possession,
Self-control. For Virtue, partaking of the
re of the Ego, must generate its own varied
s, and reveal a Psychosis of Virtues in its
ement; the Virtues, consonant with the psy-
l activities of the Ego (from which indeed
spring) are not to be picked up at any
t, examined, and then dropped for some-
g else which may happen to turn up. Their
tic relation must be discovered and set forth;
they form a true moral order and unfold

Wisdom. The meaning of the term has not only a practical but also a theoretical side; not without a profound suggestiveness does Wisdom imply the union of Will and Intellect in their highest manifestation. You think the best and you do the best; your best thought and your best deed are one in Wisdom at its best. The wise man is active as in Courage, is self-controlling as in Temperance, and, at the same he sees the Ideal End for which he is active and for which he controls himself. Knowing is doing, and doing is knowing, each having as its content the Good, or at the highest, the ultimate Good, which is freedom.

The wise man, however, is not complete in Wisdom if he stops with himself; he must impart what he has, he must share his treasure, making himself a mediator for others. Of Wisdom it may be said more than of any other spiritual thing, that he alone possesses it who gives it away. Thus he may approach the divine embodiment of Virtue, he becomes the creative source of it, creating a virtuous world by his own fiat. Plato and Aristotle were virtuous men, taught by the discipline of life and of thought to be wise; but Plato and Aristotle as makers and expounders of the System of Virtues, imparting the same to their own age and to future ages, have a new supreme Virtue, that of Wisdom, for

e, Wisdom eternal, union of the universal
ht and Deed.

shall find that Wisdom, like all Virtue,
s process, which may be given as fol-

There is, first, a native Wisdom, quite
tive, the gift of nature, implicit as yet in
o, not aware of itself, though active. Its
is immediate, its knowledge intuitive; this
natural foundation upon which the final
eted structure is reared. For there must
he individual a potential wisdom, which is
made real, an original bent that way which
itself unconsciously.

Then there is a worldly Wisdom so-called,

persons are often called and their Virtue may also be named Prudence, an inferior Wisdom, though by no means to be despised, for without it even the philosopher, gifted with his higher Wisdom, is apt to get wrecked.

Manifestly Prudence (or wordly Wisdom), both in its positive and in its inhibitory forms shows Wisdom divided, cut up, applied to a multiplicity of ends and means, and of finite relations generally. It calculates, weighs, judges, and then acts, though sometimes it also works in the manner of an instinct. Such is the separative stage of Wisdom, which, however, is ultimately one and has one end.

(*c.*) The third stage is the Wisdom which may be called philosophic; it has insight into the ultimate end and acts from the highest point of view, in contrast with worldly Wisdom, and also in contrast with native Wisdom, which acts unconsciously in harmony with the ultimate end. Still the unconscious and the conscious Wisdom have in common the one ideal purpose or content, which is the realization of Free Will. But you do not realize your best Self in the best way till you have imparted your best to others and made them best too; thus they become wise men imparting Wisdom.

Such is the Psychosis of Wisdom as a Virtue, in which thought reinforces action, in which reason clarifies conduct. Each stage by itself

be regarded as a Virtue; thus we have an-
garland of three Virtues — native Wisdom
ediate Vision), worldly Wisdom (Prud-
, philosophic Wisdom (Insight), all
hich, however, constitute one process of
om.

) It is manifest that the three Virtues above
orth — Courage, Temperance, Wisdom —
a Psychosis in themselves, they belong to-
r in one process, they intermingle and flow
her. Hence comes the frequent statement
hey have no hard-and-fast bounds against
another; each is a part of the other, yet
lf, also. This finds its ground in the fact

We may indicate in brief outline the fact that the three mentioned Virtues form a Psychosis. Courage is more the immediate, positive stage, corresponding to the direct fiat of the Will. Temperance on the other hand suggests more the inhibitory element, thus indicating the second or separative, negative stage. Wisdom holds in itself the mastery over the immediate and the inhibitory, or the positive and the negative stages through its intellectual element, which, however, utters itself in action, thus showing a return to the positive fact of Courage. Still each of these forms plays into the other, not being crystallized into hard lines, but being itself a full process of the Ego and thus a new Psychosis.

Justice, which returns to the doer the equivalent of his Deed, becomes a conscious principle in Wisdom, and thereby completes its movement. The doer can now have within himself the total process of Justice, he knows his own inadequate act, punishes it (repentance), and is restored out of his negative condition to harmony with the moral order.

2. *The Christian System of Virtues.* The Ego now has its own inner process of Justice, being culprit, judge, punisher, or rewarder, returning his own deed on himself. Thus he internally satisfies the Law and the Lawgiver, who grants to him pardon, forgiveness, freedom, whose principle is, therefore, merciful, seeking penitence

lvation for the finite man. Thus the nega-
ide of Justice is negated, and the human
, though a transgressor, can be saved, can
imself, in a new World-Order with its new
ple of Mercy or Love. Such is Christen-
n contrast to Heathendom with its Justice.
istendom, therefore, will have its own set
rtues, with its own central Virtue, which
e called in this its most general form, Love.
endom, however, does not set aside or de-
Justice, it rather preserves the same, keeps
n destroying itself. For the world in its
le had perished by mere Justice, and
n Justice itself must have perished. The

made the fundamental attribute of divinity. God is Love, "he so loved the world that he gave his only-begotten son;" that son, Christ, is Love, revealing its entire process in his life, death, and resurrection; to the Father's and the Son's Love, must be added the Mother's Love in Mary. From this divine source is manifested Love, which man is to appropriate and make the basis of a new order of things, named after its founder and prototype, Christendom. Justice in Heathendom smote the transgressor and smites him still; but now, if within himself he can perform the total process of Justice, and thereby vindicate his own infinite nature, he can be received and restored by Love, having made himself one with God. Love is, therefore, the fulfillment of Justice, the real end and purpose of the Law, which without Love is negative, and becomes, or may become, the destroyer.

The Christian Virtues, like the Heathen Virtues, are an abstraction from concrete life. There was, first, the living embodiment in the act, then came the separation of the Virtue from its outward manifestation whereby it could be known in itself and was made universal. As the Greek philosophers elaborated their System of Virtues, abstracting the same from its unconscious realization in the Heathen world, so the Christian theologians elaborated the moral System of Christendom from the existent reality.

The religious medieval Virtues. These well-known three — Faith, Hope, Charity ve) — often called the theological Virtues, ing been specially worked out by the an Theologians, or as expressing man's n to the Divine, to the unseen world. ll spring out of the universal Christian Love, and are various applications of it; have the process of self-sacrifice and self-y.

are first manifested in the individual and sayings of Christ as reported in the s of the New Testament, which contain n their implicit, unseparated form. Then e theologized, or wrought over into their

Faith. This Virtue in the Christian sense is an act of the Intellect accepting God and the Divine Process in the Trinity, and submitting the Self to His Will. There are many kinds of finite faith or beliefs in the world, but divine Faith has just the Divine for its Content. It is the conviction of Godhood, it beholds, has the celestial vision, and "sees God."

Faith as a moral doctrine regards the ethical order of the world and rests upon its supremacy. It feels and finally sees the great ultimate to be freedom; it holds that the universal Ego as Free Will is forever realizing Free-Will. Such is moral Faith, the grasping of the Divine Spirit as ethical, as willing Free-Will.

Faith has also its process within itself, it is subject to the Psychosis which reveals its deepest nature.

(*a.*) There is, first, the implicit Faith, which has no question, no doubt, no separation. Image and dogma are one, undivided; the Ego is not troubled with their conflict.

(*b.*) Faith explicit, divided, dogmatic; it has become a formula whose content, however, is still the image, the sensuous fact, in which we must believe.

(*c.*) Faith moralized banishes the image and puts in its stead an abstract content; thereby it becomes the conscious reliance on the moral order which is to realize to man his Free-Will.

pe. The Virtue of Hope as conceived by hristian mind is well defined in one of the nces of Peter Lombard: *Est enim Spes expectatio futuræ beatitudinis veniens ex ratia et meritis precedentibus.* Hope is of ture, and of all time; Hope is an act of which relates to the individual hoping; my affirms a Divine Order, my Hope believes I, this individual, will be saved in that e Order. God exists (Faith), and so man be saved (Hope).

rally my Hope is that I, willing the good is freedom, will have the good imparted to y the supreme order. Here, too, we may d a process in Hope

son as its content or object. If we love God who loves man, we are led through him to love humanity, indeed to realize in ourselves the Divine Process of Love, which in the supreme sense of the word is Charity. Thus Charity transforms its follower into the image of God, and makes that follower a second Providence in his sphere, manifesting love and providential care for his fellow-man. This Virtue like the others has its process.

(*a.*) There is the immediate stage of Charity, which springs from the direct imitation of the Divine Person in his earthly career. His actions are followed with more or less literalness, and so the believers in him become charitable through imitation.

(*b.*) Charity must be theologized, that is, separated from its embodiment, and held up by itself as a doctrine, which is to be grasped abstractly, yet as having its sanction from the Divine Exemplar.

(*c.*) Charity will also be moralized, whereby the individual is to make himself into a kind of moral order for the world around him, doing works of benevolence and especially willing and establishing Free Will for his fellow-man as the greatest gift possible.

It has always been felt that these three religious Virtues — Faith, Hope, Charity — stand in deep kinship with one another, so that all

are often spoken of together, as if making
ne grand cycle of Christian Virtue. They
estionably show that process which we have
equently called the Psychosis. Faith is the
diate stage, showing the direct acceptance
e Divine Person by the Ego as a fact, the
dered seeing of Him by the soul in the
nt. Hope implies the separation between
go and the Divine into the Present and the
re, yet it also aspires for the unity between
wo; and hence is "the future expectation
essedness." Charity is this unity realized
and now, on earth; I become one with God
gh Charity; I, loving God who loves man,
up Him into myself along with His love

sprung of the Ego, must show the latter's complete movement; thus each is all, though it be a part likewise. Lines absolutely fixed, definitions rigidly laid down, cannot be imposed upon the free spirit, which is at home only in its own process. The Ego must generate its Virtues in moral science as well as in moral life.

(2.) *The secular medieval Virtues.* The great dualism of the Middle Ages was the separation into the religious and secular worlds, of which the latter was at first subordinate to the former, then an equal conflicting antagonist, then triumphant. The Ego, being separated from the Church, that is, from the religious mediation with the Divine, falls back upon itself, and determines itself quite apart from its institutional relations. For the realm of secular institutions had declined from its ancient and had not yet risen to its modern validity; the ecclesiastical overshadowed the secular organism; State and Family were indeed tolerated, but the true life was the religious life. This great historical movement of a thousand years produced its own peculiar class of Virtues, derived from the Ego, which when out of the sphere of the Church, was left to itself, having no other content but itself, if deprived of its religious world. The result is, we witness an intensely subjective principle the moment we pass outside of the devotion to the Church.

e Knight is thus quite the opposite of the , the latter yields up absolutely his Ego to rvice and the glory of God, the former per- his service from a profound sense of his elfhood and its infinite worth.

e Knight takes his starting-point from his and acts from an overwhelming and some- distressful reverence for himself, which he his personal Honor. Now this self-rever- is a good quality within its limits, but it has y some dangers. Being so purely subjec- it is expo-ed to all the caprices, notions, antastic turns of the Ego, and therein dis- s in its own unreality. (See Don Quixote, *m*).

and ever to remain so, which place their stress upon the infinite worth of the Person.

Of these Virtues of Chivalry we can distinguish three leading ones, which are the parents of many others, yet they form one cycle of chivalrous Virtue. These are Honor, Loyalty, Love (romantic).

Honor. This is the most immediate Virtue of Chivalry, expressing the reference and the subjection of all external relations whatever to the inner Self. Everything in the world in the way of action the Ego is to determine as consistent or inconsistent with its conception of Honor, that is, of itself. The Knight is a warrior and fights for his religion or his country; still back of these he is fighting for his Honor, and in all that he does there is this reference to his own subjectivity, this intimate internal relation to himself. Thus he asserts the primal independence of the Ego, and makes it the inner secret tribunal of all his conduct. It is his true Holy of Holies, the sanctuary of his spirit, which he deems his first duty to keep inviolable. To it he makes the sacrifice of the whole outer existence of himself, for the sake of its sanctity he may defend the sanctity of the Church or of the State, or may not. He is in love with his own Ego as he loves God; he venerates himself as he might venerate a deity. Thus his secularity turns about and yet retains his religiosity.

nor is roused by many different objects, or
s manifold stimulants which cause it to
e diverse forms. Herein we may observe
ocess.

) Honor is first in immediate unity with its
ous world, or also with its secular institu-
life. The Knight goes on a crusade for
ake of his Church, deeming it a point of
to do so; he will also battle for his State
is Family for the same reason. There is as
o separation between his subjective Self
ts injunction, and the behest of the relig-
r political institution. Still this separation
e to come, as it lies in the very nature of

Loyalty. This Virtue involves the Will of another, the lord or the sovereign, to which the Ego now subordinates itself and thus gives up its own Will in appearance. Yet this surrender of Self is simply to another similar Self, which asserts its own subjectivity in like fashion, whose Virtue is Honor, and will recognize and protect the Honor of the vassal. Thus the mutual personal service of feudalism comes to light, the Knight devotes himself to his lord personally, not to the State or to some great cause which the latter represents. Thus each finds the reflection of himself in the other, which fact constitutes the reciprocal bond. In this Virtue we may note the following movement: —

(*a.*) There is the immediate unity between the two Egos, the vassal and the lord, each respecting and defending the other's Honor as his own. If that Honor is assailed in the one, it is in the other, and personal Loyalty is called upon to make defense.

(*b.*) Still the breach between the two Egos is bound to make itself felt in time, since each is the determinant of its own Honor. The lord or the vassal may do a wicked act, thereby religion may conflict with Loyalty. Which is the loyal vassal to obey, the Church or the Sovereign, in case of a collision between the two authorities? Such a question often arose in the Middle Ages, the wars in consequence form no small

on of medieval history. The Loyalty, how-
which clings to the person who is in deep
or is guilty of positive wrong, begins to
itself.

) Loyalty, therefore, must go back to the
of the two Egos, and base itself upon their
g a worthy end as their content, and not
y upon a common empty subjectivity.
I can be loyal to the man who has a noble
ose in life, and he can return Loyalty to me
knight or vassal, who will serve him faith-
in the fulfillment of his purpose. Loyalty
be fully moralized by putting into it the
end of freedom, which thus becomes the
nding loyal souls.

the man and the woman, the lord and lady, who surrender and recover each other through each other without passing through the breach, possibly at first sight.

(*b.*) But many things occur to break up this harmony and to separate the two Egos. These are known in the drama and novel and in other kinds of literature which deal with this theme as the collisions of Love. "The course of true love never did run smooth," says Shakespeare; the other relations of life assert themselves strongly against this emotion, which may conflict with its own institution, the Family.

(*c.*) Love, even romantic Love, can only preserve itself by realizing its true end in the institution. The lord must have just this lady and none other, and she must have just this lord and none other; thus each Ego asserts its absolute right; still this emotion must find its true outcome not merely in its enjoyment of itself but in the Family. I am not to love another man's wife, for thus I assail the very purpose of Love, which is to help realize the moral life of man.

From what has been said it is manifest that these three secular Virtues — Honor, Loyalty, Love — of the medieval period form a Psychosis which may be seen in the following way of connecting them in thought. Honor is the Ego turning back upon itself and making itself the determiner of conduct and therein asserting its

infinite worth. Loyalty is the Ego as in-
r or vassal subordinating itself to another
which is superior, the lord; thus the Egos
eparated by an external relation, yet inter-
both are united by the one principle of
r, which both possess. Love is the over-
ng of all separation between the two Egos,
of different sexes, which immolate them-
s to each other, yet recover themselves and
ne completely one in feeling and thought
gh such mutual sacrifice.

) *The central medieval Virtue.* We have
back to the central Christian Virtue, which
ve already designated as Love. This Virtue
oped to its fullness during the Middle Ages,

religious and secular form — Charity and Romantic Love. Just as the Christian medieval world was dualized into Church and Laity, so its fundamental Virtue divided itself into the two leading Virtues, which still further reproduced themselves in many other special Virtues according to the relations of life.

Love as Charity was the sacrifice of Self to the Divine Ideal and to its institutional organism, culminating in the individual making himself the dispenser of Love to others, as God does. So the lover unites himself with the deity, and becomes the latter's embodiment and providential agent.

Love as secular (romantic) was also the sacrifice of Self, but to another person of the opposite sex, who now takes the place of God and Church, in reflecting Love back to the one who loves. Thus romantic Love fills the woman with the Divine Ideal, of which she is the representative or substitute. Each side, the lover and the lady-love, becomes the Divine Ideal to each other, which is thus divided and incorporated in two living persons.

Love as institutional breaks up the medieval idea at last, since it has as its end the Family which it realizes and sanctifies. Love finds its corresponding institution and so turns away from the Church with its monasticism and celibacy. So it returns to institutional life, but to a

ar one, yet in such return keeps its religion
s romanticism, marriage being sealed by
Church on the one hand and by the mutual
ion of the individuals on the order.

e dualism between romantic Love and the
utional bond is what furnishes perhaps the
strange and enigmatic fact in the life of
e. His romantic Love was for Beatrice
nari whom he almost deifies, placing her in
en and making her his guide through the
liso. But his wife was Gemma Donati, the
er of his six children; yet he never men-
her in any of his works. This apparent
adiction in his life has always puzzled
rn readers of his poem, who find it difficult

ters some kind of obstacle, get married, and thus realize their Love, which may have been and may continue to be very romantic. Moreover, Shakespeare throws the chief burden of Love's conflict upon the woman, who has to mediate the conflict in some way, and vindicate the right of Love as institutional. She wills the home, the Family, as her world, and hence is the chosen mediatrix of its collisions.

But with Love, the central Virtue of medieval Christendom, taking a secular institutional content and becoming the means for that, we have receded out of the religious and secular world of the Middle Ages. When Love finds its true and supreme end in the Family, and subordinates its devotion to that institution, the age of ecclesiasticism and of chivalry and of monasticism is passing away. A new time begins which will call to life new Virtues and transform the old ones into its spirit.

3. *The Modern System of Virtues.* This has by no means rounded itself off as yet to the fullness and completeness of the two preceding Systems (Heathen and Medieval Christian). The modern Theory of Ethics shows a vast uncertain groping, with struggling pangs, not unlike birth throes; but the science will not get itself born somehow, and settle down to an ordered organic life. Doubtless such a condition is a phase of the moral process now going on, showing a de-

led contrast with the circumscribed, but com-
eted, Systems of former epochs.

Still we may draw with becoming modesty a
w outlines in this fermenting mass of old Vir-
es transforming themselves and of new Virtues
ginning to be.

That which we call the modern spirit gets its
ain character from the great movement known
the Renascence, which was a return to an-
quity with its culture, a revival of the Heathen
orld. Yet it was Christendom which made this
turn to Heathendom; it was the Christian spirit
hich went back and communed fraternally
th the Classic spirit. In art, science, literature,
ere was a wonderful rejuvenescence; in Morals

we have in knowledge and civilization, we must make him a responsible being before punishing him for violating his responsibility. Humanity is thus underlying and continually modifying Justice, yet not doing away with it by any means. Hence, too, arises on the other hand modern sentimentality, whose tendency is, not to deepen and transfigure the conception of Justice, but to destroy it utterly, and to let the guilty go free.

2. The Supreme Christian Virtue of Love will undergo a change, transcending its narrow medieval boundary and making itself universal. When the Christian no longer confines his Love to the good Christian brother, but can also love the good Heathen as a brother, the brotherhood of man has dawned in his soul, the ideal of a common humanity has begun to work, and the conception of a universal good has started to transfigure the moral character.

Here, too, undoubtedly a negative element may enter. The return to Heathendom, which is all right, may become a relapse to Heathendom, which is all wrong. The narrow Christian, dropping backwards, runs the danger of turning to a narrow Heathen; thus there is no regeneration, but degeneration. In the actual Renascence, many were heathenized, even Popes and Cardinals; the Renascence called forth its angelic Virtue, but also it begat its devil (Mephistopheles). The Heathen world perished through

n inner insufficiency and corruption; yet it
d always will have a wonderful transform-
wer, which makes it the great source of all
al Renascence or New Birth.

The distinctively modern Virtue may be
Humanitarianism, in spite of the fact that
ot yet by any means realized in individual,
or society. Even warfare is usually
ined, confined, and sometimes brought to
l by humane considerations. There is an
movement of humanity now asserting itself
st hearts throughout the civilized world.
erely to civilize but to humanize the peo-
s at present the moral process working

reponding industrial Virtue, which realizes the highest Self in labor. When you perform an act or make a thing, there is to be no slight, no skimping; you must not tell a falsehood in your product, which you easily can; you must show justice in your daily task, justice to the purchaser who is your fellow-man; you must manifest love in your work, love of mankind, realizing your best Self in whatever you do. Every thrust of the laborer's spade, every prick of the tailor's needle may have in it a lie or the truth and the whole truth.

Thus in modern life the Christian Virtues have had to undergo a process, as well as the Heathen Virtues; they are becoming secularized more and more, or humanized into new forms of Virtue, which have, however, their roots in the old.

But Humanitarianism will develop limitations quite like those which we noticed in Benevolence. The Love of Humanity can become so broad that it flattens out the Love of the Individual. The exceedingly humane person has been known to neglect family, society, and country, in the ardent pursuit of philanthropy. This is not incidental, but inherent. The purely philanthropic man or woman has a tendency to become anti-institutional — if not hostile to, at least neglectful of, institutions which secure Free Will. The Ideal End, the Supreme Good of man is freedom, and true Humanitarianism must

t have this as its content and thus become utional.

t just thereby another and higher Virtue, d the highest, begins to manifest itself. Love of Humanity must be transmuted into e of Human Freedom, and of that world secures such Freedom. The supreme duty an toward mankind must seek to realize in ct and to embody in life the supreme End, o develop a supreme Virtue, the source as s the object of all Virtues.

or the Heathen System of Virtues the best rity is ancient Plato in the *Republic*. For hristian system of Virtues the best source is

would have been a greater work, great as it now is. It may be here added that Green has brought into currency that lofty ethical category *perfection*, or *perfect self-realization*, which is the ultimate moral End. Sometimes he almost interprets this word as meaning the Will willing Free Will, thus giving to it a definite content; but for the most part he keeps the simple category, which in itself is indefinite and vague, as he himself states. As to the medieval secular Virtues, Hegel in his *Aesthetic*, *Band II*, has a very suggestive account, which has furnished us with important hints.)

III. Institutional Virtue. We now pass out of the multiplicity of Virtues to their restoration to unity, to that Virtue which is the unification of all Virtue, which we shall call institutional. If Virtue, as already defined, is the habit of willing Free Will in general, Institutional Virtue is the habit of willing that actualized world which is to return and to will Free Will.

Every individual is born not only into a physical, visible world, but into an invisible world of Institutions which from his very infancy he takes up into his action. There is a societary system around each human being, it is the body of customs domestic, social, political, religious, reaching down even to external etiquette, which he is to assimilate into his spiritual organism, thus nourishing the unseen body of his social life.

w the great object and end of these Insti-
ns is to make the individual a free man in
ighest sense of the term, for if he is free
ust be virtuous, not capricious, not negative.
institutional world comes back to man and
his freedom. On the other hand, man is to
dy in spirit and in conduct just this institu-
l Will; then he can be said to have insti-
nal Virtue. It is true that the entire moral
ess as unfolded hitherto has had such an end,
very special Virtue finds its consummation
s outcome, though the person exercising it
not be aware of the fact.
is manifest that the particular Virtue, what-
it be, presupposes a world outside of itself

tions may be said to suckle the born child with its mother-milk of the social life; its image might be that of Diana genetrix with her million breasts giving her own vital forces to earth's children.

The individual of Good Will, therefore, is to will this institutional order at which he has been suckled into freedom, and whose object is to suckle the rising generation as he has been suckled, giving him his education, the opportunity for his career, security for his work; even truth for his brain and religion for his heart are furnished him by this order, and he must give them all back again through his Free Will. Thus he has Institutional Virtue — Righteousness. He must not only will the Right, but must will what wills the Right. If he wills simply the Right, his neighbor can will the same, and yet both may be wholly different in their acts; yea, may fall into bitter conflict. Both indeed will the Right, but they must will what wills the Right for both, which is just the sphere of Institutions. The destiny of the virtuous man is not only to be right (subjectively), but be righteous (objectively).

To be sure, the Ego as Free Will can ignore or assail this institutional order. Thus the man becomes negative, he is like the infant that falls out with and scratches or smites the breast which suckles it; he may even try to slay his own

, guilty, like another Nero, of spiritual
de. Often people of good intentions are
stitutional in conduct; they may have hon-
onscientiousness, devotion to a good cause,
ny other Virtues, still they may not have
stitutional Virtue, which responds with
nd will to the Institution when it makes
. Such persons may have a strong sense
tness but not of righteousness; thus they
just thing individually, not universally;
erely through their personal Will willing
t but also through the institutional Will
the Just, do they reach up to the Justice
.

ked at from this point of view, no man can

trained to Institutional Virtue. The school is in the true sense of the word an institution, and is the greatest of all trainers to an institutional life. The child coming into the school feels the order and adjusts himself to it, he breathes its atmosphere, and it becomes ingrown into his being. He is to become a Free Will which wills Free Will, and he is to make a start for that goal down in the primary grade. The teacher is the supreme man in his calling who can make the pupil realize in spirit and in conduct that the school organism with all its regulations is to give freedom. Thus when the pupil obeys the behest of the school, he is to feel that such obedience comes back to himself and secures his liberty, and without it he could not have liberty. In this way, too, he is trained to be the free citizen of a free country, that is, a country whose institutions have as their expressed object the safeguarding and asserting of Free Will. Such an Institutional Virtue he must acquire at first unconsciously, but the teacher is to possess this Virtue consciously, as a fundamental principle of his pedagogics, and is to apply the same in his instruction with knowledge.

As Institutional Virtue is the third stage in the general Psychosis of Virtue, we have to see in it the return to the first stage, while remaining itself. It will manifest its own process, which will be seen to be similar to that unfolded pre-

sly under the head of the Conception of
ue.

There is, first, the immediate form of
itutional Virtue, when the Ego is one
the ethical life of the community. Such a
on wills the public morality of his people
nsciously, he lives in instinctive unity with
order around him; he is in this respect the
nt drawing his nourishment from invisible
maternal fountains, whose milk-drops seem
ll from Heaven.

'e have often noticed this immediate stage in
course of the present work, and it is never to
eft out, if we would grasp the total process.
as noticed in Natural Goodness, it was

ling, must come to an end, as the baby has at last to be weaned from and by its own mother.

Thus we can have a continuous development in this form of Virtue. Through knowledge and specially Self-knowledge, the Ego is perpetually limit-transcending; when it knows its bounds, it is already beyond them, in knowing if not in doing. Then this improved knowledge is not simply to stay locked up in the Intellect, but is to pass over into the Will and become improved conduct. Thus Virtue is or ought to be always advancing itself through insight. Every little piece of knowledge you acquire renders you more responsible before God and man. You are now (it may be supposed) getting an increased acquaintance with the Institutional World; such an acquaintance means little, unless you are also getting a proportionate increase in Institutional Virtue, which comes only through your own personal resolution and effort.

It is true that the Ego may, on good grounds, fall out with the morality of its time and country. Here, too, it must show itself limit-transcending, seeking to elevate the moral standard of the age and helping to transform the institution in accordance with that standard. Again we say that knowledge must realize itself in conduct, and thus reach its true fruition in character — wherewith we have reached the next stage.

3. The institutional character is the grand ob-

f ethical attainment, the goal toward which
oral process has been incessantly moving.
a character has not only the insight into the
of institutions, but also the never-failing
y which realizes this insight in life. The
s Free Will is now consciously to will
ized Free Will (the Institutional World) and
ever creating it anew in accord with the
ever-developing, limit-transcending spirit.
s the Wisest Man, the Philosopher of all
ophers, building not merely a free inner
for himself, but a free outer world for him-
nd his people.

much as he knows the excellent, he can
his knowledge and make others as good

Virtue, embracing as it does all institutions; not simply holiness or the Holy Life, which is apt to confine itself to the religious institution, the Church. The Holy Life is a very lofty and worthy ideal, still we have to think of it with its medieval, ecclesiastical connotation, which makes it neglectful of and even antagonistic to secular institutional life, that of the Family, State, Society. The holy man is supposed to retire from the secular world and to devote himself to the cultivation of religious Virtue. But such an existence is now felt to be narrowing; the very object of religion is to go forth and to transform what is not religious. Institutional Virtue is the underlying soul of every Virtue, both secular and religious, the universal Virtue, which is the generative energy of all particular Virtues.

If we glance backwards and consider the movement hitherto unfolded, we find that the Ego has now embodied or realized in itself — in its thought and conduct — the self-determined Free Will. It has completely mediated its own individual Free Will through the actual Free Will objectified in institutions; it wills its own Free Will, not subjectively and capriciously through itself, but through a world whose object is to secure all Free Will, in which, therefore, all can be free. Acting in such a way

th such a light, the Ego possesses Institu-
Virtue.

realm of institutions embraces not merely
tate, but also Family, Society, Church —
, both the secular and the religious Insti-
l World. And this is not all, it likewise
ces Art, Science, and Philosophy, which
und together in thought and form a part
se of the great institutional movement of
Hence the State often assists Art, Science,
s, these being the institutional element
is to reflect institutions, and so demanding
tion.

Moral Will, seeking to realize the Ideal

next to become explicit, and to reveal itself objectively in its own forms, whose grand object is to secure Free Will.

Moral Science, therefore, ends in a strong aspiration which seems to utter itself in a loud call for a new Science, namely the Science of Institutions.

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